Astorga vs. Villegas

Factual Background

On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a local bill amending the powers and duties of the Vice‑Mayor of Manila, was filed in the House. The House passed the bill on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964 and transmitted it to the Senate. The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities, which recommended approval with a minor amendment. On May 20, 1964 Senator Arturo Tolentino introduced substantial amendments on the Senate floor which the Senate approved in toto. The Senate journal recorded those floor amendments. The Secretary of the Senate, however, by letter dated May 21, 1964, advised the House that the bill had been passed by the Senate "with amendments" and attached a certification embodying a different, minor amendment recommended by Senator Roxas rather than the Tolentino amendments. The House approved the bill as it was sent back, copies were printed and attested by the presiding officers and secretaries of both Houses, and four printed copies were transmitted to the President, who signed the enrolled copy on June 18, 1964, whereupon it was styled Republic Act No. 4065. Thereafter the Senate President publicly declared that the enrolled copy did not contain the amendments actually approved by the Senate and that his signature on the enrolled copy was invalid; the President of the Philippines withdrew his signature on July 31, 1964. Subsequently the Mayor of Manila issued circulars and orders refusing to recognize Republic Act No. 4065 and took steps to nullify actions taken under it. In reaction, Vice‑Mayor Astorga filed a petition in this Court seeking mandamus, injunction and prohibition to compel compliance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065.

Procedural History

Petitioner filed an original petition in the Supreme Court on September 7, 1964 for mandamus, injunction and prohibition, with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction, to compel respondents to recognize and implement Republic Act No. 4065. Respondent Mayor moved for relief, and on April 28, 1965 this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from exercising powers purportedly conferred by Republic Act No. 4065 until further order. Amici curiae appeared and submitted memoranda. After full deliberation the Court rendered a final decision April 30, 1974 adjudicating the validity of Republic Act No. 4065, denying petitioner the relief sought, declaring the Act not duly enacted, and making the temporary restraining order permanent.

The Parties' Contentions

Petitioner asserted that the attestation of the presiding officers and secretaries on the enrolled bill constituted conclusive proof of due enactment and that the enrolled bill, authenticated and signed, bound the courts to regard it as law. Respondents maintained that the enrolled copy did not reflect the text actually passed by the Senate, as evidenced by the Senate journal, and that therefore Republic Act No. 4065 never became law. Respondents urged that the journal entries, and not the enrolled instrument whose text differed from what the Senate approved on the floor, should determine whether Congress had duly enacted the bill.

Issues Presented

The principal questions were: whether the so‑called enrolled bill doctrine or the journal entry rule should govern the proof of a bill's due enactment in this jurisdiction; and whether Republic Act No. 4065, as authenticated and signed and subsequently disclaimed by the Senate President and by the Chief Executive, had been duly enacted and therefore became law.

Governing Legal Principles

The Court examined the competing doctrines. The enrolled bill theory, grounded in authorities such as Field v. Clark, treats the signatures of presiding officers on an enrolled bill as conclusive attestation that the bill was passed by both Houses, invoking the respect due coequal departments and assigning to such attestation a conclusive character when the bill is presented to and approved by the Chief Executive. By contrast, the statutory provision found in Section 313 of Act 190 (as amended) and the constitutional provisions requiring each House to keep a journal and to publish its proceedings (cited from the (1935) Constitution, Sec. 10(4) and Sec. 21(2)) provide that the journals are the records of legislative action and may be resorted to as proof of proceedings. This Court recognized prior domestic decisions, including Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, which had divided opinion on the point, and considered foreign authorities, including Brown v. Morris and other American cases, reflecting divergence as to whether attestation is conclusive or whether the journals may be examined.

Court's Analysis and Reasoning

The Court began from the uncontested fact that the Senate President had declared his signature on the enrolled bill invalid and had clarified that, in his view, the enrolled copy had never been approved by the Senate. The Court held that the attestation of presiding officers is merely a mode of authentication and does not constitute the essential act of lawmaking, which is the approval of a bill by both Houses. The Court observed that where attestation is absent or disclaimed, recourse to the journals and other legislative records is appropriate to determine whether the bill as signed into law was the text actually passed by Congress. The Court examined the Senate journal, found that the substantial amendments introduced by Senator Tolentino were approved on the Senate floor but were not incorporated in the printed text transmitted to and signed by the President, and concluded that the enrolled copy did not represent the bill actually passed by the Senate. The Court declined to engage in the risky enterprise of rewriting the enrolled text to include the floor amendments; instead it confined its inquiry to whether the enacted text matched the bill that had been passed. Given the Senate President's explicit disavowal and the Chief Executive's withdrawal of his signature, the Court held that it would be imprope