G.R. No. L-30485 - Aquino vs. Mariano

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-30485)

Procedural History and Material Events

On October 9, 1968, Fiscal Aquino filed the information in Criminal Case No. 18425, charging five named accused. Subsequently, on October 27, 1968, Lucio Adriano, Jr. filed in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 11307, praying for an order directing Fiscal Aquino to include, as defendants in the information, all persons against whom he found a prima facie case, as stated in Annex “B” of the petition. A central target of the requested inclusion was Commissioner Antonio Noblejas, who had by then resigned from office.

Civil Case No. 11307 was assigned to Branch X presided by respondent Judge Mariano. On March 28, 1969, respondent court rendered a decision granting the petition for mandamus. The dispositive portion ordered Fiscal Aquino to include as accused in Criminal Case No. 18425, all persons—including Commissioner Noblejas—against whom he found a prima facie case as stated in his second indorsement dated June 20, 1968 addressed to the Secretary of Justice.

Facts on Fiscal Aquino’s Indorsements and the Filing of the Information

The record reflected that Fiscal Aquino conducted the corresponding preliminary investigation. In his second indorsement dated June 20, 1968 to the then Secretary of Justice, he expressed the view that a strong prima facie case existed against Commissioner Noblejas and recommended strongly that an information be filed against the commissioner and other persons he found liable.

More than two months later, however, Fiscal Aquino issued a memorandum dated September 2, 1968 to the then Secretary of Justice, asserting that, in view of Commissioner Noblejas’s offer to resign and the commissioner’s explanation, he found that the latter’s responsibility, if any, was only administrative in nature. As a result, the information was filed without including Commissioner Noblejas.

Issues Raised in the Petition for Review

Fiscal Aquino sought review by certiorari, assailing the mandamus judgment. The petition presented the core question whether Lucio Adriano, Jr. had a proper remedy through mandamus, or whether the aggrieved party should have pursued a simple motion in the criminal case to require Fiscal Aquino to include Commissioner Noblejas as an accused.

The Parties’ Contentions

The petitioner argued that mandamus was improper because other remedies within the ordinary course of law were available and adequate. He emphasized that Adriano, Jr. had not first requested the fiscal to include Noblejas. If the fiscal had denied such a request, Adriano, Jr. could then have appealed to the Secretary of Justice, who could reverse the fiscal and designate another to act for the purpose.

The petitioner also relied on the strict limitations governing mandamus under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, underscoring that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy reserved for extreme necessity, and only when no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists, and where the duty sought to be enforced is one specifically enjoined by law.

Legal Framework: Mandamus as an Extraordinary Remedy

The Court treated mandamus as an extraordinary remedy under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Mandamus may issue only when a tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In line with prior rulings cited in the decision—Quintero vs. Martinez, Perez vs. City Mayor of Cabanatuan, Alzate vs. Aldana, and Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association vs. Court of Industrial Relations—the Court reiterated that before a writ issues, the petitioner must exhaust remedies available in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner must also show that the duty sought to be performed is one that the law specifically enjoins as a duty of the office.

Application to the Present Case: Availability of a Motion in the Criminal Case

The Court held that, on the facts, mandamus was not warranted. It stressed that private respondent Adriano, Jr. did not first request Fiscal Aquino to include Commissioner Noblejas in the information. The Court reasoned that, had such a request been made and denied, Adriano, Jr. could have proceeded to administrative recourse by appealing to the Secretary of Justice, which could reverse the fiscal and designate another to act.

The Court found that a simple motion in the criminal case would have been more speedy and adequate than a mandamus petition. It accepted the Solicitor General’s practical explanation that a motion would avoid costs and procedural delay associated with a separate civil action for mandamus, including docket fees, case numbering, summons, court raffle, and pre-trial processes. The Court also invoked the definition of a motion under Section 1, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, and found that nothing in the rules prohibited such a procedure.

Further, the Court considered that the alternative approach would align with the principle that modern procedure abhors multiplicity of suits. It concluded that Adriano, Jr. should have availed of the administrative remedy first, and that failure to do so was fatal to the mandamus petition.

Rejection of the Claimed Exceptions and Prematurity Argument

Adriano, Jr. had attempted to avoid the exhaustion requirement by invoking exceptions recognized in Tapales vs. the President and the Board of Regents of the U.P., Mangubat vs. Osmena, Baguio vs. Honorable Jose Rodriguez, Pascual vs. Provincial Board, Marinduque Iron Mines, etc. vs. Secretary of Public Works, Alzate vs. Aldaba, and Demaisip vs. Court of Appeals. The Court rejected the attempt because it was not shown that the case fell within those recognized situations where exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with.

The Court also rejected the argument that filing a motion before the trial judge would amount to pre

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-30485)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Benjamin H. Aquino, as Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, sought review by certiorari of a Court of First Instance judgment granting a petition for mandamus against him.
Hon. Herminio C. Mariano, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch X), issued the assailed decision dated March 28, 1969.
Lucio Adriano, Jr. was the private respondent who obtained the writ of mandamus below.
The controversy originated from the filing of an information for estafa thru falsification of official and/or public documents in Criminal Case No. 18425.
The mandamus proceeding was docketed as Civil Case No. 11307 and was decided by Branch X.
The Supreme Court granted the fiscal’s petition, set aside the mandamus judgment, and held the remedy adopted by Adriano, Jr. to be improper.

Key Factual Allegations

On October 9, 1968, then Rizal Provincial Fiscal Benjamin H. Aquino filed an information in the Court of First Instance at Pasig, Rizal, docketed as Criminal Case No. 18425, titled “The People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Cenidoza, Jose R. Baricua, Cesario B. Ong, Lucio Adriano, Jr. and Adriano Castillo,” for estafa thru falsification of official and/or public documents.
The criminal case arose from the huge expansion in the area after a resurvey and subdivision of a parcel of registered land in Muntinlupa, Rizal.
The prosecution’s theory depended on the approval by certain officials of the Land Registration Commission of plans and technical descriptions prepared by the surveyor who resurveyed and subdivided the property.
One of the defendants, Lucio Adriano, Jr., filed a petition for mandamus on October 27, 1968 in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, praying that Fiscal Aquino include as defendants all persons against whom he found a prima facie case, as stated in Annex “B”.
The requested inclusion specifically covered Commissioner Antonio Noblejas of the Land Registration Commission, who had resigned from office by the time of the mandamus petition.
In the criminal prosecution, Fiscal Aquino initially recommended that a strong prima facie case existed against Commissioner Noblejas in a second indorsement dated June 20, 1968 to the Secretary of Justice.
More than two months after the June 20, 1968 indorsement, Fiscal Aquino issued a memorandum dated September 2, 1968 to the Secretary of Justice stating that, considering the offer of resignation and the Commissioner’s explanation, the responsibility, if any, was administrative in nature.
Consequently, the information was filed without including Commissioner Noblejas as one of the accused.

Relief Sought Below

Adriano, Jr. invoked mandamus to compel Fiscal Aquino to include Commissioner Antonio Noblejas as an accused in Criminal Case No. 18425.
The mandamus petition alleged that Fiscal Aquino unlawfully failed to include Noblejas despite a finding of a prima facie case.
The assailed decision ordered the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing Fiscal Aquino to include Noblejas and all persons against whom he found a prima facie case as stated in his second indorsement attached as Annex “B.”

Issue on Review

The principal issue was whether the proper remedy available to Adriano, Jr. was a petition for mandamus in the civil case, instead of a motion in the criminal case seeking the inclusion or amendment of the information.
The Court also addressed whether the prerequisites for mandamus were satisfied, particularly the requirement that there be no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Statutory And Rule Framework

The Supreme Court relied on Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on petition for mandamus.
Section 3, Rule 65 was quoted to define mandamus as an extraordinary remedy available when a tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects a duty specifically enjoined by law, or unlawfully excludes another from a right to which the other is entitled.
The rule also expressly required that there be no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The Court characterized mandamus as available only in cases of extreme necessity where ordinary procedures are powerless to afford reli