Title
Avecilla vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 46370
Decision Date
Jun 2, 1992
Antonio Avecilla, a messenger, convicted of qualified theft for unlawfully taking a registered letter containing a bank draft, affirmed by the Supreme Court.
qualified theft
registered letter
bank draft
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 46370)

Factual Background

The prosecution presented Lourdes Rodriguez de Lacson, an employee of Litton Mills, Inc., who testified that her sister in the United States sent her a registered letter containing a bank draft, and that Lourdes later learned she had not received the registered letter addressed to her. Lourdes traced the matter to the Mandaluyong Post Office, where she was informed that Registered Letter No. 247341 had been claimed on November 16, 1971 by Antonio Avecilla, who had been known as a messenger of Litton Mills for more than two years. She stated that a registry notice was duly signed by him. Lourdes further testified that she filed a complaint, which led to an investigation by Litton Knitting Mills personnel officers. In that setting, Avecilla allegedly admitted to having taken the registered letter but refused to return it upon demand. Lourdes then filed a police complaint.

The prosecution also relied on the testimony of Rosalinda Cervo, Clerk-in-charge of the registry section of the Mandaluyong Post Office, who described the registry procedure and the claim. She testified that on November 15, 1971 she received the letter addressed to Lourdes at “Litton Knitting Mills” and issued the corresponding registry notice, which was sent through the letter carrier. On November 16, 1971, Avecilla went to the post office to claim the registered letter, presented the registry notice bearing Lourdes’s signature, signed it in her presence, and introduced a woman as Mrs. Lourdes Lacson who signed in the control book and appeared as the addressee. Cervo testified that because Avecilla had been the authorized messenger since 1969, she entrusted the registered letter to him. She later met what she said appeared to be the true Lourdes when that woman went to the post office to complain that she had not received the registered letter. When Cervo was shown the control book with the signatures, Lourdes repudiated the signatures as hers. Cervo then informed Avecilla of Lourdes’s complaint, and Avecilla allegedly declared that he had placed the letter on the table of Mrs. Lacson.

Finally, the prosecution presented Federico Rivera, Sr., the Postmaster of Mandaluyong, who testified that Litton Mills, through George Litton, Sr., had authorized Avecilla to accept registered mails, including checks, parcels, and letters. He recalled that on November 16, 1971, a registered letter addressed to Lourdes c/o Litton Mills was delivered to Avecilla.

Defense Evidence and Accused’s Version

The defense called Lourdes herself and sought production of a bank cashier’s letter dated October 27, 1972, addressed to Maria Paz R. Prado, stating that Cashiers Check No. 27166, payable to Miss Carmencita S. Rodriguez, had not been paid as of that date. The accused, Antonio Avecilla, testified that as messenger of Litton Mills, it was his duty to manage incoming and outgoing mails for branches in Pasig and Mandaluyong. He stated that Lourdes was his co-employee and that he often mailed her letters and retrieved her mail from the post office. On November 16, 1971, he admitted that he obtained the registered letter addressed to Lourdes by signing Lourdes’s name and his own on the registry receipt. He claimed that once inside the office he left the letter on Lourdes’s table because she had already left for the day after 5:00 p.m., and that at the time no one else was in the office.

Trial Court Proceedings

On July 16, 1973, the trial court, presided by Judge Emilio V. Salas, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple theft and imposed an indeterminate penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The dispositive portion sentenced Avecilla to an indeterminate term of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year, eight (8) months, twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum, applying Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellate Court Ruling

The accused appealed. On December 20, 1976, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court decision. It held the offense to be qualified theft rather than simple theft, and increased the penalty. It ordered that the appellant suffer an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The appellate court affirmed the remainder of the trial court’s decision. The motion for reconsideration was denied in a single stereotyped sentence.

Issues Raised by the Petitioner

Avecilla insisted that his constitutional right to due process was violated substantially and procedurally. He argued that convicting him of qualified theft instead of simple theft increased the penalty to a level “eight times longer” than his original sentence, and he claimed the denial of his motion for reconsideration lacked sufficient detail. He further asserted violations of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation as guaranteed by Art. IV, Sec. 19 of the 1971 Constitution and reiterated in Rule 115, Sec. 1, par. (c) of the Rules of Court. He argued that the Court of Appeals erred in convicting him of qualified theft based only on the use of the term “registered letter” because not all registered letters constitute mail matter for qualified theft. He added that Art. 723 of the Civil Code—providing that a letter becomes the personal property of the addressee only after delivery—meant the charged facts constituted only simple theft. He also claimed that the information was vague as to what was exactly worth $500.00, and that it did not state that the registered letter contained a check. He then challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, alleging that the prosecution did not prove key elements: knowledge of the contents, unlawful taking because delivery was allegedly made in accordance with postal regulations, and the fact of taking of the stolen property, which he argued was not produced. He further contended that the prosecution relied on what he characterized as the complaining witness’s self-serving testimony.

The Parties’ Core Contentions as Addressed by the Court

The Court treated the petition as necessitating a scrutiny of the information, because it is the description in the information that determines the offense charged and the court’s jurisdiction. It stressed that the designation of the offense is not controlling. What controls is the description of the acts constituting the crime as alleged in the information.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court held that the information contained the essential elements of theft, namely: (1) taking of personal property; (2) property belonging to another; (3) taking done with intent to gain; (4) taking done without the consent of the owner; and (5) taking done without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things. It acknowledged that intent to gain was not expressly alleged, but ruled that it may be presumed from the allegation that the mail matter was unlawfully taken. The Court also held that the information did not allege that the taking was accomplished with violence or intimidation or with force upon things, thus the allegation supported theft rather than robbery.

On the asserted due process and information-related objections, the Court ruled that the relevant issue was whether the accused could be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation from the factual allegations, not from the label attached to the offense. It sustained the Court of Appeals’ classification of the theft as qualified on the basis that the information alleged the taking of a registered letter, which it treated as mail matter under Art. 310 of the Revised Penal Code, which qualifies theft when the property stolen is mail matter.

The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that not all registered letters are mail matter. It explained that under Sec. 1945 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, first class mail matter includes letters, and under Sec. 1962 of the same code, a registry system was established for valuable registered matter so that senders or owners may be indemnified for losses in the mails. It concluded that the accused’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was not violated.

The Court also addressed the broader contention that the accused was convicted of a different offense than what was designated at the trial level. It ruled that an accused may be convicted and sentenced according to the crime that the facts alleged in the information and proved at trial constitute, even if the offense designated in the information differs.

On sufficiency of evidence, the Court reiterated that the law does not demand absolute certainty of guilt but only moral certainty as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. It found that the evidence met this standard. It observed that the accused’s defensive claim—that he left the letter on Lourdes’s desk after office hours when no one else was in the office—was not credible. The Court also held that the accused’s attempt to show he did not benefit from the bank draft letter did not negate theft. It relied on the principle that, as in robbery, the unlawful taking becomes complete once the offender gains possession of the thing.

The Court likewise rejected the theory that postal delivery rules immunized the accused from liability for “misdelivery.” It pointed to the unrebutted proof that the accused used a woman to misrepresent herself as Mrs. Lacson, and that someone other than Lourdes signed the control book. Thereafter, the accused took the registered letter containing the bank draft that Lourdes never received. The Court then applied the doctrinal presumption of animus lucrandi, holding that intent to gain may be presumed from furtive taking of useful property belonging to another, absent special circumstances indicating a different intent. It found that intent to gain may be in

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