Title
Banez, Jr. vs. Concepcion
Case
G.R. No. 159508
Decision Date
Aug 29, 2012
Dispute over 1,233 sqm land in Bulacan; Ramos failed to comply with 1990 compromise agreement; Estate of Gomez sought revival of judgment; SC upheld RTC's reinstatement, citing no grave abuse of discretion.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 159508)

Key Individuals and Context

  • Petitioner: Juan B. Banez, Jr., counsel of Leodegario B. Ramos and respondent-defendant in the underlying action.
  • Respondents: (1) Hon. Crisanto C. Concepcion, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 12, Malolos City; (2) Estate of the late Rodrigo Gomez, represented by its administratrix Tsui Yuk Ying.
  • Subject matter: Civil Case No. 722-M-2002 — action to recover ownership and possession (in substance, an action to revive and execute a judgment by compromise concerning a 1,233 sq. m. parcel).
  • Locale: Meycauayan and Valenzuela, Bulacan/Metro Manila environs; Regional Trial Courts of Valenzuela and Malolos; Court of Appeals and Supreme Court involvement.

Key Dates

  • Compromise agreement and RTC decision approving it: October 9, 1990.
  • Death of Rodrigo Gomez: November 7, 1990.
  • Specific performance action filed by Estate of Gomez (Valenzuela RTC): July 6, 1995 (Civil Case No. 4679-V-95).
  • CA disposition affirming dismissal of that action for improper venue: July 24, 2001 (CA-G.R. CV No. 54231).
  • Complaint to revive judgment/for recovery filed in Valenzuela RTC: September 20, 2002 (Civil Case No. 722-M-2002).
  • Petitioner’s motion to dismiss granted by RTC: February 18, 2003; RTC reversed that order: March 24, 2003; motions for reconsideration denied April 21, 2003 and August 19, 2003.
  • Petition for certiorari filed directly in the Supreme Court: September 4, 2003.

Applicable Law and Procedural Rules

  • Constitution: 1987 Philippine Constitution (applicable given the decision date).
  • Rules: Rule 65, Sections 1 and 4 (extraordinary writs — certiorari; venue/hierarchy policy); Section 6, Rule 39 (execution by motion or by independent action).
  • Civil Code provisions on prescription: Article 1144 (ten-year prescriptive period for actions upon a judgment) and Article 1155 (interruption of prescription by filing of action).
  • Relevant jurisprudence cited in the decision concerning interlocutory orders, hierarchy of courts, and prescription doctrine.

Factual and Transactional Background

  • Original controversy arose from competing claims over a portion (1,233 sq. m.) of a larger tract (3,054 sq. m.) allegedly disposed of by Ramos’s mother to Ricardo Asuncion and later sold to Rodrigo Gomez. Ramos sued Gomez (Civil Case No. 3287-V-90) for rescission and damages; before adjudication, the parties entered into a court-approved compromise on October 9, 1990.
  • The compromise required segregation by survey, registration of a deed of absolute sale transferring the 1,233 sq. m. to Gomez, delivery of title duplicate, and financial undertakings guaranteed by the petitioner through post-dated checks totaling P110,000.00. Gomez died in November 1990; only P80,000 was ultimately paid; a check for P30,000 issued by the petitioner was dishonored.
  • The Estate of Gomez performed the surveying obligation and attempted to secure registration, but Ramos allegedly failed to register and instead caused the 1,233 sq. m. to be registered under his own title (TCT No. T-13005-P(M)). The Estate filed subsequent suits to enforce the compromise/judgment.

Procedural History in Lower Courts

  • The Estate sued for specific performance and later sought enforcement/revival of the judgment by compromise. An RTC in Valenzuela dismissed the Estate’s July 6, 1995 suit for specific performance on venue/execution grounds; the CA affirmed on July 24, 2001.
  • On September 20, 2002 the Estate filed Civil Case No. 722-M-2002 (seeking revival/execution of the October 9, 1990 compromise-judgment). The petitioner moved to dismiss (Jan. 8, 2003) asserting prescription, res judicata, lack of real party-in-interest, and prior payment. The RTC initially granted dismissal for prescription (Feb. 18, 2003) but, on motion by the Estate, reversed that order and reinstated the case (Mar. 24, 2003). Subsequent motions for reconsideration by petitioner were denied (Apr. 21 and Aug. 19, 2003). Petitioner then filed a direct petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Issues Presented by the Petitioner and Respondent Positions

  • Petitioner’s principal contentions: the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the dismissal based on prescription (Article 1144) and in applying Article 1155; Civil Case No. 722-M-2002 was time-barred because an action to revive a judgment must be filed within ten years from finality; the judgment had been fully satisfied or the rights waived/abandoned; and the Estate’s remedies had been exhausted or improperly pursued. Petitioner also argued the RTC lacked jurisdiction in reinstating the case and improperly ordered him to answer despite alleged defects in service on other defendants.
  • Estate’s principal responses: the filing of the July 6, 1995 specific performance action interrupted prescription (Article 1155), the CA’s July 24, 2001 disposition tolled or affected computation such that the subsequent revival action filed on September 20, 2002 was within ten years and therefore timely.

Legal Standards Applied by the Supreme Court

  • Interlocutory orders denying motions to dismiss are generally not reviewable by certiorari because they do not terminate proceedings; certiorari is reserved where the tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (Rule 65, Sec. 1). The petitioner must demonstrate such jurisdictional excess or lack, or that no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.
  • The Court reaffirmed the policy of hierarchy of courts under Rule 65, Section 4: petitions for extraordinary writs should generally be filed first in the appropriate lower or intermediate court (i.e., the Court of Appeals for rulings of a Regional Trial Court), and direct resort to the Supreme Court requires special and compelling reasons. The petitioner offered no such reasons to justify direct filing in the Supreme Court.
  • The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; where resolution of a petition would necessarily require evaluation of evidentiary matters and disputed facts (e.g., interruption or suspension of prescription, compliance with compromise terms, alleged full payment, waiver/abandonment), the proper forum is the trial court to receive evidence and adjudicate those factual questions.

Application of Law to the Facts — Prescription and Evidentiary Necessities

  • The Court characterized Civil Case No. 722-M-2002 as in substance an action to revive and enforce a judgment by compromise; Article 1144 prescribes a ten-year period to bring such actions. However, whether the action was time-barred could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss unless the complaint on its face conclusively established prescription. The complaint did not so show; therefore prescription was an issue involving factual events (e.g., the filing of the 1995 specific-performance suit, the CA’s subsequent disposition, any suspensions or interruptions under Article 1155) that required full evidentiary resolution at trial.
  • The Court noted established doctrine that the filing of an action may interrupt prescription (Article 1155) and that time during which execution is stayed (by agreement, appeal, death, etc.) may be excluded in computing the period for enforcement; such matters require proof. The petitioner’s alternate factual defenses (full payment, waiver/abandonment) similarly entailed contested facts unsuitable for resolution in an interlocutory dismissal.

On the Appropriateness of Certiorari and Forum Choice

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