Title
Aparri vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. L-30057
Decision Date
Jan 31, 1984
Bruno O. Aparri's appointment as NARRA General Manager lacked presidential approval, making it incomplete. His term's expiration on March 31, 1962, was validly fixed by the NARRA Board, not a removal, affirmed by courts.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-30057)

Facts and Chronology

  • January 15, 1960: NARRA Board approved Resolution No. 13 (series 1960) appointing Bruno O. Aparri as General Manager and resolving to inform the President of that appointment.
  • January 22, 1960: Chairman transmitted a letter effecting appointment to take effect January 16, 1960, specifying compensation.
  • March 15, 1962: NARRA Board approved Resolution No. 24 (series 1962) stating the President’s “desire” to fix the incumbent General Manager’s term to end at close of office hours on March 31, 1962.
  • March 29, 1962: Petitioner filed petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking annulment of Resolution No. 24 and a command to allow him to continue in office.
  • August 8, 1963: Republic Act No. 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code) took effect, abolishing NARRA and transferring its functions to the Land Authority (Sec. 73).
  • October 21, 1963: Court of First Instance dismissed the petition as academic because of the abolition of NARRA.
  • September 24, 1968: Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal; motion for reconsideration denied January 10, 1969.
  • Petitioner instituted certiorari to the Supreme Court contesting whether Resolution No. 24 amounted to removal without cause; the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate disposition.

Legal Issue Presented

Whether Board Resolution No. 24 (series 1962), fixing petitioner’s term to end March 31, 1962, constituted a removal or dismissal without cause, thereby entitling petitioner to relief by mandamus and damages.

Holding

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: Resolution No. 24 did not effect a removal without cause; it legally fixed the petitioner’s term of office and his right to hold office expired on March 31, 1962.

Legal Reasoning — Nature of Public Office and Appointments

  • The Court reiterates established principles: a public office exists only by virtue of law, and generally there is no vested proprietary right or estate in an office or its emoluments (citing Mechem, 42 Am. Jur.).
  • An appointment is complete only when the statutory prerequisites imposed on the appointing authority have been satisfied; if confirmation or approval by another organ is required, the appointment becomes complete only upon that assent. The decision cites authorities explaining that the last act required of the appointing power must be performed for an appointment to be complete (e.g., People v. Bissell; Molnar v. City of Aurora; State v. Barbour).

Legal Reasoning — Application to Petitioner’s Appointment

  • Resolution No. 13 (1960) evidenced appointment by the Board but did not reflect presidential approval; it stated only that the Board would inform the President of the appointment. Under Sec. 8(2) of R.A. 1160, presidential approval was a statutory prerequisite. Accordingly, the Court found the original appointment incomplete in formal terms.
  • Given the deficiency, petitioner’s status prior to Resolution No. 24 is characterized as that of a de facto officer — he assumed duties under color of apparent appointment though the statutory requirement (presidential approval) had not been manifested publicly.

Legal Reasoning — Resolution No. 24 and Fixation of Term

  • Resolution No. 24 (series 1962) corrected the prior defect by acknowledging “the desire of the Office of the President” to fix the term of the incumbent General Manager to March 31, 1962. The Court treated that act as effectively fixing the term in the manner required by R.A. 1160 (i.e., by the Board subject to the President’s approval/recommendation).
  • The Court analyzed the legal meaning of “term,” citing authorities: a “term” is a fixed and definite period during which an office may be held, and upon expiration the rights and authority of the officer ipso facto cease unless law authorizes holdover. The fixation of a definite term is a recognized mode of terminating official relations; termination by expiration is not a removal.
  • Because R.A. 1160 vested power in the Board to fix the term (subject to the required recommendation/approval), and because Resolution No. 24 fixed the term to March 31, 1962, petitioner’s cessation was the natural expiration of his term, not an ouster prior to term completion.

Distinction Between Removal and Expiration of Term

  • The Court

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