Title
Aquino vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 120265
Decision Date
Sep 18, 1995
Agapito Aquino disqualified for lacking one-year residency in Makati; COMELEC upheld, votes for him invalid, no winner declared.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 120265)

Procedural and Factual Background

Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy on March 20, 1995 listing a Makati address and an unspecified length of residence in the constituency. On April 24, 1995 Move Makati and Bedon filed a petition to disqualify petitioner for lack of the constitutional one-year residency in the district. Petitioner amended his certificate on April 25, 1995 to allege one year and thirteen days of residency, and on May 2, 1995 he presented evidence (including a lease contract and affidavits) before the COMELEC Second Division. The Second Division issued a May 6, 1995 resolution dismissing the disqualification petition and declaring petitioner eligible. Move Makati/Bedon filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc; elections were held May 8, 1995 with petitioner receiving the highest number of votes. The COMELEC en banc issued an order on May 15, 1995 directing suspension of petitioner’s proclamation pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration. On June 2, 1995 the COMELEC en banc reversed the Second Division, declared petitioner ineligible for lack of the one-year residence qualification, and made the suspension of proclamation permanent; it directed the Board of Canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner among the remaining qualified candidates upon finality.

Issues Raised by Petitioner

Petitioner challenged the COMELEC en banc orders and resolution on multiple grounds, principally: (A) lack of COMELEC jurisdiction post-election because Section 17, Article VI vests exclusive jurisdiction over contests on returns and qualifications of Members in the HRET; (B) if COMELEC had jurisdiction, it ceased post-election and remedies lie elsewhere; (C) grave abuse of discretion in suspending proclamation and in reversing the Second Division; (D) that the COMELEC’s factual finding on residency was contrary to evidence; (E) that the one-year residency requirement is legally impossible to enforce in a newly created district; and (F) that directing the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the next highest vote-getter violated settled doctrine that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed when the winner is later disqualified.

Jurisdictional Holding: COMELEC’s Authority to Proceed Pre-Proclamation and to Suspend Proclamation

The Court distinguished between an unproclaimed candidate and a member of the House. Section 17, Article VI vests exclusive jurisdiction in the HRET only with respect to contests involving Members of the House — i.e., after proclamation and assumption of office. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and has not taken the oath is not a member; hence HRET exclusivity does not automatically divest COMELEC of jurisdiction to hear disqualification petitions prior to or contemporaneous with proclamation. The Court held that COMELEC retains authority under statutes and its rules to continue disqualification proceedings even after the election and, where statutory criteria are met, to suspend proclamation pending resolution (citing Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 as applied).

Statutory Framework Supporting Continued Proceedings and Suspension

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides that a candidate declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for and that, if no final judgment is rendered before an election and the candidate nonetheless receives the winning number of votes, the Court or Commission may continue the hearing and, upon motion and where evidence of guilt (or ineligibility) is strong, may order suspension of proclamation. Section 7 of R.A. No. 6646 allows the procedure to apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy (Section 78, B.P. Blg. 881). The Court interpreted these provisions to permit COMELEC to go forward with disqualification cases after an election and, in appropriate circumstances, to suspend proclamation — subject to procedural safeguards and the requirement of strong evidence. The COMELEC’s amended Rule 25 (disqualification rule) was also discussed as a procedural vehicle for such inquiries.

Legal Standard for “Residence” in Election Law: Domicile as the Controlling Concept

The Court reaffirmed settled jurisprudence that the constitutional term “resident” for purposes of qualifications for the House is synonymous with “domicile.” Residence/domicile for election law requires not just physical presence but a permanent home or domicile of choice — the place one intends to return to and make his permanent home. The elements required to effect a change of domicile are: (1) bodily presence in the new place, (2) a bona fide intention to remain there (animus manendi), and (3) an intention to abandon the former domicile (animus non revertendi), manifested by definite acts corresponding to that intent.

Application of the Domicile Standard to Petitioner’s Proof

The Court reviewed the record showing petitioner’s long-asserted domicile of origin in Concepcion, Tarlac (including prior certificates of candidacy and registration), his birth records, and the lease contract for a Makati condominium unit dated April 1, 1994. The Court found that petitioner’s leasing (rather than purchase), the short-term character of the lease, petitioner’s admissions of maintaining other residences in Metro Manila, and the absence of clear and convincing proof of intent to abandon his Tarlac domicile demonstrated that petitioner failed to prove a bona fide change of domicile to Makati for the required one-year period. The COMELEC’s finding that the lease and surrounding circumstances did not establish the permanency required for domicile of choice was sustained as supported by the evidence.

Rejection of “Legal Impossibility” Argument for Newly Created District

Petitioner argued that the one-year residence requirement could not realistically be enforced in a newly created district that existed for less than a year. The Court rejected this contention as unsound: a new political district is carved from pre-existing territory inhabited by residents; the constitutional residency requirement is not negated by creation of a new district. Allowing a short-lived district creation to circumvent the constitutional residency rule would encourage opportunistic “transplantation” of candidacies and undermine representative fidelity to local communities. The statutory and constitutional scheme must be respected; a legislative act creating a district cannot override the constitutional qualifications for office.

Rule on Effect of Disqualification on Proclamation and “Second-Placer” Doctrine

The Court surveyed and reconciled pertinent precedents. Historically the Court oscillated between two lines: (a) Topacio and Geronimo endorsed the view that votes cast in good faith for a candidate later declared ineligible should not be treated as stray and that the second-placer should not automatically be declared winner; (b) Ticson and Santos treated votes for disqualified candidates as void, allowing proclamation of the remaining qualified candidate. The Court, relying on more recent authority (notably Abella and Labo) and emphasizing the principle that elective offices should be filled by those who actually received the highest number of votes among the qualified, reaffirmed the rule that the mere disqualification of the top vote-getter does not necessarily entitle the second-placer to be proclaimed the winner. The Court found it impermissible to assume that the electorate’s choice would have automatically transferred to the runner-up had the disqualified candidate been ineligible at election time; voters’ preferences are not fungible. Accordingly, the Court sustained COMELEC’s determination — and permanently enjoined COMELEC from proclaiming the candidate with the next highest number of votes in the contested congressional race.

Final Disposition and Relief

The Supreme Court dismissed petitioner’s certiorari petition, affirmed COMELEC en banc’s finding that petitioner lacked the one-year residence qualification required by the 1987 Constitution for membership in the House of Representatives, and made permanent the Court’s prior order restraining the COMELEC from proclaiming the candidate who received the next highest number of votes in the Second Congressional District of Makati. The Court emphasized that constitutional qualifications cannot be overridden by majority vote; where a candidate lacks an essential constitutional qualification, plurality or majority votes in his favor cannot cure that vice.

Summaries of Separate Opinions

  • Justice Padilla (separate concurrence): Agreed petitioner failed to prove actual physical residence in Makati for one year and endorsed application of Section 6, R.A. 6646 to permit COMELEC to suspend proclamation and treat votes for a disqualified candidate a
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