Title
Banez, Jr. vs. Concepcion
Case
G.R. No. 159508
Decision Date
Aug 29, 2012
Dispute over 1,233 sqm land in Bulacan; Ramos failed to comply with 1990 compromise agreement; Estate of Gomez sought revival of judgment; SC upheld RTC's reinstatement, citing no grave abuse of discretion.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 159508)

Factual Background

In 1982 Leodegario B. Ramos purportedly acquired sole adjudication of a larger tract of land, which had earlier been transferred by his mother to Ricardo Asuncion, who sold it to Rodrigo Gomez; a 1,233 square meter portion of that tract became the subject of dispute. On February 1, 1990 Ramos sued Gomez in the RTC in Valenzuela for rescission and damages (Civil Case No. 3287‑V‑90), and on October 9, 1990 the parties entered into and obtained court approval of a compromise agreement that, among other things, required segregation by survey of the 1,233 square meter portion, the execution and registration of a deed of absolute sale by Ramos in favor of Gomez, and the issuance of post‑dated checks aggregating P110,000 to guarantee payment.

Compromise Agreement Terms and Immediate Performance

The compromise agreement of October 9, 1990 obligated the defendant to cause the survey and segregation of the 1,233 square meter portion and to register the deed of absolute sale, while the plaintiff was to entrust the owners duplicate of the TCT and to guarantee repayment by post‑dated checks in the amount of P110,000 covering loan, use, and attorneys’ fees; of the guaranteed sum only P80,000 was ultimately paid, the check for the remaining P30,000 was dishonored, and Rodrigo Gomez died on November 7, 1990, his estate being represented by Tsui Yuk Ying.

Subsequent Transactions, Claims and Early Litigation

The Estate of Gomez caused the survey called for by the compromise and performed other undertakings but allegedly did not receive registration of the deed or the owners duplicate because Ramos caused the 1,233 square meter portion to be registered in his own name under TCT No. T‑13005‑P(M); the Estate sued for specific performance on July 6, 1995 in the RTC in Valenzuela (Civil Case No. 4679‑V‑95), and that complaint was dismissed for improper venue on April 1, 1996, a dismissal the Court of Appeals affirmed on July 24, 2001.

Filing of Civil Case No. 722‑M‑2002 and Motions to Dismiss

On September 20, 2002 the Estate of Gomez filed Civil Case No. 722‑M‑2002 in the Valenzuela RTC, styled to revive the judgment by compromise of October 9, 1990 and to compel Ramos to execute the deed of absolute sale, with Petitioner impleaded as defendant; Petitioner moved to dismiss on January 8, 2003 asserting prescription, res judicata, lack of real party in interest, and payment of the guaranteed amount, and the RTC initially granted the motion on February 18, 2003 as barred by prescription, but on March 24, 2003 reversed that dismissal and reinstated the case, holding that the specific performance suit of July 6, 1995 interrupted prescription under Article 1155; the RTC denied subsequent motions for reconsideration on April 21 and August 19, 2003 and ordered petitioner to file an answer.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The petitioner framed the central issue as whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in reversing its dismissal and denying motions for reconsideration on grounds that the action was not barred by prescription; related issues included whether Civil Case No. 722‑M‑2002 was time‑barred under Article 1144 in relation to Section 6, Rule 39, and whether other grounds existed for dismissal such as satisfaction of the judgment or waiver by the Estate for failure to move for execution.

Parties' Contentions at Appeal

The Petitioner maintained that the action was a revival of a final compromise judgment that accrued on October 9, 1990 and therefore had to be filed within ten years under Article 1144, that the complaint on its face showed prescription, and that the judgment had been satisfied or the rights waived. The Estate of Gomez contended that the filing of the specific performance action on July 6, 1995 interrupted prescription, that the prescriptive period resumed after the CA dismissal on July 24, 2001, and that the revived action filed on September 20, 2002 fell within the permissible ten‑year period to enforce a final judgment.

Ruling on the Petition for Certiorari

The Court dismissed the petition for certiorari. It held that the assailed orders denying the motion to dismiss were interlocutory and, absent a showing that they were issued without jurisdiction, with excess of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, were not proper subjects of a Rule 65 certiorari; the petitioner had failed to demonstrate such jurisdictional defect or the absence of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law because he could have answered, proceeded to pretrial and trial, and later sought appellate relief.

Governing Procedural Policy and Venue for Extraordinary Relief

The Court emphasized strict observance of the judicial hierarchy and the venue provisions of Section 4, Rule 65, noting that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts does not confer an unrestrained right to invoke the Supreme Court directly; because the petitioner did not proffer special and compelling reasons to bypass the Court of Appeals, direct filing in the Supreme Court violated established policy and warranted dismissal.

Evidentiary Nature of the Prescription Defense and the Court's Refusal to Resolve Factual Disputes

The Court further explained that resolution of the prescription defense raised by the petitioner involved factual and evidentiary matters unsuited to summary dis

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