A.M. No. 92-7-360-0 - Baylon vs. Sison

Case Summary (A.M. No. 92-7-360-0)

Initiation of the Administrative Complaint and Material Case History

The records showed that on October 24, 1991, the Office of the City Prosecutor in Dagupan City filed an information for double murder against several accused, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. D-10678 and raffled to the respondent judge. On November 8, 1991, the accused filed a petition for reinvestigation, which the trial court granted on November 20, 1991, giving the prosecution until December 23, 1991 to resolve the reinvestigation. The reinvestigation was concluded by the prosecutor on March 31, 1992. A petition for review filed by the accused was later dismissed by the Department of Justice on May 8, 1992.

During the reinvestigation, the accused filed a petition for bail on December 21, 1991, a Saturday, seeking a hearing on December 23, 1991, immediately the following Monday. In an order dated June 8, 1992, the respondent judge later reiterated that he had granted bail “after due hearing and after a careful and deliberate consideration” of the parties’ submissions. The prosecution claimed, however, that the grant was tainted by lack of notice and lack of meaningful participation, and that it effectively preempted the ongoing reinvestigation.

The Contested Bail Hearing and the Grant of Bail

According to the proceedings narrated in the record, the prosecution filed an opposition signed by Third Assistant City Prosecutor Chita Estrella D.N. Bonifacio and noted by First Assistant City Prosecutor Silverio Q. Castillo on June 8, 1992’s described sequence, alleging that (a) the information was based on sworn statements of eyewitnesses constituting clear and strong evidence of guilt of all accused; (b) granting bail would preempt the reinvestigation then pending at the instance of the accused and defeat its purpose; and (c) the accused should wait for the outcome of the reinvestigation before filing motions of the same import.

Notwithstanding these contentions, a bail hearing was purportedly conducted on December 23, 1991 at 1:30 P.M., and the trial court allegedly granted bail for the provisional liberty of each accused in the amount of P40,000.00, reportedly based on a joint counter-affidavit, an affidavit of Oscar Villaga, a police blotter entry certification, and the position paper of the accused. The prosecution alleged that it was not duly represented and was deprived of the opportunity to establish the strength of the evidence of guilt. The respondent judge, for his part, insisted that the assistant prosecutor present did not object to the grant and left the matter to the court’s discretion.

Motion for Reconsideration, Denial, and Subsequent Annulment by the Court of Appeals

After the order granting bail, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, which the respondent judge denied on January 10, 1992. The respondent judge maintained that he granted bail based on due consideration of the evidence and that the prosecution did not request an opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt was strong.

Significantly, the bail orders of December 23, 1991 and January 10, 1992 were attacked by the prosecution through certiorari, and were later annulled and set aside by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28384 on January 19, 1993. The administrative case before the Court took judicial cognizance of this appellate decision, which the Court treated as materially reinforcing the conclusion that the respondent judge’s action required disciplinary sanction.

Motion to Inhibit and the Private Complainant’s Challenge

Immediately after the bail order was issued, Roberto Untalan, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. D-10678, filed a motion for the respondent judge to inhibit himself on March 11, 1992, with counsel. He argued that the respondent judge’s conduct created doubt as to impartial disposition and placed the complainants’ grievance of justice in grave peril.

The respondent judge denied the motion to inhibit in an order dated March 25, 1991 (the record reflected the year as 1992). He reasoned that during the bail hearing, the prosecution was represented by Assistant City Prosecutor Rosita Castro, who allegedly interposed no objection to granting bail in the amount of P40,000.00, which she considered reasonable. He also argued that time was of the essence because the accused, except one named Joel Doe, had been under detention since October 21, 1991, and because the reinvestigation had not yet been terminated by December 23, 1991. He added that he granted bail without determining the proper charge, given the stage of proceedings.

The private complainant sought reconsideration, contending that the assistant prosecutor who supposedly appeared at the hearing was not duly authorized to appear for or comment for the prosecution in the bail incident, claiming she had been sent to another branch to move for postponement. The respondent judge denied reconsideration in an order dated June 8, 1992, and persisted in his position that the prosecution did not request an opportunity to prove the strength of the evidence of guilt and instead submitted the incident for resolution.

The Administrative Charges and Respondent Judge’s Defenses

The administrative complaint charged the respondent judge with utter disregard of judicial decorum through an excessive display of interest in handling a case pending in his branch. It further alleged “malfeasance” in granting bail in a non-bailable offense without benefit of notice and hearing.

The prosecution’s principal factual and legal theory was that it was not given at least three (3) days’ notice before the scheduled bail hearing, contrary to Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. It was also alleged that the scheduled hearing reflected two non-working days between the filing and the hearing because the petition for bail was filed on a Saturday and heard the following Monday. The complainant further asserted that during the contested bail hearing on December 23, 1991, the prosecution was not given an opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt was strong.

In response, the respondent judge argued that he honestly believed he did not commit serious and grave abuse of discretion; that he granted bail because the assistant prosecutor did not object; that the prosecution did not ask to be allowed to prove that evidence of guilt was strong; that the motion for reconsideration was denied after due hearing and careful evaluation of affidavits and position papers; and that the alleged lack of previous notice was cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration because due process sought to safeguard opportunity to be heard rather than previous notice. He also defended that the claim that no hearing took place was negated by testimonies taken in another administrative proceeding, and he insisted that the complaint was harassment.

Finally, the Court noted with displeasure the handling of the matter by the Office of the Court Administrator, which conducted evaluation and submitted its report only after a delay of about two (2) years from February 10, 1995 after repeated inquiries, despite an earlier instruction to submit within sixty (60) days. The Court treated the delay as unreasonable and prejudicial, though it nonetheless proceeded to decide the case on the merits.

The Court’s Assessment: Lack of Notice, Distorted View of Bail as Urgent, and Failure of Due Process

The Court agreed with the finding that the respondent judge was guilty as charged. It emphasized that the petition for bail was filed in court and served on the prosecution on December 21, 1991, a Saturday, yet it was “craftily set” for hearing on December 23, 1991, leaving the prosecution only one day, a Sunday, to prepare opposition. The Court treated the scheduling as an obvious stratagem depriving the prosecution of adequate opportunity to counter the petition. It also noted the unusually precipitate haste with which the trial court granted bail.

The Court further rejected the respondent judge’s invocation of theory that the petition for bail is an urgent motion and therefore may be heard on shorter notice. The Court held that this reasoning distorted the nature and requisites of the right to bail. It reiterated the settled principle that bail is not a matter of right and requires hearing where the accused is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

On the factual matrix, the Court rejected the respondent judge’s argument that “time was of the essence” because the accused had been detained since October 21, 1991. The Court stressed several contrary circumstances that required circumspection: (first) the charge was double murder, each punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, making bail discretionary; (second) the information was not recommended with bail, allegedly because it was based on sworn statements of eyewitnesses constituting clear and strong evidence of guilt; (third) reinvestigation was pending at the instance of the accused, so delays from its conduct were attributable logically to them; and (fourth) the guileful setting of the bail hearing on December 23, 1991 when the petition was filed only on December 21, 1991 cast doubt on the good faith and regularity of the defense’s procedure.

Judicial Good Faith and Discretion Misapplied

The Court treated respondent judge’s claim of good faith as insufficient. It acknowledged the general rule that judges are not answerable for erroneous decisions made in good faith, but held that good faith could be negated by circumstances on record. It underscored that the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to act with competence, integrity and independence, and to behave so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

The Court clarified that although bail in capital offenses is addressed to the trial judge’s discretion, the discretion must be exercised according to law and guided by applicable legal

Case Syllabus (A.M. No. 92-7-360-0)

The administrative matter arose from a sworn letter-request dated June 18, 1992 by Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of Dagupan City, charging Judge Deodoro J. Sison of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Dagupan City with utter disregard of judicial decorum through excessive interest in handling a case assigned to and pending in his branch.
The complaint was coursed through the Chief State Prosecutor, Fernando P. de Leon, who indorsed the letter to the Court for appropriate action.
The Court ultimately found Judge Deodoro J. Sison guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion and imposed an administrative fine with a stern warning.

Parties and Procedural Posture

The complainant was Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of Dagupan City.
The respondent was Judge Deodoro J. Sison, presiding judge of RTC Branch 40, Dagupan City.
The case originated as an administrative charge upon a request for action by the Court.
The matter was referred by the Court to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
The Court expressed displeasure over the Office of the Court Administrator’s two-year delay in submitting its report and recommendation.
Despite the procedural delay, the Court proceeded to rule on the merits and adopted the Office of the Court Administrator’s finding that respondent judge was guilty as charged and warranted a sanction.

Core Factual Background

On October 24, 1991, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed an information for double murder against several accused, docketed as Criminal Case No. D-10678, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Manolo Salcedo, et al.
The criminal case was raffled to respondent judge for assignment to his branch.
On November 8, 1991, the accused filed a petition for reinvestigation.
The trial court granted the reinvestigation in an order dated November 20, 1991 and gave the prosecutor until December 23, 1991 to resolve it.
The reinvestigation was concluded by the prosecutor on March 31, 1992.
A later petition for review by the accused was dismissed by the Department of Justice in a resolution dated May 8, 1992.
During the reinvestigation, the accused filed a petition for bail on December 21, 1991, a Saturday, and requested that it be set for hearing on December 23, 1991, the immediately following Monday.
On December 23, 1991 at 1:30 P.M., the Court granted bail for each accused in the amount of P40,000.00 based on the records described in the decision.
The prosecution filed an opposition signed by Third Assistant City Prosecutor Chita Estrella D.N. Bonifacio and noted by First Assistant City Prosecutor Silverio Q. Castillo, but the bail hearing proceeded despite the defense strategy that allegedly deprived the prosecution of adequate preparation.
The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent judge denied on January 10, 1992.
Respondent judge reiterated in an order denying an inhibition motion that he granted bail after due hearing and after careful consideration of pleadings and arguments, while asserting that the prosecution did not request an opportunity to show that evidence of guilt was strong.
The Court of Appeals later annulled and set aside respondent judge’s orders granting bail on December 23, 1991 and denying reconsideration on January 10, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 28384 promulgated on January 19, 1993.
After the bail order, the private complainant Roberto Untalan moved to inhibit respondent judge, alleging bias, lack of impartial disposition, and a network of intrigue and distrust.
Respondent judge denied the motion to inhibit, reasoning that during the bail hearing the prosecution was represented by Assistant City Prosecutor Rosita Castro who supposedly interposed no objection, and that time was of the essence because most accused had been detained since October 21, 1991 and reinvestigation was still pending.
The private complainant later moved for reconsideration of the denial of inhibition, contending that the assistant prosecutor was not duly authorized and supported the claim by an affidavit.
Respondent judge denied reconsideration again on June 8, 1992, maintaining among others that the prosecution did not ask to prove strength of evidence of guilt, that absence of due process was cured by reconsideration and inhibition motions, and that the inhibition motion constituted forum shopping.

Allegations of Procedural Violations

The complainant alleged that the prosecution was not given at least three days’ notice before the scheduled hearing of the petition for bail, in violation of Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
The complainant stressed that the petition for bail was filed on December 21, 1991, a Saturday, and set for hearing on December 23, 1991, leaving the prosecution only one day, a Sunday, to prepare.
The complainant alleged that during the controverted hearing, the prosecution was not duly represented and was not afforded the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt was strong.
The complainant characterized the defense’s setting of the bail hearing as a stratagem that effectively deprived the prosecution of the opportunity to adequately counter the petition for bail.
Respondent judge justified the non-observance of the three-day notice rule by characterizing the petition for bail as an urgent motion that could be heard on shorter notice.
The Court held that respondent judge’s theory violated the well-established rules that in capital offenses bail requires a hearing and is not a matter of right.

Respondent Judge’s Justifications

Respondent judge claimed he acted honestly and believed he did not commit a serious and grave abuse of discretion.
He invoked the principle that a judge generally should not be held administratively liable for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith.
He asserted that bail was granted because the assistant prosecutor present did not in