Title
Astudillo vs. Board of Directors of People's Homesite and Housing Corp.
Case
G.R. No. L-28066
Decision Date
Sep 22, 1976
Peregrina Astudillo, a squatter, challenged the sale of Lot 16 to Ramon Mitra, claiming rights. Court ruled she lacked cause of action, upheld dismissal, and affirmed Mitra's ownership.
squatter
sale
possessory rights

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-28066)

Factual Background: PHHC’s Award and Astudillo’s Occupation

The respondents alleged that on December 28, 1957, Ramon P. Mitra applied, on behalf of his minor son Ramon Mitra Ocampo, for the purchase of Lot 16, Block E-155. The application was approved on January 3, 1958, and Mitra made a downpayment of P840, representing ten percent of the lot’s price. On September 9, 1961, the PHHC and Mitra executed a contract of conditional sale. After Mitra paid the full price—totalling more than nine thousand pesos—a final deed of sale was executed in his favor on February 18, 1965, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89875 was issued to him on March 1, 1965.

The lot was, however, stated to be in the possession of Astudillo. She admitted that she had been squatting on the lot “uninterruptedly since 1957 up to the present.” She filed a request on February 24, 1963 with the administrative investigating committee of the PHHC, seeking cancellation of the award of Lot 16 to Congressman Mitra and asking that it be re-awarded to her. The record, as presented in the decision, showed no action on that request.

On May 3, 1965, Astudillo filed the petition in the lower court against the PHHC board of directors, the register of deeds of Quezon City, and the Mitra spouses. She questioned the legality of the award of Lot 16 to Mitra and asked that the lot be sold to her.

Lower Court Proceedings: Summary Judgment Treated as a Dismissal

After the respondents filed answers, the Mitra spouses filed a verified motion for summary judgment, asserting that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. Astudillo opposed the motion. The parties later submitted memoranda. The lower court treated the motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss. It dismissed Astudillo’s petition on the grounds that she was a mala fide squatter and that the sale of Lot 16 to Mitra could not be assailed through certiorari and mandamus.

Issues on Appeal: Cause of Action and Availability of Certiorari and Mandamus

On appeal, Astudillo assigned four errors, each raising questions of law. She argued that the lower court erred in holding that certiorari and mandamus did not lie, and in concluding that she had no right to question the award to Mitra. She also contended that the award violated section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law and the constitutional provision prohibiting a Senator or Representative from being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in contracts with the government or its subdivisions and instrumentalities during his term.

In “the ultimate analysis,” the Supreme Court framed the core issue as whether Astudillo possessed a cause of action to annul the sale of Lot 16 to Mitra and to compel the PHHC board to award the lot to her.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling on Cause of Action: No Right Predicated on Squatting

The Court held that Astudillo had no cause of action to impugn the award to Mitra or to require that she be allowed to purchase Lot 16. The Court emphasized that, as a squatter, she had no possessory rights over the lot. It reasoned that, “in the eyes of the law,” the award to Mitra did not prejudice her, because she was bereft of any rights that could have been impaired by the award, citing Banez vs. Court of Appeals, L-30351, September 11, 1974, 59 SCRA 15, 22.

The Court further noted the absence of a showing that Astudillo was a member of the Pinahan Homeowners Association, particularly any category of members described as “deserving squatters,” citing Kempis vs. Gonzales, L-31701, October 31, 1974, 60 SCRA 439. Procedurally, the Court concluded that she was not entitled to sue to enforce or protect a right or to prevent a wrong, because she had no right to the lot and thus respondents did not commit any delict or wrong in violation of her rights.

Subsidiarily, the Court held that she was not entitled to seek annulment of the sale because she was not principally or subsidiarily bound by the contract. The Court invoked Art. 1397, Civil Code, underscoring that lack of binding relation to the contract defeated the demanded annulment.

Astudillo’s Reliance on Housing Policy and PHHC Charter: Rejection

Astudillo invoked provisions of the PHHC charter, described in the decision as erroneously referred to as section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 648, arguing that the PHHC was to acquire buildings to provide “decent housing for those who may be unable otherwise to provide themselves therewith” and to acquire large estates for resale to bona fide occupants. The Court held that these provisions did not sustain her action. It reasoned that the provisions did not justify her squatting on a government-owned lot and then demanding that the lot be sold to her. The Court explicitly stated that she was not a bona fide occupant of Lot 16.

The Court acknowledged, in broad constitutional and statutory terms, the State’s commitment to social justice and adequate social services in housing, referencing Secs. 6 and 7, Art. II, New Constitution. Nonetheless, it ruled that the State’s solicitude for the destitute did not mean it would tolerate usurpations of property. It quoted the principle that the government could not set aside moral standards to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders, because such a policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of achieving lawful resolution, citing Bernardo vs. Bernardo, 96 Phil. 202, 206. The Court also adverted to the government’s “militant policy against squatters,” citing Letter of Instruction No. 19 (October 2, 1972) directing city and district engineers to remove illegal constructions and provide for relocation, and referencing Letter of Instruction No. 19-A, as well as City of Manila vs. Garcia, L-26053, February 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 413, 418.

Availability of Certiorari and Mandamus: Not Proper for the Relief Sought

The Court also held that the lower court did not err in finding that Astudillo could not use certiorari and mandamus to obtain judicial review of the award of Lot 16 to Mitra.

As to certiorari, the Court cited Rule 65. It reiterated the text of section 1, explaining that certiorari is available when a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and when there is no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It underscored that the respondent PHHC board was not the board contemplated in section 1, because it did not exercise judicial functions. It described the award as a routinary corporate act within the board’s competence, and it found that no jurisdictional issue was involved. The Court noted that certiorari corrects jurisdictional errors only, citing Gov’t of the P. I. vs. Judge of 1st Instance of Iloilo, 34 Phil. 157, 159.

As to mandamus, the Court addressed section 3 of Rule 65, which allows mandamus when a tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects a duty specifically enjoined by law as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right, with no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. The Court ruled that the relief Astudillo sought—compelling the PHHC board to cancel the award and resell the lot—was not the kind of right enforceable through mandamus. It held that what she wanted was to compel PHHC to execute a contract of sale in her favor, and that mandamus does not lie to enforce performance of a private contract not fully performed by either party. It cited Quiogue vs. Romualdez, 46 Phil. 337, and added by reference Jacinto vs. Director of Lands, 49 Phil. 853, where a petition to compel the Director of Lands to execute a deed of conveyance was denied. The Court further stated that generally, title to property cannot be litigated in a mandamus proceedin

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