G.R. No. L-40004 - Aquino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-40004)

Threshold issue — nature of petition and petitioners’ standing

One ground urged by respondents was that the petition effectively challenged President Marcos’s title to office — a quo warranto matter — and that the petitioners lacked the proper personality to bring such a challenge (only the Solicitor General or the person claiming the office may bring a quo warranto). The Court noted settled doctrine that the legality of a public officer’s election or appointment cannot be collaterally attacked by seeking to invalidate his official acts. Notwithstanding these procedural and standing contentions, the Court proceeded to decide the substantive issues because of their far-reaching implications.

Effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and prior judicial rulings

The Court relied on its prior rulings (notably Javellana and the habeas corpus/martial-law cases) holding that the question of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution had been laid to rest and that the 1973 Constitution was to be treated as in force for purposes relevant to the present case. The Court also reiterated that the general referendum of July 27–28, 1973 produced a people’s decision that removed certain questions from judicial review and that the referendum results constituted an exercise of popular sovereignty beyond the scope of judicial inquiry.

Whether President Marcos is a de jure President

The Court examined the fact of Marcos’s 1969 election under the 1935 Constitution and his term’s theoretical expiration on December 30, 1973. It held that by the general referendum and by the operation of the 1973 Constitution’s transitory provisions (which the Convention drafted with the incumbent President in mind), the sovereign people authorized Marcos to continue beyond 1973 to finish reforms initiated under Martial Law. On this basis the Court concluded that President Marcos was a de jure President of the Republic.

Scope of “incumbent President” under Article XVII transitory provisions

The Court interpreted the term “incumbent President” in Article XVII (Sec. 3(1) and Sec. 3(2)) of the 1973 Constitution as referring to the sitting President at the time the Convention approved and the people ratified the new charter — i.e., President Marcos. Because he was the only incumbent President during those events, the transitory provisions were read as addressing him and as recognizing the actions (proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions) he had taken during Martial Law as part of the law of the land, subject to later modification or repeal as specified in the Constitution.

Recognition of presidential lawmaking during Martial Law

The Court affirmed that during Martial Law the incumbent President, as Commander-in-Chief and administrator of Martial Law, could promulgate proclamations, orders, and decrees essential to national security and reform. Section 3(2) of Article XVII was treated as an express recognition of the legislative character of many presidential acts already issued during Martial Law — not as a new grant but as an affirmation that such acts were part of the law of the land and would remain valid unless modified, revoked, superseded by subsequent presidential action, or expressly repealed by the regular National Assembly.

Comparison with historical precedents and constitutional theory

In support of its view the Court cited historical examples (e.g., U.S. wartime actions by Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt) and scholarly commentary referenced in the opinions to show that chief executives have exercised extraordinary powers in emergencies and that constitutional systems may recognize such authority during crises. The Court emphasized that such powers should be temporary and subject to later judicial or legislative control, but that recognition of the acts until so judged was consistent with constitutional principles.

Interim National Assembly — existence, convening, and the President’s discretion

The Court analyzed Section 1 and Section 3(1) of Article XVII, recognizing that an interim National Assembly exists “immediately upon the ratification” of the Constitution but that it cannot function until convened and organized. It held that the Constitutional Convention deliberately left the timing of the President’s initial convening of the interim Assembly to his discretion because of the emergency context (Martial Law). That discretion encompassed determining when conditions warranted convocation; the President’s decision to defer convocation was within the discretion the Convention intended to confer.

Referential equivalence between challenged decrees and prior referenda

The Court considered Decrees Nos. 1366, 1366-A, 629, 630, 637, and 637-A as analogous to prior referenda (January and July 1973) and held that the President’s action in calling a consultative referendum was within the scope of his recognized authority during the transitory period, particularly given the Convention’s understanding and the people’s prior acceptance in referenda.

Petitioners’ objections regarding freedom and fairness of referendum

Petitioners argued that the climate of fear under Martial Law made any genuine expression of the people’s will impossible, and that the two-week period for free discussion was inadequate. The Court rejected the claim that Martial Law necessarily sterilized popular expression, pointing to past elections held under suspension of the writ and to prior referenda conducted via secret ballot. The Court also found the two-week debate period not unprecedented and comparable to prior plebiscite practices under the pre-1973 constitutional regime. The Court observed that the referendum’s secrecy and COMELEC safeguards supported the proposition that voting could reflect the people’s will.

Final disposition by the Court

The Court declared President Marcos the de jure President of the Republic, upheld Presidential Proclamations Nos. 1366 and 1366-A and Presidential Decrees Nos. 629, 630, 637, and 637-A as valid, and dismissed the petition for prohibition. Costs were denied.

Concurring rationale — Justice Antonio

Justice Antonio concurred and emphasized a liberal contextual construction of Article XVII’s transitory provisions, stressing the emergency context in which the Convention acted. He argued that constitutional democracy recognizes temporary, extraordinary executive powers during crises (constitutional dictatorship), that the Convention intended the incumbent President to have legislative-type authority during Martial Law to achieve reforms, and that consultative referenda are a legitimate democratic means for ascertaining popular consent in emergencies. He defended the President’s discretion on convening the interim Assembly and rejected the view that such powers necessarily contradict democratic principles when they represent the will of the sovereign people.

Concurring rationale — Justice Barredo

Justice Barredo concurred in dismissal, accepting Court jurisdiction and concluding that the transitory provisions explicitly authorized the incumbent President to exercise specified powers. He reasoned that the Convention knowingly provided that the interim Assembly’s convening and the exercise of transitional powers would be reconciled with Martial Law realities, and he viewed the validating clause (Sec. 3(2)) as the Convention’s contemporaneous recognition of the incumbent President’s lawmaking role during Martial Law, including appropriations.

Separate concurring opinion — Justice Castro

Justice Castro, in his separate opinion, assumed arguendo the petitioners’ standing and the Court’s jurisdiction, but concluded that (1) the transitory provisions unmistakably referred to Marcos as the incumbent President and (2) those provisions expressly authorized him to exercise legislative powers until the interim National Assembly was convoked and organized. He treated the convening timing as a political question outside judicial competence.

Concurring opinion with Convention record emphasis — Justice Fernandez

Justice Fernandez concurred and provided detailed exposition of the Constitutional Convention debates and votes to show that delegates intentionally gave the President discretion when to convene the interim Assembly, that the incumbent President was to continue with combined powers, and that the validating language of Sec. 3(2) was adopted to recognize, not to retroactively ratify, the President’s prior acts. He argued the referendum could be a legitimate democratic exercise under emergency conditions, and urged COMELEC to safeguard free debate and secret balloting.

Concurring opinion stressing popular sovereignty — Justice Fernando

Justice Fernando concurred in result, basing his view on the primacy of popular sovereignty: since the people’s acceptance of the Constitution and past referenda had occurred, it was appropriate to defer to the people’s channels for expression. He noted the Court’s duty to exercise judicial restraint and to avoid invalidating a mechanism (referendum) that can help ascertain the people’s will during an emergency, though he acknowledged continued conc

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-40004)

Case Caption, Court, Report and Date

Reported at 159 Phil. 328, En Banc, G.R. No. L-40004, decision dated January 31, 1975.
Petitioners: Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.; Trinidad Herrera; Bishop Francisco Claver, S.J.; Bishop Antonio Nepomuceno; Bishop Jesus Varela; Bishop Felix Zafra; Bishop Teotimo Pacis; et al.
Respondents: Commission on Elections and National Treasurer.
Opinion author of the main decision: Justice Makasiar.

Relief Sought and Procedural Posture

Nature of action: Petition for prohibition filed January 21, 1975.
Relief sought: Nullification of Presidential Decrees Nos. 1366, 1366‑A (referendum called for February 27, 1975); Presidential Decrees Nos. 629 and 630 (appropriations for the referendum); Presidential Decrees Nos. 637 and 637‑A (specifying referendum questions); and other presidential decrees, orders and instructions relative to the said referendum.
Respondents filed a comment (treated as answer) through the Solicitor General on January 28, 1975.
Oral argument lasted over seven hours on January 30, 1975; the Court considered the comment as answer and submitted the case for decision.

Primary Legal Grounds Advanced by Petitioners

Central contention: President Ferdinand E. Marcos does not hold any legal office nor possess lawful authority under either the 1935 Constitution or the 1973 Constitution and therefore lacked authority to issue the questioned proclamations, decrees and orders.
Legal consequence asserted by petitioners: The challenge goes to the incumbent President’s title and is, in essence, a quo warranto matter — only the Solicitor General or the person claiming title may properly bring such proceedings; petitioners do not claim such right and therefore lack legal personality to file (citing precedents such as Castro v. Del Rosario; City of Manila & Villegas v. Subido; Nacionalista Party v. Bautista; Nacionalista Party v. Vera).
Petitioners argued that the issuance of the decrees and appropriations for a referendum are legislative acts beyond the President’s executive authority.

Jurisprudential and Doctrinal Threshold: Collateral Attack and Court’s Duty

The Court restated established doctrine: the legality of the appointment or election of a public officer cannot be collaterally questioned through prohibition attacking his official acts.
Despite these threshold principles, because of the far‑reaching implications of the petition, the Court resolved to pass upon the substantive issues raised.

Prior Decisions on the New Constitution and Martial Law (Context)

The Court recalled earlier rulings (the “Ratification Cases” and Javellana) that there is “no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.”
In the habeas corpus cases (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile and companion cases) the Court affirmed the validity of Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081 (Sept. 22, 1972), finding no arbitrariness and that the factual bases persisted or had been exacerbated.
Section 3(2), Article XVII, 1973 Constitution was relied upon in prior jurisprudence to foreclose judicial inquiry into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law because all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated by the incumbent President were made part of the law of the land.

Referenda of January and July 1973: Sovereign Decision and Non‑Justiciability

The January 1973 and July 27–28, 1973 referenda were highlighted: the July 1973 question asked whether the people wanted President Marcos to continue beyond 1973 to finish reforms initiated under Martial Law.
The Court observed that the overwhelming affirmative votes, including votes from persons beyond the ages of 15 and 18 who were allowed to vote, transferred the question from presidential constitutional power to the seat of sovereignty — rendering it beyond the Court’s judicial yardstick in that context.
The Court emphasized that, on the basis of the people’s decision in those referenda, judicial review on the matter was precluded.

Marcos’ 1969 Reelection and De Jure Presidential Status

Under the 1935 Constitution President Marcos was reelected in 1969 by a popular vote (over 5,000,000 votes against about 3,000,000 for his rival; majorities cited from Osmeña v. Marcos Presidential Election Contest No. 3).
Although his 1935 Constitution term should have expired on December 30, 1973, the general referendum of July 27–28, 1973 authorized him to continue beyond 1973 under the 1973 Constitution (ratified January 17, 1973) to finish reforms begun under Martial Law.
The Court held that, as a consequence of the people’s approval, President Marcos is a de jure President of the Republic of the Philippines.

“Incumbent President” under Article XVII: Identity and Scope

The Court reasoned that at the time the Constitutional Convention approved the new Constitution (Nov. 30, 1972), the only incumbent President was Ferdinand E. Marcos; thus the phrase “incumbent President” in Section 3(2) of Article XVII necessarily referred to him.
The same dispositive reference applies elsewhere in Article XVII (e.g., Section 9, and Section 10’s reference to “incumbent members of the Judiciary”).
By virtue of Section 3(1), Article XVII, the incumbent President could continue to exercise powers and prerogatives under the 1935 Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under the 1973 Constitution until he called upon the interim National Assembly to elect interim officials.

Presidential Authority during Martial Law: Executive and Lawmaking Acts

The Court affirmed that as Commander‑in‑Chief and enforcer/administrator of Martial Law, the incumbent President can promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during Martial Law that are essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, protection of political and social liberties, and institutional reforms to prevent resurgence of rebellion or to meet economic crises.
Section 3(2), Article XVII was characterized as an express constitutional recognition — not as a novel grant — of presidential lawmaking authority exercised during Martial Law.
Authorities and commentators cited in the opinion (Dr. Jose M. Aruego; delegate Arturo Pacificador; historical U.S. examples such as Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt) were invoked to support the view that extraordinary executive measures during emergency can include lawmaking and appropriations.

Nature and Scope of Section 3(2), Article XVII

The Court construed Section 3(2) as affirming that proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated by the incumbent President prior to the Convention approval and prior to ratification are “part of the law of the land” and remain valid unless modified or repealed by subsequent acts of the incumbent President or expressly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly.
The Court emphasized that the validating paragraph recognized existing presidential lawmaking during Martial Law rather than purely granting a new legislative power.

Interim National Assembly: Existence, Convening and Presidential Discretion

Distinction drawn between the immediate existence of the interim National Assembly upon ratification and the later convening, organization and functioning (existence v. organization).
The interim Assembly “exists immediately” upon ratification (Section 1, Article XVII) but cannot function until convened and organized with election of officers.
The Constitutional Convention intentionally left to the incumbent President the discretion to determine when to initially convene the interim Assembly, in light of martial law conditions and the need for unity in planning and execution (supported by state