Title
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Case
G.R. No. 78742
Decision Date
Jul 14, 1989
Landowners challenged agrarian reform laws, claiming violations of due process, equal protection, and just compensation. The Supreme Court upheld the laws, affirming their constitutionality and the President's authority to issue related executive orders.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 211166)

Constitutional directives and statutory background

The court analyzes the challenged measures against the 1987 Constitution’s Article XIII, Section 4 (state duty to undertake agrarian reform and to provide for retention limits and just compensation), and other transitory and appropriation provisions invoked by the parties. The Court recounts the legislative and executive history: the Agricultural Land Reform Code (R.A. No. 3844, 1963), P.D. No. 27 (1972), E.O. No. 228 (July 17, 1987), Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 (July 22, 1987), and the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 6657 (June 10, 1988), which expressly provides that earlier measures are suppletory when not inconsistent with the CARP.

Procedural Posture and Consolidation

Consolidation, parties’ standing, and justiciability

Multiple petitions raising common constitutional questions were consolidated. The Court found the petitions to present an actual case or controversy and held that petitioners and intervenors suffered or faced imminent injury sufficient to establish standing. The Court reaffirmed its discretion to entertain important constitutional challenges even when parties do not strictly fit the usual standing tests, citing prior precedents permitting broader access when issues are of transcendent public importance.

Preliminary Determinations: Authority to Act

Presidential legislative authority in the transitory period

The Court upheld President Aquino’s authority to issue Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, which vested interim legislative powers in the incumbent President until the first Congress convened. The Court rejected arguments that the measures were invalid “midnight” enactments or automatically voided when the President’s interim legislative power ceased, noting that such acts remain effective unless repealed or declared invalid.

Retention Limits, Appropriation, and Legislative Action

Retention limits, congressional action, and the Agrarian Reform Fund

Challenges asserting that the executive measures lacked retention limits were rendered academic by R.A. No. 6657, which set retention limits (Section 6) and thereby addressed the constitutional requirement. The Court distinguished Proc. No. 131’s creation of a P50 billion Agrarian Reform Fund as incidental to a proclamation (not an appropriation statute proper) and observed that Congress later incorporated related provisions into the CARP. Objections that the fund was an invalid in futuro appropriation or lacked certification by the National Treasurer were addressed by noting Proc. No. 131’s nature and subsequent legislative treatment in R.A. No. 6657.

Police Power versus Eminent Domain

Distinction and interplay between regulatory measures and taking

The Court reviewed traditional distinctions between the police power (regulation) and eminent domain (expropriation), recognizing both historical separation and modern convergence where expropriation may serve broad public purposes. It explained that retention limits and other regulatory measures fall under the police power insofar as they regulate ownership and use; however, where removal of title and possession of land in excess of retention limits is required, the power exercised is eminent domain and triggers the constitutional requirement of just compensation.

Public Use Requirement

Constitutional sufficiency of agrarian reform as public use

The Court held that agrarian reform is expressly authorized by the Constitution and thus satisfies the “public use” requirement for eminent domain. The Court declined to substitute judicial judgment for the political branches’ policy choice to include private agricultural land redistribution within CARP.

Just Compensation: Fundamental Principles

Definition of “just compensation” and traditional cash standard

The Court reiterated that just compensation is the full, fair, and money-equivalent indemnity for the owner’s loss and emphasized that historically just compensation has been paid in cash. The jurisprudential principle is that compensation should reflect the market value of the property and be neither more nor less than that fair equivalent.

Administrative Determination of Compensation and Judicial Prerogative

Summary administrative proceedings under CARP and judicial review

Petitioners argued that administrative valuation procedures (e.g., Section 16(d) of CARP) unconstitutionally usurped judicial prerogatives. The Court distinguished the present statutory scheme from prior invalidating precedents (notably EPZA v. Dulay), observing that under CARP the DAR’s administrative valuation is expressly preliminary and non-final because Section 16(f) preserves the landowner’s right to bring the matter to court for final determination. Accordingly, summary administrative proceedings to produce a preliminary valuation do not preclude a landowner’s judicial remedy and therefore do not constitute an unconstitutional delegation or usurpation of judicial power.

Modes of Compensation under CARP

Legality of non-cash compensation and Court’s pragmatic rationale

CARP’s Section 18 provides multiple modes of compensation—varying cash percentages by size of excess hectares and payment of the balance in negotiable government financial instruments, LBP bonds, shares, tax credits, and other instruments. Petitioners contended that the Constitution requires payment of just compensation strictly in money. The Court acknowledged traditional authorities that favor cash payment but concluded that the extraordinary scope and national significance of CARP justified a more pragmatic approach. Given the immense fiscal burden of comprehensive redistribution, the Court found it reasonable and constitutionally permissible for Congress to authorize alternative modes of payment (subject to safeguards), particularly because the Constitution’s agrarian reform mandate implicitly contemplated a practicable mechanism for implementing large-scale land reform when immediate full cash payment may be impracticable. The Court therefore sustained Section 18 as not unduly oppressive, noting the graduated cash percentages favoring smaller landowners and the negotiability and permitted uses of LBP bonds and other instruments.

Timing of Transfer of Title and Possession

Requirement of full payment or deposit; retention of title until compensation

The Court reaffirmed the settled rule that title generally passes to the expropriator only upon full payment of just compensation. It interpreted CARP consistently with this principle: title and transfer to the State occur upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or upon deposit of compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank (Section 16(e)). The Court rejected claims that E.O. No. 228 or the CARP effectuated an unconstitutional transfer of ownership prior to full payment; it read the measures as conditioning transfer on payment or bona fide deposit, while also recognizing tenant-beneficiary rights under P.D. No. 27 and CARP.

Tenant Rights and Retained Benefits

Recognition of tenant interests and continuity of P.D. No. 27 benefits

The Court held that rights previously acquired by tenant-farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized under R.A. No. 6657. It also confirmed that landowners who had been unable to exercise retention rights under prior rules may avail themselves of retention rights under CARP, which the Court noted are in many respects more liberal.

Equal Protection and Classification Challenges

Validity of classifications and burden allocation

Petitioners complained that CARP unfairly singled out agricultural landowners to bear the burden of reform and that particular groups (e.g., sugar planters) were improperly classified. The Court applied the established four-part test for classifications (substantial distinctions, germane to the law’s purpose, not limited to present conditions, and e

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