Title
Aquino vs. Municipality of Malay, Aklan
Case
G.R. No. 211356
Decision Date
Sep 29, 2014
Petitioner challenged EO 10 ordering demolition of his Boracay hotel, claiming FLAgT rights and due process violations. SC upheld CA, ruling LGU acted within authority, FLAgT did not override local laws, and certiorari was proper remedy.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 181508)

Factual Background

Petitioner represented a corporation that, while already operating a resort, applied on January 7, 2010 for zoning compliance to construct a three-storey hotel on a 998 sqm parcel in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, an area covered by a FLAgT issued by the DENR. The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied the zoning application on January 20, 2010 because the proposed site lay within the twenty-five meter “no build zone” measured from the mean high water mark as defined in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131. Petitioner appealed to the Office of the Mayor on February 1, 2010, and followed up on May 13, 2010, but the appeal remained unresolved. Despite the denial and pending appeal, petitioner continued construction, expansion, and operation of the resort.

Administrative Actions and Enforcement

Respondents issued a Notice of Assessment on April 5, 2011 seeking payment of unpaid taxes and other liabilities and later issued a Cease and Desist Order on March 28, 2011 enjoining further expansion. On June 7, 2011 the Office of the Mayor promulgated EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of petitioner’s hotel; the EO was partially implemented on June 10, 2011 and subsequent demolitions followed, including one in February 2014. The municipal treasurer also allegedly refused tendered payment from petitioner for fees and permits.

Procedural History

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief in the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion in the issuance and execution of EO 10 and asserting rights under the FLAgT and DENR supervision. The CA dismissed the petition on procedural grounds, holding that certiorari lies only against tribunals, boards, or officers exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and that a mayor issuing an Executive Order acts in an executive capacity; the CA instructed that the proper remedy was declaratory relief in the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner sought reconsideration before the CA, which denied it, and then filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issues Presented

The dispositive questions framed by the Supreme Court were: whether a petition for certiorari was the proper remedy instead of declaratory relief; whether declaratory relief remained available after enforcement of EO 10; whether the respondent mayor exercised judicial or quasi-judicial functions in issuing EO 10; whether the mayor committed grave abuse of discretion; whether petitioner’s due process rights were violated by demolition without prior judicial proceedings; whether the LGU properly refused permits and clearances; whether rights under the FLAgT prevailed over the municipal ordinance and PD 1096; and whether the DENR had primary jurisdiction rather than the LGU.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that certiorari under Rule 65 could not be directed against the mayor because the issuance of EO 10 constituted an executive act; the CA held that the appropriate remedy was declaratory relief before the Regional Trial Court. The CA thus declined to reach the substantive question of grave abuse of discretion.

Supreme Court Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The Court held that, contrary to the CA’s narrow view on procedure, certiorari under Rule 65 was the appropriate remedy in the circumstances, but that respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing and implementing EO 10.

Procedural Reasoning: Declaratory Relief versus Certiorari

The Court found that declaratory relief under Rule 63 was no longer viable because the action contemplated by that remedy presupposes no actual breach or violation of rights or instruments; its purpose is to obtain authoritative guidance before breach occurs. Because EO 10 had already been enforced and demolition had been partially executed, declaratory relief could not provide the practical relief petitioner sought. The Court therefore held that the CA erred in directing petitioner to pursue declaratory relief after the EO’s enforcement. By contrast, the Court concluded that certiorari under Rule 65 was appropriate because the challenged act involved an officer exercising quasi-judicial functions and because there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy that would promptly remedy the injurious effects of the EO given the ongoing demolitions.

Quasi-Judicial Character of the Mayor’s Act

The Court explained that the proper inquiry is whether the particular act performed was judicial or quasi-judicial in nature, not the public character of the actor. The issuance of EO 10 rested on the mayor’s finding that petitioner’s construction was illegal. Such a factual and legal determination implicated the exercise of quasi-judicial powers because it required investigation of facts, determination of rights, and the imposition of consequences. The Court relied on previous pronouncements, including City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued, to sustain that a mayor may exercise quasi-judicial powers when determining the illegality of structures and ordering demolition.

Adequacy of Remedies and Urgency of Relief

The Court found that remedies under the LGC, such as review of executive orders by the provincial governor, were not adequate in the exigent circumstances because partial demolition had already occurred. The Court emphasized that adequacy is measured by whether a remedy would promptly relieve the petitioner from injurious effects and thus concluded that certiorari was an available and appropriate remedy.

Substantive Merits: Nuisance Characterization

The Court analyzed whether the hotel constituted a nuisance. Applying Article 694 of the Civil Code, the Court distinguished between nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens. It held that the hotel was not a nuisance per se, because that category attaches to matters inherently injurious irrespective of location. The Court concluded that the hotel was a nuisance per accidens because its location within the municipal no build zone transformed it into a public safety menace and thereby justified abatement.

Substantive Merits: Authority to Order Demolition under the LGC

The Court recognized limitations on the Sangguniang Bayan’s power to declare nuisances but held that the mayor possessed authority under Section 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC to require owners of illegally constructed structures to obtain permits, to make changes, or to order demolition. The Court reasoned that the demolition was not predicated solely upon the nuisance doctrine but also upon the building’s illegality for having been erected without required permits and clearances.

Substantive Merits: Illegality of the Construction

The Court found that petitioner admitted construction and operation without securing necessary permits and clearances. It cited Section 9 of Municipal Ordinance 2000-131, which required zoning clearance, endorsement, and issuance of a building permit before construction, and Section 301 of PD 1096, which mandated building permits for any erection, alteration, or demolition of structures. The Court held that petitioner’s continued construction after denial of zoning clearance and while an appeal remained unresolved constituted violation of municipal ordinance and the National Building Code, thereby justifying the mayor’s exercise of power under the LGC.

Procedural Due Process

The Court assessed whether procedural due process was observed. It invoked the presumption of regularity in public officers’ performances and noted the petitioner’s failure to attach the Cease and Desist Order and EO 10 to demonstrate nonobservance of the ordinance’s ten-day demolition notice. The Court observed that EO 10 itself referenced notices dated March 7 and March 28, 2011, which, if true, satisfied statutory notice requirements. The Court also noted that petitioner did not challe

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