Title
Bacus vs. Ople
Case
G.R. No. L-56856
Decision Date
Oct 23, 1984
Workers staged a strike over unpaid wages; company sought termination. Supreme Court ruled due process violated, ordered reinstatement pending new hearing.
labor dispute case
termination of employment
equities

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-56856)

Factual Background

On February 19, 1979, approximately one thousand four hundred employees of the Company staged a simultaneous, immediate, and unanimous mass walk-out. The Company attributed the walk-out to an organized strike refusal to work and later characterized the conduct of the workers it sought to terminate as coercion, threats, and intimidation, including stoning incidents, in violation of PD 823 and the Company’s rules and regulations under its collective bargaining agreement.

On February 23, 1979, the Minister of Labor, through Deputy Minister Inciong, assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute pursuant to Section 10 of PD 823, as amended, directing that the dispute be heard and decided by Assistant Regional Director Ombra T. Jainal and that such acts be done as necessary to effect immediate settlement.

On February 27, 1979, the Company filed with the MOLE District Office of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, an application for clearance to terminate twenty-two (22) employees, including the petitioners. It claimed that the workers who abandoned their jobs for seven consecutive days from February 19 to February 26, 1979 were responsible, in one way or another, for coercing other workers through stoning, threats, and intimidation along the national highway leading to the main gate. The Company further alleged that the strike struck at a critical export schedule and adversely affected its ability to meet export commitments for products to Japan and the United States.

Jurisdictional Orders and Clearances

On March 2, 1979, Deputy Minister Inciong issued an order directing management to pay the payroll covering January 16–31 and February 1–15, 1979 not later than March 6, 1979. It also ordered all striking employees to return to work and management to accept them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the walkout, with resumption of operations by the first working hour of March 5, 1979. The order further granted management authority to replace striking workers who failed to return by the deadline.

On March 3, 1979, the Company filed another clearance application to terminate nineteen (19) more employees for reasons substantially the same as the first, except that the Company alleged ten consecutive days of abandonment from February 19, 1979 to March 1, 1979. The workers filed a consolidated opposition on March 10, 1979.

After the parties failed to carry out the March 2, 1979 order—particularly the payment of wages and the workers’ return to work—Deputy Minister Inciong called a conference. The workers argued that they failed to comply because they were required to sign a document allegedly admitting guilt. The Company countered that signing was part of standard operating procedure and did not constitute admission of guilt.

The March 13, 1979 Order and Transfer of Proceedings

On March 13, 1979, Deputy Minister Inciong issued an order assuming jurisdiction over all pending and subsequent issues connected to the February 19, 1979 strike, requiring workers to return without requiring them to sign any document, and warning them not to take the law into their hands. The order required parties to submit position papers within ten days and enjoined the maintenance of status quo until final resolution of all issues.

The Ministry then issued a Memorandum Order on September 25, 1979 directing labor arbiter Bach M. Macaraya to proceed to Iligan City to hear the case. The hearing was set for October 8, 1979.

October Hearings and the Alleged Denial of Due Process

Notice to counsel for the workers was received only in the afternoon of October 8, 1979. Counsel also received a telegram before the hearing date requiring appearance on October 8, 1979 at the District Office but without specific reference to the MOLE Case No. 003-79. Counsel objected on lack of proper notice but later entered into a stipulation of facts. The hearing was then continued to October 9, 1979.

On October 9, 1979, counsel objected again because he had another hearing scheduled that same day in a related case, BLR Case No. 2309-79 (“Findlay Workers vs. Philippine Labor Alliance Council”), apparently set for the morning. He ultimately agreed to the October 9 hearing, though the record did not specify the exact time. The hearing in BLR Case No. 2309-79 began in the morning and was continued in the afternoon. On that same afternoon, the labor arbiter ordered the start of proceedings in MOLE Case No. 003-79.

Counsel objected because the start conflicted with the agreed timing of the related case, which disrupted proceedings in BLR Case No. 2309-79. The records, as narrated by the labor and labor arbiter proceedings in the decision, reflect that after the other case concluded, the hearing officer purportedly proceeded immediately and that respondents allegedly walked out in the middle of the hearing, resulting in an ex parte hearing and later a failure to appear on October 13, 1979.

Petitioners’ version directly challenged these findings. They asserted that the hearing could not even start as late as five o’clock in the afternoon and that counsel and the workers left only to go home. They also denied that they were properly informed of the next setting on October 13, 1979. They claimed that the labor arbiter, after they left, surreptitiously continued receiving the Company’s evidence and made a recommendation based on that evidence.

The October 18, 1979 Decision and March 10, 1981 Order

On October 18, 1979, the Deputy Minister, acting upon the recommendation of the labor arbiter, issued a decision declaring the strike illegal and granting clearance to terminate only ten (10) workers out of forty-one (41) sought to be terminated. The decision held that those ten workers were the instigators of the strike, emphasizing that a strike of such magnitude lasting from February 19 to March 13, 1979 could not occur without organizers, particularly because the workers refused to work despite two “Return to Work” orders.

The dispositive portion declared the strike illegal and granted clearance to terminate the ten petitioners listed in the decision. Clearance for termination of other employees was denied for lack of merit.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by an order dated March 10, 1981 by Minister Blas F. Ople.

Procedural Posture and Relief Sought

After denial of reconsideration, petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, assailing the October 18, 1979 decision as having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction, allegedly in violation of due process. The petitioners sought to set aside the clearance granted to terminate their employment and to prevent enforcement pending resolution.

The Company then served memoranda dated February 21, 1980 informing each petitioner of the approval of clearance and that they were dismissed as of that date.

Issues and Petitioners’ Contentions

Petitioners anchored their attack on procedural infirmities allegedly committed during the October 9 and October 13, 1979 hearings before the labor arbiter. They contended that the hearing was conducted under circumstances that deprived them of a full and fair opportunity to present evidence to meet serious allegations of instigation and leadership of a strike allegedly involving acts of violence, which the administrative authority treated as decisive for granting termination clearance.

They further contended that the alleged walk-out was misrepresented and that they were not properly notified of the October 13, 1979 hearing. They thus argued that the ex parte receipt of the Company’s evidence and the resulting determination of their liability violated the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.

The Court’s Ruling on Due Process and Clearance for Dismissal

The Court granted the petition. It held that a mere finding of illegality of a strike should not automatically lead to wholesale dismissal of the strikers. It further ruled that the finding of illegality depended on evidence ascertained through an irregular procedure that, while described as summary in character, still required observance of essential due process safeguards.

While the Court acknowledged that administrative agencies with quasi-judicial functions are not bound by the rigid technicalities of procedure, it held that they cannot dispense with fundamental requirements of due process. It relied on doctrinal statements in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations and later cases emphasizing that even in quasi-judicial proceedings, the more liberal admission of testimony does not justify dispensing with substantial rules essential to arriving at truth and protecting rights.

The Court found that petitioners were not afforded a full opportunity to be heard in a manner adequate to justify the drastic consequence of termination of employment. It emphasized the principle that procedural due process requires a hearing before condemnation, an orderly investigation, and judgment after such inquiry.

It held that the arbitration scheduling conflicts between the related BLR case and the MOLE case were not shown to be tainted by an intent to delay, and that the labor arbiter should have adopted a more circumspect and liberal approach in resolving motions for postponement. The Court considered it an inadequate justification to deny workers a reasonable opportunity to be heard on charges of serious violence, where such charges served as the prime basis for granting clearance to terminate only ten out of forty-one workers.

The Court also rejected the characterization that non-appearance necessarily amounted to waiver of the right to present evidence. It reasoned that the failure to appear on October 13, 1979 was attributable to lack of proper notice. It underscored that the ex parte receipt of evidence on October 9, 1979 did not deprive petitioners of the right to later present their own evidence if they were not properly notif

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