Case Summary (G.R. No. 246816)
Petitioners’ Detailed Allegation and Proposed Remedy
Petitioners proposed: (1) rank parties by votes; (2) award one guaranteed seat to each party with at least 2% of party‑list votes; (3) deduct from each two‑percenter the votes equivalent to 2% (the votes already used to secure the guaranteed seat); (4) re‑rank parties based on the recomputed totals; and (5) allocate the remaining seats proportionally to the recomputed votes (subject to the three‑seat cap). They argued this prevents double‑counting and yields fairer distribution, asserting consistency with the Court’s BANAT Resolution.
Respondent COMELEC / OSG Position
COMELEC (through the OSG) defended the BANAT formula and COMELEC Resolution No. 004‑19 on several grounds: (a) there is no double‑counting because the two rounds serve distinct purposes (first: apply the 2% threshold and guarantee seats; second: ensure the constitutional 20% party‑list composition by proportional distribution); (b) the differential treatment of two‑percenters and non‑two‑percenters is justified — the former have a clearer mandate; (c) BANAT’s approach (as clarified) does not support petitioners’ deduction proposal; and (d) Congress may legitimately design the party‑list mechanics to maximize representation and to prevent domination by any single party (three‑seat cap, two‑tier allocation).
Jurisdictional and Procedural Thresholds Considered by the Court
The Court reviewed the requisites for judicial review — actual case or controversy, standing, earliest‑opportunity (preservation) rule, and whether the constitutional question is the lis mota. The ponencia found: (a) actual controversy and standing existed because COMELEC had already proclaimed winners (Resolution No. 004‑19) and petitioners claimed direct injury; (b) the “earliest opportunity” requirement weighed against petitioners because RA 7941 and its interpretation had been litigated and settled in prior cases (including BANAT) and petitioners had previously benefited from the BANAT/Veterans regime in earlier elections (ANGKLA and SBP had previously been proclaimed winners under the same approach), thus their present challenge came “too late” and raised estoppel/clean‑hands concerns; (c) notwithstanding procedural issues, the Court acknowledged the constitutional question was indeed the core of the controversy.
Core Ruling — Disposition and Holding
The petitions were DENIED. The Supreme Court declared that Section 11(b) of RA 7941, as interpreted and applied under the BANAT framework (i.e., awarding additional seats “in proportion to their total number of votes” using the two‑round method), is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court UPHELD NBOC Resolution No. 004‑19 (the 2019 party‑list proclamations). The Court also recommended that Congress review RA 7941, specifically Section 11(b), to resolve recurring allocation ambiguities.
Reasoning — Procedural and Equitable Grounds
- Earliest opportunity / estoppel / clean hands: The ponencia emphasized that the petitioners had in previous elections benefited from the same allocation method and did not timely object to it; equity and estoppel counseled against allowing litigants to accept a rule when favorable and attack it when unfavorable. The Court stressed jurisprudence requiring a party to raise constitutional objections at an early opportunity and invoked equitable doctrines (estoppel by silence, unclean hands) to deny relief where petitioners had acquiesced and benefited.
- Notwithstanding procedural posture, the Court proceeded to address the merits due to the issue’s broad public importance.
Reasoning — Substantive Law: Equal Protection and “One Person, One Vote”
- The Court rejected petitioners’ double‑counting theory. It explained each vote is counted once in the underlying tally; the two rounds serve distinct constitutional and statutory objectives: Round 1 operationalizes the statutory 2% threshold (guaranteed seat for those with a constituency), while Round 2 operationalizes the constitutional objective that party‑list membership constitute 20% of the House, by allocating remaining seats proportionally to vote shares.
- The equal protection analysis: classification between two‑percenters and non‑two‑percenters is sustainable because it rests on a substantial distinction — two‑percenters have a more definitive mandate of the electorate. The 2% rule, the three‑seat cap, and the two‑tier allocation were deemed rationally related to legitimate legislative goals (meaningful representation; prevention of domination by a single party; broadest possible representation).
- The Court held that absolute proportionality (award seats from the outset strictly by seat = votes/total votes × seats) is not required by the Constitution; Congress has broad discretion in designing the mechanics. Thus petitioners’ proposed deduction of the 2% votes before Round 2 would improperly alter Congress’s chosen balance and, arguably, undermine the representational advantage legitimately conferred on two‑percenters.
Precedent Synthesis: Veterans → BANAT → Post‑BANAT Application
- Veterans (2000) articulated four parameters (20% cap; 2% threshold; 3‑seat cap; proportionality for additional seats) and originally applied a formula that restricted additional seats to two‑percenters.
- BANAT (2009) held that retaining the 2% threshold as an exclusive basis for additional seat allocation could make it mathematically impossible to fill the 20% allotment; BANAT therefore opened the second round to all parties while preserving the first‑round 2% guarantee. BANAT set the two‑step second round: (1) multiply each party’s vote percentage by the remaining available seats and allocate whole integer seats; (2) distribute remaining seats one by one by ranking fractional remainders, until seats are exhausted; still observe the three‑seat cap.
- The Court explained BANAT did not eliminate the distinction between two‑percenters and non‑two‑percenters — the 2% guarantee remains intact — and that BANAT’s reproportioning in the second round necessarily continues to use the parties’ total votes as the proportional index.
Treatment of Petitioners’ “Double‑Counting” Argument and BANAT Clarification
- Petitioners’ central claim — that the same votes are counted twice — was addressed: the Court observed that votes are tallied only once (the initial raw vote count), but they may be used in distinct computations serving distinct allocation purposes. The Court found no constitutional infirmity in that arithmetic process.
- The Court clarified that while BANAT refers to subtracting guaranteed seats from the pool of available seats, the proportionality multiplier in the first step of the second round still uses each party’s percentage of the total party‑list votes (i.e., BANAT did not require that the 2% be subtracted from a party’s vote percentage before the first step of the second round computation). The 2% deduction appears only in the second step for ranking fractional remainders to decide which parties obtain the last seats — not as a global subtraction before computing parties’ whole‑integer shares in the remaining seats.
Practical Result — Application to the 2019 Canvass
- Applying the BANAT approach, COMELEC’s NBOC Resolution No. 004‑19 was held valid; seat allocations declared therein were sustained. Petitioners’ requested re‑allocation (which would have given ANGKLA, SBP, AKMA‑PTM and AKBAYAN seats at the expense of certain two‑percenters) was rejected.
Vote, Separate Opinions and Notable Concurrences/Dissents
- The Court’s vote reflects deep division: decision sustained with multiple separate opinions and significant disagreement about the optimal methodological and policy approach. The opinion notes a multi‑split vote characterized as 7‑3‑3‑1 in which (broadly) seven members voted to dismiss the petition and uphold the BANAT approach, while others would have modified or invalidated parts of Section 11(b) or adopted alternative seat‑allocation formulas.
- Separate writings:
- Justice Perlas‑Bernabe (concurring) agreed in result, emphasized constitutional and statutory deference to Congress and defended BANAT’s reflection of the statutory text and policy aims; she preferred resolving the case on the merits rather than sole reliance on procedural grounds.
- Justice Leonen (concurring) likewise agreed in result and discussed conceptual policy and operational benchmarks for the party‑list system beyond mere nume
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 246816)
Case Caption, Citation and Core Relief Sought
- Citation: 884 Phil. 333, En Banc, G.R. No. 246816, September 15, 2020.
- Principal petitioners: ANGKLA: Ang Partido ng mga Pilipinong Marino, Inc. (ANGKLA) and Serbisyo sa Bayan Party (SBP).
- Petitioner-in-intervention: Aksyon Magsasaka - Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-PTM).
- Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC), sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC), and individual COMELEC Commissioners named in caption.
- Relief sought: Certiorari and prohibition to annul or enjoin implementation of (a) the proviso in Section 11(b) of RA No. 7941 that allocates additional party‑list seats “in proportion to their total number of votes,” and (b) National Board of Canvassers Resolution No. 004‑19 (May 22, 2019) proclaiming the winning party‑list groups in the May 13, 2019 party‑list election; and a declaration that petitioners are entitled to at least one seat each under the party‑list system following petitioners’ proposed seat‑distribution framework.
Statutory Provision in Dispute (Section 11(b), RA 7941)
- Text relied upon (as quoted in the opinion):
- “The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party‑list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.”
- Legal effects under the statute:
- First clause: 2% threshold → guarantee of one seat for such party‑lists (the “two‑percenters”).
- First proviso: additional seats “in proportion to their total number of votes.”
- Final proviso: cap of not more than three (3) seats per party‑list.
Factual Background — 2019 Party‑List Results and NBOC Resolution No. 004‑19
- NBOC Resolution No. 004‑19 (May 22, 2019) declared winners in the May 13, 2019 party‑list election based on National Canvass Report No. 8 and applying BANAT v. COMELEC.
- The national canvass ranked party‑lists and allocated sixty‑one (61) party‑list seats; key ranked results (extracted from the National Canvass Report No. 8 included in the source):
- Top party‑lists (examples from the canvass): ACT‑CIS — 2,651,987 votes (9.51%) → 3 seats; BAYAN MUNA — 1,117,403 (4.01%) → 3 seats; AKO BICOL — 1,049,040 (3.76%) → 2 seats; CIBAC — 929,718 (3.33%) → 2 seats; and other two‑percenters down to PROBINSYANO AKO at 630,435 (2.26%) → 2 seats.
- Many party‑lists below 2% were allocated one seat under the BANAT allocation that filled the 61 seats.
- Petitioners' ranks in the canvass:
- AKMA‑PTM ranked 52 with 191,804 votes (0.69%).
- SBP ranked 53 with 180,535 votes (0.65%).
- ANGKLA ranked 54 with 179,909 votes (0.65%).
- AKBAYAN ranked 55 with 173,356 votes (0.62%).
- Petitioners amended their petition to seek annulment of NBOC Resolution No. 004‑19 and proclamation that petitioners are entitled to at least one seat each under their proposed reallocation.
Petitioners’ Principal Contentions and Proposed Reallocation Framework
- Main contention:
- The BANAT/COMELEC application of Section 11(b) results in “double‑counting” of votes in favor of two‑percenters because the votes that secured the guaranteed 2% seat are again used in the calculation for additional seats; that violates equal protection and “one person, one vote.”
- Relief and proposed formula (as asserted by ANGKLA and SBP):
- Rank parties by raw votes.
- Award guaranteed one seat each to those with ≥ 2% (two‑percenters).
- Deduct from each two‑percenter’s total votes an amount equal to two percent (2%) of total party‑list votes (i.e., the votes already used to secure the guaranteed seat).
- Recompute and re‑rank parties by the remaining (recomputed) votes.
- Distribute the remaining (additional) party‑list seats proportionally to the recomputed votes until all additional seats allocated, applying three‑seat cap.
- Petitioners assert this approach is consistent with the Court’s July 8, 2009 Resolution in BANAT (they cite a specific passage about fractional seats).
- Practical claim:
- Under petitioners’ formula, petitioners (AKMA‑PTM, SBP, ANGKLA, AKBAYAN) would allegedly be entitled to one seat each at the expense of certain two‑percenters (BAYAN MUNA, 1PACMAN, MARINO, PROBINSYANO AKO).
Petitioner‑in‑Intervention (AKMA‑PTM) Specific Computation and Claim
- AKMA‑PTM’s computations (expressed in the petition‑in‑intervention):
- Total votes cast for party‑list system in 2019: 27,884,790.
- Two percent threshold = 2% of 27,884,790 = 557,695.80 votes.
- AKMA‑PTM’s argument: when you deduct the 557,695.80 votes from each two‑percenter that was awarded a guaranteed seat, the remaining votes of some two‑percenters (e.g., 1PACMAN, MARINO, PROBINSYANO AKO) become smaller than petitioners’ votes, justifying awarding those additional seats to petitioners rather than to the two‑percenters’ additional seats.
Respondent COMELEC / Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) Defenses
- Principal defenses (as summarized in the source):
- No double‑counting: the counting occurs in two separate rounds and for two different purposes. First round: applying the 2% threshold and guaranteeing seats to parties with a sufficient constituency; second round: ensuring compliance with the Constitution’s 20% requirement by allocating additional seats proportionally to total votes.
- No equal protection violation: there is a substantial distinction between two‑percenters and non‑two‑percenters because two‑percenters have a clearer mandate of the people; the differential treatment is justified.
- Petitioners’ proposed framework misreads BANAT and in fact conflicts with BANAT; petitioners’ remedy would contravene the Court’s prior pronouncement.
- RA 7941 does not contravene the party‑list system’s objectives; petitioners’ proposed formula would be repugnant and inconsistent with Congress’ judgment promoting broad representation.
Governing Legal Standards for Judicial Review (and their Application)
- Requirements for Court exercise of judicial review (as stated in the ponencia):
- (1) An actual case or controversy (ripe, not advisory).
- (2) Standing (locus standi): challenger must have personal and substantial interest; direct injury or imminent injury.
- (3) Question of constitutionality raised at earliest possible opportunity.
- (4) The constitutional issue must be the very lis mota (the central cause) of the case.
- Application in this case (majority analysis):
- Requisites (1) and (2) present: there is an actual controversy and petitioners have standing (they claim entitlement to seats).
- Requisite (3) — earliest opportunity — found wanting in the majority view for ANGKLA and SBP: RA 7941 enacted 1995; Veterans (2000) interprets Sec. 11(b); BANAT (2009) clarified it; ANGKLA and SBP previously benefitted and were proclaimed winners under the BANAT doctrine in 2013 and 2016; SBP even defended BANAT in An Waray v. COMELEC; AKMA‑PTM previously litigated in 2013 asserting the same formula beneficially. The majority regard petitioners’ current challenge as raised too late (horizontal/vertical earliest opportunity tests, estoppel and clean‑hands considerations invoked).
- The majority nevertheless finds the fourth requisite (lis mota) satisfied — the constitutionality of Section 11(b) is central — and, because of the public importance, proceeds to decide the substantive question despite procedural arguments.
Judicial and Doctrinal Background (Veterans → Ang Bagong Bayani → CIBAC → BANAT → Atong Paglaum)
- Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC (Veterans):
- Established four parameters: (1) 20% allocation ceiling for party‑list representatives; (2) 2% threshold as qualifier; (3) 3‑seat cap; (4) additional seats in proportion to total votes (Veterans’ “First Party Rule” / Niemeyer method influence).
- Subsequent rulings refined and sometimes departed from Veterans:
- Ang Bagong Bayani (and follow‑ons) applied Veterans in early elections.
- CIBAC and other cases further treated methods but largely upheld Veterans’ validity.
- BANAT v. COMELEC (2009) held: the 2% threshold is unconstitutional only insofar as it is the exclusive basis for additional seats because, mathematically, it could prevent filling the 20% composition; BANAT therefore opened the allocation of additional seats to non‑two‑percenters and promulgated a two‑step second round provision (first: multiply percentage by remaining seats; second: assign remaining seats by ranking until all seats distributed), while still guaranteeing the initial 2% one seat in Round 1; the three‑seat cap remains in force.
- The Court in BANAT clarified the divisor (total votes cast for the party‑list system) and fractional seat handling: whole integers from the product of percentage × remaining seats correspond to additional whole seats; fractional seats are material in the second step’s ranking to assign remaining seats — BANAT’s Resolution further exemplified computations and fractional comparisons (CIBAC/TUCP example).
- Atong Paglaum and other later cases left the Veterans/BANAT mechanics intact, whil