G.R. No. 126221 - Asmala vs. Commission on Elections

Case Summary (G.R. No. 126221)

Factual Background

In the May 8, 1995 elections, eight candidates contested the Vice Mayor post. The Municipal Board of Canvassers credited Hadji Husni Mohammad with 3,065 votes, Emmanuel Manny Alano with 2,912 votes, and Halim Asmala with 2,542 votes. On the basis of these canvass results, Mohammad was proclaimed and later assumed the Vice Mayoral position.

On May 22, 1995, Asmala filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court of Basilan, docketed as Election Case No. 4-95, alleging election fraud and other irregularities affecting the election and the canvass. On the same date, Emmanuel Alano filed Election Protest No. 6-95, which was consolidated with Election Case No. 4-95.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court invalidated ballots for being written by one hand or prepared by only two persons. On February 14, 1996, it rendered judgment crediting Asmala with 2,130 votes, Alano with 1,920 votes, and Mohammad with 1,729 votes. The court then adjudged Asmala as the duly elected Vice Mayor of Tuburan and ordered his proclamation.

Regional Trial Court Decision and Execution Pending Appeal

On February 26, 1996, after the decision had been promulgated, Mohammad filed a Notice of Appeal with the same Regional Trial Court. On February 27, 1996, Asmala filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Mohammad opposed it, arguing that his perfected appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to resolve the motion.

Asmala relied on the doctrine in Edding vs. COMELEC, emphasizing that the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction over incidents, including motions for execution pending appeal, when the motion is filed within the reglementary period for perfection. After hearing, on March 28, 1996, the Regional Trial Court granted Asmala’s motion. Asmala was required to post a bond of P 30,000.00, and the court directed the sheriff to install Asmala as Vice Mayor after the COMELEC proclamation and taking of office oath. On April 1, 1996, upon approval of the property bond, the trial court authorized Asmala to assume office.

The COMELEC Petition and Its Resolution

On April 1, 1996 as well, Mohammad filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari, alleging that the March 28, 1996 Special Order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction because his appeal had been perfected, thereby allegedly depriving the trial court of power to issue an order for execution pending appeal.

After the parties submitted memoranda, the COMELEC, on August 20, 1996, granted Mohammad’s petition and set aside the March 28, 1996 order, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue it. Asmala then filed the present petition for certiorari on September 19, 1996.

Subsequent Motions and the Supplemental Petition

After Asmala filed the Supreme Court petition, Mohammad moved on September 21, 1996 for execution of the COMELEC resolution, asserting finality and executory character under Section 13(a), Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The motion was allegedly mailed without notice of hearing, and Asmala received it only on September 26, 1996. On September 27, 1996, Asmala opposed before the COMELEC, calling attention to the pending Supreme Court petition seeking to annul the August 20, 1996 resolution.

Despite that, on September 24, 1996, the COMELEC issued ex parte an order granting Mohammad’s motion for execution and issued a writ of execution the same day. This prompted Asmala to file a Supplemental Petition in the Supreme Court, requesting a Temporary Restraining Order to stop implementation.

The main issue in the original petition was whether the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the Regional Trial Court’s March 28, 1996 order of execution pending appeal. The supplemental issue concerned whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting execution despite the pendency of the Supreme Court certiorari petition.

The Parties’ Positions

Asmala argued that the Regional Trial Court had competence and jurisdiction to act on and grant his motion for execution pending appeal based on the timing of the motion relative to the period for perfecting an appeal. Mohammad, in contrast, insisted that the trial court had lost jurisdiction once he perfected his appeal before COMELEC by filing a notice of appeal and paying required appeal fees, thereby barring any further action by the trial court on execution pending appeal.

Notably, the text showed that Mohammad conceded both before the COMELEC and before the Supreme Court that Asmala’s motion was seasonably filed within the five-day period to perfect the appeal, with the admission emphasizing that Mohammad had not questioned the trial court’s authority to entertain execution pending appeal for as long as the motion was filed within that five-day period. Mohammad further insisted, nevertheless, that the timing of his own perfected appeal deprived the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction.

Supreme Court’s Discussion of Applicable Doctrine

The Supreme Court reviewed the controlling rules on the effect of an appeal on the trial court’s jurisdiction over incidents. It relied on Edding vs. COMELEC, which in turn referenced earlier jurisprudence including Eudela vs. Court of Appeals and Cebu Contractors Consortium vs. Court of Appeals, and which stated the “settled rule” that the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to resolve pending incidents. The Court stressed that when a motion for execution pending appeal is filed within the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal, the opposing party’s subsequent filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to resolve the motion. The Court treated this as a rule anchored on the fact that the motion must be heard and resolved while the court has jurisdiction, and the resolution then forms part of the record elevated on appeal.

The Supreme Court also addressed the lineage of doctrines, noting that Relampagos vs. Cumba held that a motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for perfection of the appeal, and that the earlier rulings in Garcia vs. de Jesus, Tobon Uy vs. Comelec, and Veloria vs. Comelec were overturned in that doctrinal development. It further cited later reiteration of the principle, including Conrado Lindo vs. Comelec, Judge Napoleon Dilag, etc. and Rosario Velasco (June 19, 1997), as consistent with the timeliness requirement.

Accordingly, the determinative question for the Court was whether Asmala’s motion for execution pending appeal was timely filed within the period for perfecting the appeal.

Timeliness of the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal

The Court identified a key procedural timeline. The Regional Trial Court promulgated its subject judgment on February 26, 1996, which was the decision dated February 14, 1996. Under Rule 35, Section 22 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the parties had five (5) days from service of judgment to interpose an appeal before the COMELEC.

From the Court’s perspective, even though Mohammad filed his Notice of Appeal on the day the judgment was promulgated, the appeal would be deemed perfected only with respect to him, and it would not deprive Asmala of the remainder of the five-day period if he wanted to file within it. The Court cited Valencia vs. Court of Appeals for the proposition that, under the then-present procedure, an appeal is perfected upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party, and not merely upon the filing date of a notice of appeal by one party. It reasoned that a notice of appeal filed earlier does not perfect the appeal such that it divests the trial court prior to the expiration of the last day to appeal by the other party.

Thus

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 126221)

Halim Asmala filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 39 and Section 1, Rule 37 of the 1993 Revised Rules of Court, to annul a Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution that set aside a Regional Trial Court order for execution pending appeal.
The COMELEC assailed the trial court’s Special Order dated March 28, 1996 which had granted execution pending appeal of the trial court’s decision declaring Asmala the duly elected Vice Mayor of Tuburan, Basilan and ordering his proclamation.
The Court treated the controversy as involving both the trial court’s jurisdiction to grant execution pending appeal and the COMELEC’s jurisdiction and discretion in setting aside that order.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Petitioner Halim Asmala sought relief in the Court to restore the trial court’s execution order that enabled his assumption of office.
Respondent Commission on Elections issued the Resolution dated August 20, 1996 that nullified the trial court’s March 28, 1996 execution order for alleged lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent Hadji Husni Mohammad was the protestee in the trial court and the petitioner before the COMELEC seeking to set aside the trial court’s execution order.
The Court reviewed the COMELEC’s Resolution via certiorari, with a Supplemental Petition challenging further execution actions taken by the COMELEC while the certiorari proceedings were pending.
The supplemental controversy concerned whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting execution on its August 20, 1996 Resolution notwithstanding the pendency of the present Petition for Certiorari.

Key Factual Allegations

In the elections of May 8, 1995, eight candidates vied for Vice Mayor of Tuburan, Basilan.
The canvass results reflected Hadji Husni Mohammad with 3,065 votes, Emmanuel Manny Alano with 2,912 votes, and Halim Asmala with 2,542 votes.
Mohammad was proclaimed and later assumed office as Vice Mayor based on the canvass.
On May 22, 1995, Asmala filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court of Basilan, docketed as Election Case No. 4-95, alleging election fraud and irregularities affecting the election and canvass.
On the same day, Alano filed a separate protest, docketed as Election Protest No. 6-95, which was consolidated with Election Case No. 4-95.
The trial court invalidated ballots on the ground that some were allegedly written by only one hand and others by only two persons.
On February 14, 1996, the trial court rendered decision crediting Asmala with 2,130 votes, Alano with 1,920 votes, and Mohammad with 1,729 votes, and declared Asmala duly elected Vice Mayor.
On February 26, 1996, Mohammad filed his Notice of Appeal with the same trial court.
On February 27, 1996, Asmala moved for execution pending appeal, and Mohammad opposed on the theory that a perfected appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction.
After hearing, the trial court issued its Special Order on March 28, 1996, granting execution pending appeal and requiring Asmala to post a bond of P 30,000.00 with instructions for the sheriff to install Asmala after the COMELEC’s proclamation and oath.
On April 1, 1996, after approval of Asmala’s bond, the trial court authorized him to assume office.
On April 1, 1996, Mohammad filed a Petition for Certiorari with the COMELEC to set aside the trial court’s March 28, 1996 order, asserting the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction because his appeal had allegedly perfected.
On August 20, 1996, after memoranda were submitted, the COMELEC granted Mohammad’s petition, set aside the trial court’s March 28, 1996 order, and ruled that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue it.
Asmala then filed the instant certiorari on September 19, 1996.
Mohammad moved on September 21, 1996 for execution of the COMELEC Resolution dated August 20, 1996, and the motion was allegedly mailed without notice of hearing to Asmala’s lawyer.
The COMELEC issued an ex parte order granting execution on September 24, 1996, and a writ of execution followed the same day.
Asmala filed a Supplemental Petition seeking a Temporary Restraining Order to stop implementation.

Issues Presented

The principal issue was whether the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the trial court’s March 28, 1996 order granting execution pending appeal.
The core jurisdictional question turned on whether the trial court still had competence to act on the motion for execution pending appeal when the motion was filed.
The supplemental issue was whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting Mohammad’s motion for execution of the August 20, 1996 COMELEC Resolution