G.R. No. L-16970 - Bello vs. Ferdo

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-16970)

Procedural History and Material Dates

The record showed that Fernando received a copy of the summary judgment on April 28, 1959. Fernando then filed a motion for reconsideration on May 22, 1959, which the trial court denied on June 17, 1959. A copy of the order denying the motion was served on Fernando on June 24, 1959.

On the same day, June 24, 1959, and six days before the expiration of his time to appeal, Fernando filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension of thirty (30) days within which to submit his record on appeal and appeal bond, citing “heavy pressure of work from other cases” on the part of counsel. On July 1, 1959, one day after the thirty-day period for appeal had expired, Fernando received a copy of the trial court order dated June 26, 1959, denying the motion for extension. Nevertheless, Fernando filed his record on appeal and appeal bond only on July 8, 1959. Later, on July 25, 1959, the trial court disapproved the record on appeal and appeal bond on the ground that its decision had already become final and executory.

Aggrieved, Fernando filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari on September 23, 1959, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the motion to extend the time for appeal and in disapproving the record and appeal bond. The Court of Appeals found the petition meritorious and, on February 29, 1960, rendered judgment nullifying the trial court’s order disallowing Fernando’s appeal and ordering that the appeal be given due course. From that judgment, Ferrer appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues Raised on Appeal

The principal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in disapproving Fernando’s appeal. Related to this were the questions whether Fernando’s appeal was timely under the governing procedural rules, whether the filing of a motion for extension suspended the running of the appeal period, whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the extension, and whether Fernando’s circumstances justified relief from the time requirements imposed by law.

The Parties’ Positions

Ferrer maintained that the trial court correctly disapproved Fernando’s record on appeal and appeal bond because the documents were filed out of time, and that the Court of Appeals improperly concluded that grave abuse of discretion attended the trial court’s actions. Ferrer also invoked controlling doctrine that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege, exercisable only in the manner prescribed by law, and that the appeal period is indispensable for preventing delays and for the orderly discharge of judicial business.

Fernando, through his certiorari petition below, insisted that the trial court’s denial of his motion to extend and the subsequent disapproval of his record and bond amounted to grave abuse. He sought relief by relying on the alleged difficulty in preparing the record and bond, including the asserted “pressure of work from other cases” and logistical considerations tied to counsel’s work and the location of the required filing.

Supreme Court’s Ruling on Grave Abuse of Discretion

The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in finding grave abuse of discretion. It ruled that the trial court did not commit an actionable error in disapproving the appeal for being filed outside the period fixed by the rules.

The Court reiterated that the right to appeal is not a natural right nor part of due process. It is a statutory privilege that must be exercised in the manner and according to the provisions of law. The Court cited Aguila vs. Navarro, 55 Phil. 898 and Santiago vs. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397 for this proposition.

Timeliness Under Rule 41 and Jurisdictional Consequences

The Court applied Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which requires that the notice of appeal, the appeal bond, and the record on appeal be filed in court and served on the adverse party within thirty (30) days from notice of judgment, with the period deducting the time when a motion for reconsideration is pending. The Court emphasized that compliance with the prescribed appeal period was absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to ensure the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. It also held that if the period is not complied with, the judgment becomes final and executory and the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal. The Court cited Altavas Conlu vs. C. A., 106 Phil. 940 and 60 Off. Gaz., [35] 5324, and doctrinal cases including Layda vs. Legaspi, 38 Phil. 83; Pampolina vs. Suiza, 12 Phil. 99; Caisip vs. Cabangon, L-14684, Aug. 26, 1960.

On the facts, the Court found no dispute that Fernando’s record on appeal and appeal bond were filed out of time. While Fernando had filed a motion to extend the period, the Court ruled that such a motion does not suspend the running of the appeal period. It relied on Escolin vs. Garduno, 57 Phil. 924; Government vs. Abad, 66 Phil. 504; Alejandro vs. Endencia, 64 Phil. 321; Capinpin vs. Hon. Ysip, Aug. 31, 1959, L-14018. The Court explained that the purpose of a motion for extension is only to ask for an enlargement of the time fixed by law. As such, the movant has no right to assume that the motion will be granted, and must check the outcome within the remaining appeal time. If the motion is denied, the appellant must still perfect the appeal within the remaining period.

Assessment of Fernando’s Conduct and the Trial Court’s Dispatch

The Supreme Court addressed Fernando’s explanation that he received the denial of his extension only on July 1, 1959, one day after the thirty-day period had expired. It noted that Fernando set his motion for extension “for resolution immediately upon receipt thereof,” and that the trial court acted with dispatch. The trial court denied the motion two days after receipt on the rationale that the pleadings needed for the record were few and that there was no reason why the defendant could not have completed the record within the thirty-day period, excluding the time during which the motion for reconsideration was pending.

The Court nonetheless faulted Fernando for failing to take steps to verify the status of his motion while his time to appeal was still running. The Court held that a litigant cannot demand preferential treatment from court officials, absent special arrangements, to ensure early receipt of the order before the expiration of the period. The Court further observed that even after Fernando received the order one day after the expiration of the appeal period, he still waited seven days before filing the record on appeal and appeal bond on July 8, 1959. This delay reinforced the Court’s conclusion that his appeal was correctly disallowed.

No Justifiable Reason to Extend the Appeal Period

The Court also reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Fernando’s motion to extend. It agreed with the trial court that there were only very few pleadings to be included in the record, and that therefore there was no reason Fernando could not have filed the record on appeal within the eight days remaining at the time he filed his motion for extension.

The Court rejected Fernando’s claim that “pressure of work from other cases” justified an extension. It reasoned that the thirty-day period already assumes that counsel’s attention may be demanded by other cases. The Court found the asserted ground insufficient to relax compliance with the time requirements.

The Court further disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ view that time was needed to prepare and file the appeal bond because Fernando resided in Angat, Bulacan, counsel had his office in Manila, and the bond had to be deposited or filed in Lingayen, Pangasinan. The Supreme Court held that Fernando only needed to deposit P60 in cash with the Pangasinan court, or alternatively send an appeal bond by registered mail. It reasoned that even under the Court of Appeals’ premise, Fernando could have done either act within the remaining six days when he filed his motion

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-16970)

The controversy arose from an appeal by certiorari filed by Valentin A. Fernando in the Court of Appeals after the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan had disapproved his record on appeal and appeal bond for being filed out of time.
Eusebio E. Ferrer (plaintiff in the trial court) sought reversal by appeal in this Court of the Court of Appeals decision that had nullified the trial court’s disallowance of Fernando’s appeal.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s orders that disapproved the appeal and denied the request for extension.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Eusebio E. Ferrer appealed to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals decision in C.A. G.R. No. 25203-R, which had given due course to Fernando’s appeal.
Valentin A. Fernando was the respondent in this appeal and the petitioner below in the Court of Appeals via certiorari.
The certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleged grave abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Fernando’s motion to extend the period to file the record on appeal and appeal bond, and in disapproving the record and bond.

Key Factual Allegations

In Civil Case No. 13798, Ferrer sued Fernando for damages.
Upon the plaintiff’s motion, the trial court rendered a summary judgment on the ground that there was “really no genuine issue between the complaint and the answer.”
Fernando received a copy of the summary judgment on April 28, 1959.
Fernando filed a motion for reconsideration on May 22, 1959, or 24 days after receiving the judgment.
The trial court denied the motion on June 17, 1959, and served the order of denial on June 24, 1959.
On June 24, 1959, six days before the expiration of the appeal period, Fernando filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension of 30 days to submit the record on appeal and appeal bond, citing “heavy pressure of work from other cases” on the part of counsel.
On July 1, 1959, after the 30-day extension period had already expired, Fernando received a copy of the trial court’s order dated June 26, 1959 denying his motion for extension.
On July 8, 1959, Fernando filed his record on appeal and appeal bond.
On July 25, 1959, the trial court disapproved the record on appeal and appeal bond because the judgment “had already become final and executory.”
On September 23, 1959, Fernando filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion.
On February 29, 1960, the Court of Appeals found the certiorari meritorious, nullified the trial court’s order disallowing the appeal, and ordered that the appeal be given due course.
Ferrer then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Statutory Framework

The Supreme Court treated the right to appeal as not a natural right and not part of due process, but instead a statutory privilege that must be exercised strictly according to law.
The Court applied Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, requiring that the notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal must all be filed and served within thirty days from notice of judgment, with the period deducting the time when a motion for reconsideration was pending.
The Court characterized compliance with this appeal period as absolutely indispensable for preventing delays and for ensuring the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
The Court also invoked the rule that when the prescribed period is not complied with, the judgment becomes final and executory and the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal.

Issues Presented

The primary issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it disapproved Fernando’s appeal for filing beyond the time allowed by Rule 41.
A secondary issue concerned whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Fernando’s motion to extend the time to file the record on appeal and appeal bond.
A further issue concerned whether Fernando’s alleged circumstances, including “pressure of work,” justified relief despite the lapse of the appeal period.

Contentions of the Parties

Ferrer contended that the Court of Appeals wrongly found grave abuse of discretion because the trial court correctly applied the rule that the period for appeal is indispensable and jurisdictional.
Ferrer argued that the record on appeal and appeal bond were filed out of time, and that the judgment therefore became final and executory, leaving no basis for appellate jurisdiction.
Fernando maintained that the trial court’s denial of his motion to extend and its subsequent disapproval of his appeal were unjust and amounted to grave abuse, considering that counsel faced heavy work pressure and that practical circumstances delayed bond-related preparation.

S