Title
Aquino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. L-40004
Decision Date
Jan 31, 1975
Petitioners challenged President Marcos' authority under Martial Law to issue decrees and call a 1975 referendum; the Court upheld his legitimacy and dismissed the petition.
de jure president
private citizens
nullify

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-40004)

Factual Background

Petitioners sought prohibition and the nullification of Presidential Decrees Nos. 1366 and 1366-A calling a referendum for February 27, 1975, Presidential Decrees Nos. 629 and 630 appropriating funds therefor, Presidential Decrees Nos. 637 and 637-A specifying the referendum questions, and other presidential decrees, orders and instructions relative to that referendum. The petition contended that President Ferdinand E. Marcos held no lawful office or authority under either the 1935 Constitution or the 1973 Constitution and therefore lacked power to issue the challenged acts. The petition followed a history in which President Marcos had proclaimed Martial Law by Proclamation No. 1081 on September 22, 1972, the Constitutional Convention approved the 1973 Constitution on November 30, 1972, and the people ratified it by action culminating January 17, 1973. Prior referenda were held in January and July 1973, the latter asking whether the people wanted President Marcos to continue beyond 1973 to finish reforms initiated under Martial Law.

Procedural History

The petition for prohibition was filed January 21, 1975. Respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed a comment which the Court considered an answer. Oral argument occupied over seven hours on January 30, 1975, after which the case was submitted for decision. The Court addressed preliminary objections that the petitioners lacked standing because the challenge to presidential title allegedly sounded in quo warranto and only the Solicitor General or a claimant to the office could properly raise such issue; authorities cited included Castro vs. Del Rosario, City of Manila & Antonio Villegas vs. Abelardo Subido, and Nacionalista Party precedents. Despite these jurisdictional and standing contentions, the Court resolved to decide the merits because of the far-reaching implications of the petition.

Issues Presented

The principal issues the Court considered were whether President Ferdinand E. Marcos was a lawful incumbent President and whether he possessed authority to promulgate the presidential decrees and orders challenged by petitioners; whether Section 3 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution made the incumbent President the source of continued executive or legislative power during the transitory period; whether the President was obliged to convene the interim National Assembly at a particular time before exercising certain powers; whether presidential lawmaking and appropriations during Martial Law were constitutionally valid and within the contemplated transitory powers; and whether the scheduled referendum, its limited period for public discussion, and the atmosphere of Martial Law rendered the plebiscite an invalid exercise of popular will.

Petitioners’ Contentions

Petitioners argued that President Marcos held no legal office under either constitutional order and therefore lacked authority to issue the decrees calling and funding the February 27, 1975 referendum. They contended that this attack on title was essentially a quo warranto matter, so that the petition should be dismissed for want of personality. They maintained that the President improperly delayed convening the interim National Assembly in violation of Article XVII, Section 3(1), and that the President lacked legislative power to issue decrees appropriating public funds. Petitioners also asserted that a fair expression of the people’s will was impossible under Martial Law because of a climate of fear and because the period for free discussion was unduly brief and without adequate right of rebuttal.

Respondents’ Contentions

Respondents invoked this Court’s prior rulings, notably Javellana vs. Executive Secretary and the habeas corpus or “Ratification” cases culminating in Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile, to assert that the 1973 Constitution was in effect for purposes of governance and that questions as to the effectivity of the Charter and the validity of Martial Law proclamations had been laid to rest. Respondents argued that by virtue of his 1969 election, by the ratification and referenda of 1973, and by Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution, President Marcos was the de jure incumbent President authorized to continue exercising the powers of the Presidency. They relied on Section 3(2) of Article XVII to validate prior proclamations, orders and decrees as part of the law of the land and to justify lawmaking acts by the President during Martial Law. Respondents further argued that the interim National Assembly existed upon ratification but that its initial convocation and organization were matters left to the incumbent President’s discretion, and that the scheduled referendum was an advisory consultative exercise analogous to prior referenda and constitutional plebiscites and compatible with safeguards instituted by the Commission on Elections.

Ruling and Disposition

The Court declared President Ferdinand E. Marcos a de jure President of the Republic of the Philippines. It held Presidential Proclamations Nos. 1366 and 1366-A and Presidential Decrees Nos. 629, 630, 637 and 637-A valid, and it dismissed the petition for prohibition. The dismissal was rendered without costs. Several justices filed separate, concurring, and a concurring and dissenting opinions that both supplemented and qualified portions of the main opinion.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court began by reaffirming its prior holdings in the Ratification and habeas corpus cases that there was no remaining judicial barrier to the 1973 Constitution being treated as in force and effect, and that inquiries into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for Proclamation No. 1081 had been foreclosed by the July 27–28, 1973 general referendum. The Court emphasized that the July 1973 referendum placed the matter of the President’s continuation beyond 1973 in the hands of the sovereign people and therefore outside the proper scope of judicial review. The Court found it dispositive that under the 1935 Constitution President Ferdinand E. Marcos was duly reelected in 1969 and that the sovereign people, by the ratification procedures and referenda in 1973, expressly authorized him to continue in office beyond 1973 pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. Consequently, the Court concluded that he was a de jure President.

On the transitory provisions, the Court reasoned that the phrase “incumbent President” in Article XVII unambiguously referred to President Marcos, who was the sole incumbent at the time the Constitutional Convention approved the new Charter on November 30, 1972, and at the time of its ratification. The Court construed Section 3(1) to allow him to “continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution” until he convened the interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and Prime Minister. The Court treated the validating clause in Section 3(2) as a deliberate recognition by the Convention that proclamations, orders, decrees and instructions issued by the incumbent President during Martial Law were to be considered part of the body of positive law and to remain valid and effective unless modified by later presidential acts or expressly repealed by the National Assembly. The Court characterized that paragraph not as a grant but as an affirmation of lawmaking power the incumbent President had exercised under Martial Law.

In justifying presidential lawmaking during Martial Law, the Court surveyed historical analogies and constitutional doctrine. It observed that constitutional democracies have recognized extraordinary executive powers in times of grave emergency and that such powers historically produced provisional rules presumed constitutional until declared otherwise by a judicial body. The Court cited authorities and Convention delegates’ explanations to show that the Convention intended to equip the incumbent President with adequate authority to deal with emergency conditions and to institute reforms aimed at removing the causes of rebellion. The Court held that the President, as Commander-in-Chief and administrator of Martial Law, could promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees essential to national security, preservation of the Republic, and the institution of reforms, and that Section 3(2) expressly affirmed the validity of such acts.

Regarding the interim National Assembly, the Court drew a distinction between its immediate legal existence upon ratification and the later act of initial convocation a

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