Title
Baguyo vs. Leviste
Case
A.M. No. 2224-CFI
Decision Date
Aug 31, 1981
A judge amended a rape conviction to acquittal before finality, citing insufficient evidence, despite procedural delays and clerical errors, upheld by the Supreme Court.
amendment of decision
grave abuse of authority
formal investigation

Case Summary (A.M. No. 2224-CFI)

Factual Background and Allegations in the Complaint

The complainant alleged, first, that the respondent rendered a decision convicting Fernando Azarraga of rape on March 20, 1979, after the prosecution rested and the accused waived his right to testify, and after the case had been ordered submitted for decision on September 26, 1978.

Second, the complainant asserted that on March 30, 1979, and before the conviction became final, the respondent issued an “Amendment to Decision of March 20, 1979” declaring the accused not guilty for failure of the prosecution to prove the offense beyond reasonable doubt. The complaint further maintained that the amendment was issued without any motion for reconsideration being filed by the accused.

Third, the complainant alleged clerical and service-related errors. She claimed that because of haste, the respondent incorrectly indicated Criminal Case No. 5567 instead of “768” in the amendment, and that he furnished a copy to the Provincial Fiscal rather than to the City Fiscal of Roxas City.

Fourth, the complainant alleged an undue delay in deciding the case. She claimed that while the case was submitted for decision on September 26, 1978, the respondent decided it only on March 20, 1979, which she characterized as 174 days from submission, allegedly violating Section 5 of R.A. 296.

Respondent’s Comment and Explanation

In his comment dated September 6, 1979, the respondent explained that the records of Criminal Case No. 768, including exhibits, minutes, and transcripts, were submitted by interpreter Sabiniano Mendoza, and that Mendoza prepared the minutes, only on January 19, 1979. The respondent argued that, because of this late submission of the complete records, he could not render the decision within the ninety (90) days counted from the order declaring the case submitted for decision on September 26, 1978.

He also stated that the stenographer who typed the respondent’s certification of service failed to include the case due to non-informalization by the Deputy Clerk of Court. He further contended that he amended his decision before it became final and executory, and that he was empowered to amend a decision to conform to the evidence before finality, even without notice to the parties. He added that any clerical mistakes in the case number in the amendment were not his fault and were attributable to the clerk responsible for those details.

Finally, the respondent maintained that the amendment was consistent with the law and the evidence and that, if the amendment were legally improper, the fiscal and the private prosecutor would have questioned it through certiorari, which they did not.

The Court’s Appreciation of the Amendment and the Applicable Rule

The Court found that the decision of conviction in Criminal Case No. 768 rested on the respondent’s evaluation of the evidence, including the principle that the defense of alibi could not prevail over the prosecution’s positive testimony, as recognized in established jurisprudence.

However, the Court noted that on March 30, 1979, before the judgment of conviction became final, the respondent issued an amendment modifying the findings and dispositive part. The Court recited that the amendment was anchored on the respondent’s recognition that, despite the accused’s waiver of the right to testify, the accused was still entitled to the presumption of innocence and the benefit of the doubt. The amendment also reflected the respondent’s view that the conviction should not have been based on the accused’s silence but on the prosecution’s ability to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Further, the amendment considered that reasonable doubt existed because the prosecution allegedly failed to prove force or lack of consent, and because the prosecution evidence allegedly showed that it was the supposed victim’s mother who wanted to prosecute, not the alleged victim herself. The Court also noted that the amendment reasoned that the handling of the victim immediately after the alleged incident, including the alleged wearing of a blouse with no sign of damage, was inconsistent with the theory of force in taking off the blouse and committing rape, leading to the conclusion that the offense was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

In determining whether the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion, the Court relied on Section 7, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, which provides that a judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected, and specifies the circumstances when a criminal judgment becomes final.

The Court held that it was within the prerogative of a judge to correct the court’s own decision before finality so that it would conform to the evidence and applicable law. It therefore found that the respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the amendment motu proprio, because he sufficiently explained the reasons for changing the earlier conviction upon his realization that the evidence and applicable jurisprudence showed error.

Assessment of Good Faith, Service Issues, and the Presumption of Regularity

The Court characterized the respondent’s reasons for amending the decision as convincingly correct. It also emphasized the good faith of the respondent judge, which had not been put in issue. With that backdrop, the Court applied the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.

As to the allegation of lack of notification and the claimed omission connected with service, the Court observed that the amendment itself contained an order that the Provincial Fiscal, counsel, complainant, and the accused be notified. The Court reasoned that if the parties did not receive notification as ordered, the respondent could no longer be faulted for that omission.

On the related clerical accusation concerning the wrong case number and the identity of the office furnished with a copy, the Court accepted the respondent’s position that errors in placement of the case number were clerical and not attributable to the judge.

Delay in Disposition and the Court’s Admonition

Although the Court found no basis for a formal investigation because the issues were adequately explained and the complaint could be resolved by reference to the record, it addressed the question of timeliness. The Court noted that the respondent delayed the decision in the criminal case fo

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