Title
Anonymous vs. Ibarreta
Case
A.M. No. P-19-3916
Decision Date
Jun 17, 2019
A court sheriff was found guilty of simple misconduct for engaging in a money lending business during office hours, violating judiciary rules, and fined one month's salary.

Case Summary (A.M. No. P-19-3916)

Factual Background

At around two o’clock in the afternoon of January 7, 2016, the Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous call alleging that respondent displayed wealth disproportionate to her monthly wage, that she engaged in money lending, and that she held influence because RTC judges allegedly gave her special preference. Assistant Ombudsman Joselito P. Fangon forwarded the complaint to the OCA, which in turn referred the matter to Executive Judge Timoteo A. Panga, Jr. of the RTC for investigation.

After Judge Panga submitted a partial report, Hon. Manuel M. Rosales was designated as the new executive judge of the RTC and assumed the investigation, after which he submitted his own report. The two investigative reports shared material observations. First, respondent’s marriage had been annulled. Second, respondent had two college-level children studying at a private university in Naga City. Third, respondent owned a house and two vehicles, all declared in her Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth. Fourth, there were no adverse findings regarding her work performance as Sheriff and no complaints or accusations showing misuse of office or reports of harassment or oppression from litigants or counsel. The reports, however, also found that respondent ran a local money lending business known as “5-6,” charging excessive interest rates of as much as ten percent (10%) per month, which appeared to be the source of her wealth, and that she personally conducted the money lending business during office hours.

Ombudsman and OCA Developments

In a Memorandum dated May 24, 2017, the OCA found the charge of acquisition of ill-gotten wealth against respondent to be without merit. However, the OCA found prima facie evidence supporting a charge of simple misconduct, considering that respondent engaged in a money lending business during office hours and devoted her official time to foster her proprietary pursuit. The OCA thus recommended that the case be docketed for preliminary inquiry and that respondent be required to comment.

Respondent submitted a Comment refuting, point by point, the allegation of acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. On the money lending aspect, she did not squarely deny the conduct but asserted only that the money lending business had been her late mother’s and discontinued when her mother passed away.

OCA Findings and Recommended Sanctions

In a Report and Recommendation dated November 6, 2018, the OCA recommended that respondent be held guilty of simple misconduct for violating Reasonable Rules and Regulation and Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, and be fined P5,000.00 payable within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice. The OCA also recommended that respondent be directed to cease and desist from her money lending activities and be sternly warned that noncompliance would be met with more severe consequences.

The OCA explained that it had already cleared respondent of ill-gotten wealth in the May 24, 2017 memorandum and that the inquiry therefore focused on the alleged money lending activities. It noted that respondent required more time to explain the origins of her wealth and offered an unconvincing response regarding the latter charge. The OCA took her limited rebuttal—particularly as to her money lending business—as an implicit admission that she indeed engaged in money lending during office hours. Accordingly, it held that respondent violated Section 1, Canon IV—which requires court personnel to commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours—and Administrative Circular No. 5 (October 4, 1988), which prohibits judiciary officials and employees from engaging in money lending activities during office hours. The OCA considered a fine rather than suspension appropriate, in view of respondent’s first offense and the desirability of avoiding adverse effects on public service, given that she performed frontline functions as a Sheriff.

Issue Presented to the Court

The Court noted that, as early as the OCA’s May 24, 2017 Memorandum, respondent had been cleared of the allegation of acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. Consequently, the Court limited the matter to a single issue: whether respondent should be administratively liable for engaging in money lending business activities during office hours.

Ruling of the Court

After reviewing the records, the Court adopted the OCA’s findings and recommendations on respondent’s administrative liability. The Court, however, modified the amount of fine to be imposed.

The Court quoted at length Administrative Circular No. 5 dated October 4, 1988, which addressed a prohibition against judiciary officials and employees working as insurance agents, while reflecting a broader policy against engaging in private business activities. The Court emphasized that the Circular enjoined court officials and employees from engaging in, among others, related activities and from commissioning as insurance agents, and required immediate desistance if presently engaged. The Court interpreted the Circular as prohibiting all officials and employees of the judiciary from engaging directly in any private business, vocation, or profession, even outside office hours, because the prohibition aimed at ensuring full-time devotion to government service and preventing undue delays in the administration of justice.

The Court further relied on Canon IV, Section 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel (A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC), which mandates that court personnel perform official duties properly and with diligence and commit themselves exclusively to the responsibilities of their office during working hours. The Court held that respondent’s alleged act of engaging in a money lending business—an accusation she failed to sufficiently rebut—while concurrently holding the position of RTC Sheriff placed the integrity of her office under unwarranted suspicion. The Court stressed that respondent should have acted more circumspectly given that her activities would inevitably create impressions of taking advantage of position and abusing the confidence reposed in her office. The Court held that her conduct diminished the reputation of the office and the courts in the public’s esteem.

On penalty, the Court discussed the classification of simple misconduct under Section 46(D)(2), Rule 10 of the RRACCS, which treats it as a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense. It nonetheless recognized, pursuant to Cabigao v. Nery, that the Court had discretion to temper the harshness of prescribed administrative penalties when warranted by circumstances such as length of service and other equitable considerations.

Applying that discretion, the Court considered respondent’s first offense in thirty (30) years of service and the nature of her work as a frontline Sheriff. It therefore imposed a fine equivalent to her salary for one (1) month and one (1) day, invoking Section 47(1)(b) and (2) of the RRACCS, which permits payment of fine in lieu of suspension when the respondent is actually discharging frontline functions and when personnel complement is insufficient to perform the function. The Court also cited Cabigao, which had justified imposing a fine rather than suspension to prevent disruption in frontline duties.

Finally, the Court reinforced that court personnel must be beyond reproach and circumscribed by heavy responsibility so as to avoid even the slightest suspicion that might taint the judiciary. The Court specifically underscored that sheriffs, as officers of the court and agents of the law, must demonstrate integrity because once they lose the people’s trust, they also diminish faith in the judiciary.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court’s liability finding rested on the nexus between the prohibited conduct and the standards governing court personnel. Under Canon IV, Section 1 of the Code of Conduct, court personnel must commit themselves exclusively to their office responsibilities during working hours. The Court found that respondent failed to adequately rebut the OCA’s factual premise that she ran and personally conducted money lending during office hours, which directly conflicted with the exclusivity requirement and undermined the integrity expected of a Sheriff.

Separately, the Court treated Administrative Circular No. 5 (October 4, 1988) as embodying a policy of full-time devotion and prohibiting c

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