G.R. No. L-3087 - Suntay vs. Suntay

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-3087)

Procedural History

Fifteen separate informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 40909–40913, were filed against respondent Rosario Claudio and originally assigned to RTC Branch 84. The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited himself following a petition for recusal dated May 19, 1986. The cases were re-raffled and assigned on June 25, 1986 to Branch 105, then presided by Judge Johnico G. Serquina. The accused was arraigned on November 20, 1986 and pleaded not guilty; pre-trial was set for January 8, 1987. Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. subsequently replaced Judge Serquina as presiding judge of Branch 105. On January 8, 1987 the respondent court issued an order rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 10, 1987; respondent Claudio opposed on March 25, 1987. The court denied the motion on March 31, 1987. The petitioner sought relief by certiorari and mandamus to review those orders; this Court had earlier issued a temporary restraining order now referenced as having been lifted by the final disposition.

Issue Presented

Whether the respondent RTC, Branch 105, acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction by rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor to represent the private or civil aspect of the prosecution in the Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases.

Respondents’ Position

Respondents argued that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the act of knowingly issuing worthless checks as an offense against public order; therefore the State and the public are the principal complainants. Because the special statute does not expressly provide for civil indemnity within the criminal charge, respondents maintained that private parties lack a basis to intervene as private prosecutors to pursue civil relief within the criminal cases.

Petitioner’s Position

The petitioner invoked the well-recognized legal axiom embodied in Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code that “every man criminally liable is also civilly liable,” asserting that the offended payee may seek indemnity from the offender irrespective of whether the special penal statute specifically enumerates civil indemnity. The petitioner argued that she suffered direct damage as a result of the issuance of the worthless checks and is therefore entitled to have her civil claims addressed within the criminal proceedings.

Legal Principles on Civil Liability Arising From Crime

The Court closely examined the nature and source of civil liability in the criminal context. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code expresses the general rule that criminal liability often carries civil liability, reflecting the dual character of many wrongful acts: an offense against the State and an injury to individual victims. The Court cautioned, however, that the proposition can be misleading if taken to mean that civil liability automatically and invariably arises simply because an act is criminal. Rather, civil liability fundamentally rests on the existence of damage to another person caused by the wrongful act, as reflected in Article 20 of the New Civil Code: “Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.” Jurisprudence cited by the Court (Quemel v. Court of Appeals; Bagtas; United States v. Bernardo) supports the view that criminal actions give rise, as appropriate, to civil claims for restitution, repair, and indemnification when the criminal conduct directly causes damage to a private party.

Application to Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and the Payee’s Rights

Applying these principles, the Court rejected the respondent court’s reasoning that because Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is characterized as an offense against public order the private injured party is precluded from civil relief within the criminal prosecution. The decision emphasized that the effects of a worthless check reach beyond public interest and produce a concrete injury to the payee who parted with money, property, or services in reasonable reliance on the check’s validity. The Court observed that although the statute addresses a public wrong, it does not and should not negate the private injury resulting from the same act. To deny the payee the opportunity to seek civil indemnity within the criminal proceeding would, in many cases, leave the offended party without an efficient or realistic means of recovering the face value of the check and would risk unjust enrichment of the drawer at the payee’s expense.

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-3087)

Citation and Procedural Caption

Reported at 240 Phil. 326, Third Division, G.R. Nos. 78911-25, decided December 11, 1987.
Petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioner Charmina B. Banal to review and set aside two orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City:
- Order dated January 8, 1987 rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-40909 to Q-40913 (charges against respondent Rosario Claudio for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22).
- Order dated March 31, 1987 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the January 8, 1987 order.
Relief prayed: Certiorari to annul the challenged orders and mandamus to compel the respondent court to allow Atty. Bustos to enter his appearance as private prosecutor for the petitioner.

Facts and Case Background

Fifteen (15) separate informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks law), docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 40909–40913, were filed against respondent Rosario Claudio before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
These cases were originally assigned to Branch 84.
The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited himself upon a petition for recusal filed by respondent Claudio through counsel on May 19, 1986.
The cases were re-raffled and on June 25, 1986 were assigned to Branch 105, then presided over by Judge Johnico G. Serquina.
Respondent Claudio was arraigned on November 20, 1986 and pleaded not guilty.
Pre-trial was set for January 8, 1987.
Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. later replaced Judge Serquina as presiding judge of Branch 105.
On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor on the ground that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 “does not provide for any civil liability or indemnity and hence, it is not a crime against property but public order.”
Petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 10, 1987.
Respondent Claudio filed opposition to the motion for reconsideration on March 25, 1987.
By order dated March 31, 1987, the respondent court denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
A temporary restraining order had been issued by this Court on July 15, 1987 (later lifted by this decision).

Issue Presented

Whether the respondent Regional Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor (Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos) for the petitioner in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

Positions of the Parties

Respondents’ position:
- Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the act of knowingly issuing worthless checks as an offense against public order.
- Because the offense is against public order, the State and the public are the principal complainants.
- Consequently, no civil indemnity is provided by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which a private party or prosecutor may intervene in the criminal prosecution.
Petitioner’s position:
- Relies on the legal axiom “Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable” (Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code).
- Argues indemnity may be recovered from the offender regardless of whether Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 expressly provides for civil indemnity.
- Asserts the private offended party suffered damage and is entitled to have civil claims adjudicated within the criminal proceedings rather than being compelled to file a separate civil action.

Legal Principles and Authorities Cited

Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code: “Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable.”
The underlying theory that a wrongful act may offend (1) society/the State and (2) an individual whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured by the punishable act.
Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages (1978, Revised Edition), pp. 246–247: distinction that civil liability arises because damage was caused to another, not merely because an act is felonious.
Article 20, New Civil Code: “Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.”
Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil. 692: the indemnity forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime.
United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265: every crime gives rise to a penal action and also a civil action for restitution, re