Title
Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan
Case
G.R. No. 116033
Decision Date
Feb 26, 1997
Private individual Azarcon, designated by BIR as custodian of distrained truck, acquitted as Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over non-public officer.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 116033)

Facts: distraint, receipt, and subsequent events

The BIR issued a Warrant of Distraint addressed to its Regional Director ordering distraint of goods of delinquent taxpayer Jaime Ancla and a Warrant of Garnishment directed to Alfredo Azarcon to transfer surrendered property. Azarcon received the Warrant and signed a Receipt for Goods Seized (June 17, 1985), which obligated him to preserve and not dispose of the truck without BIR authority. Azarcon later sent a letter (November 21, 1985) attempting to relinquish responsibility after Ancla allegedly removed equipment. The BIR Regional Director replied (May 27, 1986) asserting Azarcon had voluntarily assumed safekeeping obligations and remained responsible. A progress report (June 11, 1986) suggested further action against a third party but instead a letter‑complaint was filed (January 22, 1988), and the Ombudsman authorized preliminary investigation in August 1988.

Procedural history before the Sandiganbayan

An Information was filed on January 12, 1990 charging Azarcon and Ancla with malversation of public funds or property (Art. 217 RPC in relation to Art. 222 RPC), alleging Azarcon had become a depository/administrator of distrained property and thus a responsible public officer who misappropriated the truck or its value (P80,831.59). The Sandiganbayan granted reinvestigation (May 22, 1991); prosecution recommended withdrawal but was overruled by the Ombudsman. Motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction were denied; trial proceeded; the Sandiganbayan convicted Azarcon on March 8, 1994, and sentenced him to imprisonment, indemnity, fine, disqualification and costs. Azarcon filed a motion for new trial/reconsideration which was denied; he then elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

Core legal issues presented

  • Whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over Azarcon, a private individual, charged with malversation of public funds.
  • Whether Azarcon, by virtue of signing the BIR receipt and acting as a custodian/depositary of distrained property, became a public officer subject to Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.
  • Ancillary contentions raised below: lack of proof of Ancla’s ownership of the truck; alleged non‑compliance with NIRC procedures for disposition of distrained property; delay and alleged negligence by the BIR in selling distrained property.

Governing jurisdictional rule and its application date

Jurisdiction is determined by statute as of the time the criminal action commenced (the filing of the Information on January 12, 1990). Under P.D. No. 1606 (as amended by P.D. No. 1861 and prior to R.A. No. 7975), the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive original jurisdiction encompassed, inter alia, certain offenses committed by public officers and cases under the Anti‑Graft law; expressly, when private individuals are charged as co‑principals, accomplices or accessories with public officers, they may be tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. Thus the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over a private individual depended on either (a) the private person being charged jointly with a public officer, or (b) the private person himself qualifying as a public officer.

Jurisdictional analysis and statutory construction

The Supreme Court reiterated the elementary rule that jurisdiction must appear clearly from statute and is not presumed. Applying the statutory framework in force on January 12, 1990, the Court emphasized that P.D. No. 1606 specified only two situations for the Sandiganbayan to try private individuals: where they are charged as co‑principals/accomplices/accessories with public officers or where the private individuals themselves are public officers. Because the Information did not charge Azarcon as a co‑actor with any public officer, the Court analyzed whether Azarcon could be deemed a public officer for jurisdictional purposes.

Definition of public officer under the RPC and application to Azarcon

Article 203 RPC defines public officers for purposes of relevant criminal provisions: a person who takes part in the performance of public functions or performs public duties must have such authority by (a) direct provision of law, (b) popular election, or (c) appointment by competent authority. The Court held that even if signing the BIR receipt commenced participation in an activity related to public functions (safekeeping of distrained property), Azarcon’s status could not be elevated to public officer absent authorization by one of the three constitutionally or statutorily recognized modes. The Court found no direct statutory provision or appointment by a competent authority that converted Azarcon into a public officer.

NIRC constructive distraint provision and its limits

The NIRC provision authorizing constructive distraint (quoted as Section 206 in the decision) permits the BIR to require a taxpayer or any person in possession of property to sign a receipt and obligate preservation of the distrained property. The Court acknowledged the BIR’s authority to require such a receipt but distinguished that administrative authority to secure and preserve distrained goods does not carry with it the power to appoint the private holder as a public officer. The Court stressed that administrative agencies exercise only powers conferred expressly or by necessary implication in their enabling statutes and may not, by administrative act, usurp appointive powers or confer public‑officer status.

Distinguishing authorities relied upon by the prosecution

The Solicitor General invoked U.S. v. Rastrollo (1 Phil. 22, 1901) and analogized the depositary status there to the BIR receipt here. The Court found Rastrollo inapposite: Rastrollo involved a judicial deposit in the context of court jurisdiction and the depositary’s character as an officer flowed from the judicial act; here, the act was administrative (BIR distraint and receipt), and the NIRC did not create public‑officer status by that act. The Court therefore rejected the contention that signing the BIR receipt transformed Azarcon into a public officer.

Interpretation of Article 222 and penal construction

Article 222 RPC makes penal provisions applicable to private individuals who have charge of certain funds or property (including administrators or depositaries of property attached or seized by public authority). The Court highlighted the plain language of Article 222: it subjects such private individuals to the penal provisions of the chapter but does not declare them to

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