Title
Antonio vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 135869
Decision Date
Sep 22, 1999
Antonio appealed a barangay election loss, filing nine days post-decision; COMELEC dismissed, citing a five-day appeal rule. SC upheld, affirming procedural compliance over extended deadlines.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 135869)

Issue Presented

Whether the statutory ten-day appeal period (as provided in Section 9 of R.A. 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code) governs appeals from MTC decisions in barangay election contests, or whether the five-day period prescribed in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure applies; and whether COMELEC abused its discretion in dismissing Antonio’s appeal as untimely.

Relevant Statutes and Rules

  • R.A. No. 6679, Section 9: provides a ten-day period to file an appeal from MTC decisions in barangay election contests to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), with other procedural time limits for filing protests and trial.
  • Omnibus Election Code, Section 252: a parallel ten-day appeal provision to the RTC for barangay contests (as originally framed).
  • COMELEC Rules of Procedure (1993, amended 1994): multiple provisions prescribing a uniform five-day period to file notices of appeal to the Commission from decisions of trial courts in election-related contests (Rule 22 Sec. 3; Rule 35 Sec. 21; related provisions permitting dismissal for failure to file within prescribed period).
  • Constitutional authority cited: Article IX-A, Section 6 (rulemaking power of COMELEC), Article IX-C (COMELEC’s powers over election contests), and Article VIII, Section 5 (rules of procedure of quasi-judicial bodies remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court), as discussed in the decision.

Procedural History

After the board of canvassers proclaimed Antonio the winner, Miranda filed an election protest before the MTC. The MTC rendered a decision declaring Miranda the duly elected barangay chairman on March 9, 1998. Antonio received the decision March 18, 1998, and filed his Notice of Appeal with the trial court on March 27, 1998 (nine days after receipt). The trial court denied execution; records were forwarded to COMELEC. The COMELEC Second Division, applying its Rules of Procedure, dismissed Antonio’s appeal on August 3, 1998 for being filed after the five-day period. The COMELEC en banc denied reconsideration (October 14, 1998). Antonio petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari under Rule 65, challenging COMELEC’s dismissal.

Petitioner’s Contentions

  1. The appeal period for barangay election protest decisions is ten days under Section 9 of R.A. 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, so Antonio’s March 27, 1998 Notice of Appeal (nine days after receipt) was timely.
  2. The COMELEC Rules’ five-day appeal period cannot override explicit statutory provisions enacted by Congress. Quasi-judicial bodies cannot amend acts of Congress by rulemaking.
  3. COMELEC erred procedurally by dismissing the appeal without requiring briefs and by issuing the dismissal motu proprio without notice or hearing, thereby speeding the case to its detriment.
  4. Dismissal on technical grounds frustrates the electorate’s will where the vote margin was only four votes; election protests should not be defeated by procedural technicalities.

COMELEC’s Rationale (as recited in the record)

COMELEC relied on its Rules of Procedure (Rule 35 Sec. 21 / Rule 22 Sec. 3) prescribing a five-day notice-of-appeal period. COMELEC invoked its constitutional rulemaking authority under the 1987 Constitution (Article IX-A, Section 6) to justify promulgation of the Rules. COMELEC noted Supreme Court recognition of the five-day rule in prior jurisprudence (citing Pahilan, Rodillas, Calucag). COMELEC treated the perfection of appeal in the manner and period laid down by its Rules as jurisdictional, and thus Antonio’s failure to file within five days deprived the Commission of appellate jurisdiction and warranted dismissal.

Supreme Court’s Analysis — Governing Law and Precedent

The Court acknowledged the general principle that statutory enactments prevail over administrative or quasi-judicial rules. It analyzed Flores v. COMELEC (promulgated April 20, 1990) which declared unconstitutional the provision in R.A. 6679 (and, by extension, the corresponding provision in the Omnibus Election Code) that gave appellate jurisdiction over barangay election contests to the Regional Trial Court. Flores thereby recognized that appeals from MTC decisions in barangay contests are to be taken to COMELEC under the 1987 Constitution’s allocation of jurisdiction (Article IX-C). The Court reasoned that Flores effectively invalidated the appellate remedy to the RTC, and that the ten-day appeal period in the statutes was integrally bound to that remedy. Because the appellate forum (RTC) provided in the statutes was declared unconstitutional, the ten-day period could not logically survive independently of the remedy it governed.

Statutory Construction and Separability

The Court applied the doctrine on severability: where an invalid portion of a statute is so connected to the remainder that the latter cannot stand independently, the entire provision must fall. The Court found the ten-day appeal period inseparable from the now-invalid appellate remedy to the RTC; the appellate time limit was an essential characteristic of the remedy and could not be salvaged when the remedy was void. The Court rejected petitioner’s separability argument and held that retention of a ten-day period for barangay appeals to COMELEC would be inconsistent and would frustrate the constitutional mandate for COMELEC to provide rules of procedure to expedite election controversies.

Reliance on Subsequent Legislation and Uniformity of Procedure

The Court observed that Congress later enacted Republic Act No. 7166 (approved November 26, 1991) and other statutory changes that reflected a legislative policy favoring expedited remedial mechanisms for election cases, including five-day appeal periods for municipal contests to the Commission. The Court found it illogical to allow a ten-day period for barangay contests when uniform and expedited five-day rules had been consistently applied to similar election appeals and were recognized in Supreme Court decisions. The Court emphasized COMELEC’s constitutional authority to promulgate its Rules of Procedure (Article IX-A, Section 6; Article VIII, Section 5) provided such rules do not alter substantive rights.

Jurisdictional and Procedural Nature of the Appeal Period

The Court characterized the filing period under COMELEC Rules as jurisdictional and essential: failure to perfect an appeal in the prescribed manner and time deprives the appellate body of jurisdic

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