Title
Bautista vs. Sandiganbayan
Case
G.R. No. 136082
Decision Date
May 12, 2000
Mayor Bautista accused of hiring 192 casual employees, charging salaries to peace fund, violating RA 3019; SC upheld charges, denied motion to quash, citing waiver and single offense.
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Case Summary (G.R. No. 136082)

Factual Background

An anonymous, unsigned, and unverified letter-complaint dated November 20, 1996 and allegedly prepared by the Contractors Association of Davao del Sur and the Good Government Employees of Davao del Sur accused Franklin P. Bautista of, among other acts, causing the hiring of one hundred ninety-two casual employees whose honoraria and salaries were charged to the municipal peace and order fund despite the municipality’s limited savings, and of illegal disbursements and fictitious and overpriced payments.

Initiation of Preliminary Investigation

Graft Investigation Officer II Corazon A. Arancon, acting on the anonymous letter-complaint, issued an Order dated January 16, 1997 directing Franklin P. Bautista to submit a counter-affidavit. The complaint was docketed as Case No. CPL-MIN-96-180 in the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao, and as Case No. OMB-3-96-2900 in the Office of the Ombudsman, Manila.

Counter-Affidavits and Ombudsman Action

Petitioner filed a counter-affidavit on February 26, 1997, denying the allegations and attaching affidavits from several individuals, including Enrique Ponce De Leon and Rogelio E. Llanos, disavowing knowledge of the complaint’s institution. After evaluation, GIO II Arancon issued a resolution dated May 27, 1997 finding a prima facie case under Sec. 3, par. (e) of R.A. No. 3019, which the Ombudsman approved on October 3, 1997.

Information Filed Before Sandiganbayan

An Information prepared and signed by GIO II Arancon, docketed as Crim. Case No. 24276, charged Franklin P. Bautista with willfully, unlawfully and criminally causing the hiring of one hundred ninety-two casual employees in flagrant disregard of Sections 288 and 289 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual, charging their honoraria and salaries to the peace and order fund and to project component and other services activity funds, representing 72.5% of total personnel services expenditures, thereby giving unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to the casuals and causing undue injury to the Municipality of Malita.

Motion to Quash and Sandiganbayan Resolutions

On November 13, 1997 petitioner moved to quash the Information on the grounds that the alleged acts did not constitute the offense under Sec. 3, par. (e) of R.A. No. 3019 and that the Information charged more than one offense. The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to Quash by Resolution dated March 13, 1998, holding that the essential elements of the crime were sufficiently alleged and that only one offense was charged. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on October 9, 1998.

Petitioner's Contentions before the Supreme Court

Petitioner sought relief from the Supreme Court, arguing that the Ombudsman lacked legal basis to conduct a preliminary investigation or to file the Information because the Ombudsman failed to require the complainants to submit affidavits before directing him to file a counter-affidavit, in violation of Sec. 4, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman. Petitioner further argued that the Information improperly charged at least two distinct offenses under Sec. 3, par. (e)—giving unwarranted benefits and causing undue injury—and that the term “private party” could not properly describe the casuals who, petitioner asserted, were public officers.

Sandiganbayan’s and Ombudsman’s Procedural Posture

The record shows that GIO II Arancon directed petitioner to file a counter-affidavit without first obtaining affidavits from the unnamed complainants, but petitioner nevertheless filed a counter-affidavit and participated in the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan concluded that the Information stated all essential elements of the offense and that the use of alternative or multiple descriptive phrases in the Information did not amount to charging multiple offenses.

Supreme Court’s Analysis on Affidavit Requirement

The Court examined the requirement under Sec. 4, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman and the Court’s earlier decision in Olivas v. Office of the Ombudsman, which had held that complainants must submit affidavits before a respondent may be required to submit a counter-affidavit. The Court distinguished Olivas on the ground that, unlike Olivas where the respondent had refused to file a counter-affidavit because no complainant affidavits had been produced, Franklin P. Bautista actually filed his counter-affidavit and thereby submitted to the jurisdiction and process of the Ombudsman. The Court held that petitioner’s voluntary submission to the investigative process rendered his present challenge to the Ombudsman’s initial noncompliance with the affidavit requirement moot and that petitioner thereby waived and was estopped from questioning the validity of the Information.

Supreme Court’s Analysis on Allegation of Multiple Offenses

The Court addressed petitioner’s contention that the Information charged two distinct offenses under Sec. 3, par. (e) because the statute proscribes both causing undue injury and giving unwarranted benefits. The Court reviewed precedent, including Santiago v. Garchitorena, Pareno v. Sandiganbayan, Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan, Diaz v. Sandiganbayan, and Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, and explained that the disjunctive phrasing in Sec. 3, par. (e) identifies alternative modes by which the single statutory offense may be committed and that the use of multiple descriptive phrases in an information does not necessarily charge multiple offenses. The Court found the Information’s language susceptible of either reading—alternative modes or consequences of the same act—but in either event concluded that the Information sufficiently and unambiguously charged an offense under Sec. 3, par. (e), and thus did not suffer fatal defect for charging multiple offenses.

Supreme Court’s Analysis on the Term “Private Party”

The Court considered petitioner’s argument that the casual employees could not be described as “private party” because they were public officers under Sec. 2, par. (b), of R.A. No. 3019 or under relevant precedent such as Philnabank Employees Association v. Auditor General. The Court observed that the relevant reckoning period was before the casual employees’ inc

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