Title
Barrioquinto vs. Ferdez
Case
G.R. No. L-1278
Decision Date
Jan 21, 1949
Petitioners sought amnesty under Proclamation No. 8 for murder charges; Supreme Court ruled admission of guilt unnecessary, ordered Commission to review evidence for eligibility.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 123553)

Key Dates

Proclamation No. 8: September 7, 1946. Administrative Order No. 11 (creating Amnesty Commissions): October 2, 1946. Commission order returning the files: January 9, 1947. Decision reviewed by the Supreme Court: January 21, 1949 (therefore the 1935 Constitution is the applicable constitutional framework governing the Executive’s amnesty power).

Applicable Law and Instruments

  • Proclamation No. 8 (September 7, 1946): a proclamation of amnesty by the President with the concurrence of Congress, granting amnesty to persons who committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code if such acts were committed in furtherance of resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding the enemy, between December 8, 1941 and the date of liberation of the area where the offense occurred; excludes crimes against chastity and acts committed from purely personal motives; directs the creation of Guerrilla Amnesty Commissions to examine and decide individual cases, including conducting summary hearings of witnesses where necessary.
  • Administrative Order No. 11 (October 2, 1946): establishes the Guerrilla Amnesty Commissions and prescribes allocation of cases among them (cases pending in Courts of First Instance to be passed upon by respective Commissions; appeals to be considered by a specified Commission).
  • Constitutional authority cited in the proclamation: Article VII, section 10, paragraph 6 of the (then applicable) Constitution, authorizing the President to grant amnesties with the concurrence of Congress.
  • Relevant statutory context: offenses alleged were penalized under the Revised Penal Code.

Procedural and Factual Background

Both petitioners were charged with murder. Jimenez was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga; he sought to avail himself of Proclamation No. 8 before the period for perfecting an appeal expired. Barrioquinto, initially at large, had a separate information and was later arrested; both petitioners submitted their cases to the 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission. After a preliminary hearing, the Commission issued an order returning the cases to the Court of First Instance on January 9, 1947, without adjudicating entitlement to amnesty. The Commission’s stated ground was that neither petitioner admitted having committed the offense (Barrioquinto specifically testified that another, Hipolito Tolentino, fired the fatal shot), and therefore, in the Commission’s view, they could not invoke the benefits of amnesty.

Legal Issue Presented

Whether a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission may require, as a condition precedent to deciding an application for amnesty, that the applicant admit having committed the offense charged; and more broadly, whether an amnesty determination may be made notwithstanding an accused’s denial of responsibility, based on the evidence presented to the Commission or the courts.

Supreme Court Holding

The Court held that an admission or confession by the accused that he committed the offense is not a necessary precondition for a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission or a court to determine entitlement to amnesty under Proclamation No. 8. Amnesty is to be distinguished from pardon: amnesty is a public act granted to classes of persons and operates to obliterate the offense so that the person stands as if he had never committed it; therefore courts and the Commissions should take judicial notice of the proclamation and apply its terms when the evidence (from either the prosecution or the defense) shows the offense falls within the amnesty. The 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission was ordered to proceed to hear and decide the petitioners’ applications for amnesty unless the courts had, in the meantime, already decided the issue expressly and finally.

Reasoning: Distinction Between Amnesty and Pardon

The Court emphasized the conceptual and legal distinction:

  • Pardon: a private act of clemency granted to an individual, typically after conviction, which relieves punishment but does not erase the offense and generally must be pleaded and proved by the person claiming it; courts do not take judicial notice of pardons. Pardon does not necessarily restore civil rights unless so provided and does not exempt the offender from civil liabilities imposed by sentence (citing provisions and authorities set out in the record).
  • Amnesty: a public act of the Chief Executive (here with Congressional concurrence), operating as a class or communal obliteration of the offense, which places the amnestied person before the law as if he had never committed the punishable act. Because amnesty is public and legislative/ executive in scope, courts and administrative bodies should take notice of its terms and apply it to cases that fall within its conditions.

Reasoning: Evidentiary and Procedural Principles

  • The Court held that entitlement to amnesty may be established by the evidence presented to the Commission or the court, whether from the prosecution or the defense; a confession is not essential. The Commission is authorized to examine facts and circumstances and to conduct summary hearings of witnesses for both sides; motive and political character of an act may be inferred from attendant facts, acts, statements, and witness testimony.
  • The Court rejected the view that invocation of amnesty is necessarily a plea in the nature of confession and avoidance requiring the accused to first admit commission of the offense; holding otherwise would frustrate the purpose of the proclamation and the Commissions. Requiring confession would deter applicants because such admissions could be used as evidence against them in ordinary courts if the Commission later found the case not within amnesty.
  • Motive—whether an act was committed in furtherance of resistance to the enemy or for purely personal reasons—is often proven by extrinsic evidence and inferences and need not rest on the defendant’s own testimony at arraignment or before the Commission.

Application to the Petitioners’ Cases and Relief Ordered

Given the foregoing principles, the Court concluded that the Commission erred in returning the petitioners’ cases without deciding whether they were entitled to amnesty. The respondents (the Commissioners) were ordered to proceed promptly to hear and decide the applications of Jimenez and Barrioquinto in accordance with Proclamation No. 8 and Administrative Order No. 11, unless a court had already expressly and finally determined entitlement to amnesty in the interim.

Concurring Opinion (Perfecto, J.)

The concurrence emphasized the three essential elements for review by a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission: (1) the accused is charged with an offense under the Revised Penal Code (except crimes against chastity or acts of purely personal motive); (2) the offense was committed in furtherance of resistance to the enemy; and (3) the offense was committed within the temporal limits specified by the proclamation (from Dec. 8, 1941 until liberation of the area). If these elements are present, the Commission cannot refuse to hear and decide the case. The concurrence ordered revocation of the Commission’s January 9, 1947 order and directed the Commission to decide the applications.

Dissenting Opinion (Tuason, J.; joined by Pablo, M.)

The dissent concluded the Court should not grant mandamus because, on its view of the record, the Commission had in fact examined records, conducted hearings (Barrioquinto was examined at length), and

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