Case Summary (G.R. No. 246816)
Applicable constitutional framework and legislative source
Governing constitution: 1987 Philippine Constitution (Article VI, Section 5(1) and (2) cited by the Court).
Primary statutory provision at issue: Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 (the Party-List Act), specifically the proviso that additional seats are “in proportion to their total number of votes” with a three-seat cap.
Statutory Provision at Issue
Textual focus of the challenge
Section 11(b), RA 7941, provides that parties receiving at least 2% of total party-list votes are entitled to one guaranteed seat; the proviso challenged allocates additional seats “in proportion to their total number of votes,” subject to a maximum of three seats per party. The petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the second-round allocation mechanism implementing that proviso.
Precedent and the BANAT Formula
Court-established allocation method used by COMELEC
The Court’s BANAT (Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency) decision formulated the operative allocation procedure used by COMELEC:
- Round 1: rank parties by votes; parties obtaining at least 2% (the “two-percenters”) receive one guaranteed seat each.
- Round 2, Part 1: multiply each party’s percentage of total party-list votes by the number of remaining available seats; award the whole-integer portion as additional seats (no fractional seats); no party may receive more than two additional seats (three-seat cap). All parties participate in this part.
- Round 2, Part 2: allocate one seat each to parties next in rank until all remaining seats are distributed.
Petitioners’ Arguments
Core contention and proposed remedial formula
Petitioners contend the BANAT implementation results in “double counting” and infringes the constitutional principle of equal protection and the “one person, one vote” concept by allowing votes used to secure a guaranteed seat in Round 1 to be again used (in full) to obtain additional seats in Round 2. They argue this produces unequal vote weighting disadvantaging non-two-percenters. Petitioners propose an alternative formula: after awarding guaranteed seats, deduct the 2% vote-equivalent from each two-percenter’s total votes, re-rank parties by the adjusted vote totals, and distribute additional seats proportionally on the recomputed totals (still observing the three-seat cap).
COMELEC / OSG Response
COMELEC’s defenses against the constitutional challenge
COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, defended the BANAT formula on three principal grounds: (1) the Court applied the plain language and intent of Section 11(b) and was not creating a formula beyond legislative prerogative; (2) there is no double counting because all votes are tallied once at the outset and preserved for distinct purposes in different rounds — there is a single counting process used for ranking and then two allocation rounds with distinct aims; and (3) the statutory distinction between two-percenters and non-two-percenters justifies preferential treatment for two-percenters in both rounds, and petitioners’ deduction proposal would unduly favor lower-vote parties and yield outcomes inconsistent with the vote totals.
Threshold Issue Presented to the Court
Legal question decided on reconsideration
Whether the proviso of Section 11(b) of RA 7941, as implemented by the BANAT formula (specifically the practice of using the parties’ total vote counts intact in the second round), violates the “one person, one vote” principle and the equal protection clause, and whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying that provision for the 2019 party-list seat allocation.
Court’s Disposition on Motion for Reconsideration
Summary of the Court’s ruling and disposition
The Court denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and reaffirmed its earlier ruling that Section 11(b) of RA 7941, as interpreted and implemented via the BANAT formula, is not unconstitutional. The NBoC’s Resolution declaring the winning party-list groups in the May 13, 2019 elections was upheld.
First Reason: Application and Scope of “One Person, One Vote”
Court’s assessment of the equal protection and “one person, one vote” arguments
The Court rejected petitioners’ application of “one person, one vote” to require absolute proportionality in the party-list context. It relied on prior jurisprudence recognizing that proportional representation in the party-list system is not absolute and that Congress enjoys broad discretion to set rules for party-list allocation under Article VI, Section 5(1) of the 1987 Constitution. The Court observed that some justices’ expansive view of one person, one vote (e.g., Justice Carpio’s dissent in Aquino III) would compel untenable consequences for other apportionment and reapportionment laws; the majority declined to adopt an absolute-proportionality standard for party-list seat allocation.
Second Reason: Legislative Intent and RA 7941’s Structure
The BANAT formula follows statutory text and legislative purpose
The Court held that BANAT mirrors the textual sequence and intent of Section 11(b): the first sentence yields guaranteed seats to two-percenters; the following proviso contemplates additional seats in proportion to total votes so that two-percenters remain entitled to participate in the second-round allocation with their full votes. The Court recounted the evolution of formulas (Veterans line of cases, then BANAT removing the 2% threshold for additional seats to satisfy the constitutional 20% party-list share) and concluded BANAT preserved the core legislative design while ensuring the constitutional quota.
Third Reason: No Double Counting — Different Rounds, Single Counting
Explanation why the Court found no double counting of votes
The Court explained that all votes are counted once initially and used for two distinct allocation stages with different objectives: Round 1 enforces the 2% threshold to guarantee seats to parties with sufficient constituency; Round 2 ensures compliance with the constitutional 20% party-list membership by allocating remaining seats proportionally based on the same preserved vote totals. The Court emphasized that the system does not “re-tally” votes and that deducting 2% from two-percenters before Round 2 would produce absurd and textually unsupported results (illustrated by the hypothetical of a party with exactly 2% being reduced to zero and disadvantaged in Round 2).
Fourth Reason: Remedy and Limits of Judicial Role
Institutional competence and the remedy for petitioners’ preferred scheme
The Court observed that even if the proviso were void, petitioners’ proposed formula lacks textual basis in RA 7941 and would amount to judicial legislation if imposed. The Court reiterated that formulation of allocation methods is fundamentally legislative policy; accordingly, petitioners’ appropriate remedy is to seek amendment of RA 7941 in Congress rather than re-writing the statute in the courts.
Final Outcome and Mandate
Case outcome and immediate procedural effect
Motion for reconsideration denied for lack of merit; the prior decision upholding Section 11(b) and the NBoC Resolution stood. The Court ordered entry of judgment.
Separate and Dissenting Opinions — Chief Justice Gesmundo
Core points of the principal dissent (Gesmundo, C.J.)
Chief Justice Gesmundo (joined by others) dissented, concluding the BANAT formula violates equal protection and the one person, one vote principle because it effectively credits the votes of two-percenters twice: once to secure the guaranteed seat and again when their full votes are used in computing additional seats. He adopted petitioners’ proposed corrective formula (deduct 2% equivalents from two-percenters before allocating additional seats, re-rank, and distribute remaining seats) as consistent with the republican and equal-protection values embodied in the Constitution. He likened the issue to apportionment and malapportionment jurisprudence (citing Reynolds, Wesberry, Gray, Baker) and argued the one person, one vote principle is applicable in the party-list setting when unequal vote crediting occurs.
Separate Opinion — Justice Zalameda and Others
Dissent arguing double counting and proposing adjusted allocation
Justice Zalameda (joined by others) also found constitutional infirmity in BANAT due to double-counting. He proposed a remedial approach that reallocates excess percentages (variance beyond 2% corresponding to additional seats) for ranking in distribution of additional seat
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 246816)
Procedural Antecedents
- Petitioners ANGKLA (Ang Partido ng mga Pilipinong Marino, Inc.) and Serbisyo sa Bayan Party (SBP) filed an amended petition and petition-in-intervention challenging the proviso in Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 as applied to the allocation of additional party-list seats.
- The Court promulgated a Decision dated September 15, 2020 denying the petitions and upholding the constitutionality of the proviso in Section 11(b), RA 7941; National Board of Canvassers Resolution No. 004-19 declaring the winning party-lists in the May 13, 2019 elections was upheld.
- Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the September 15, 2020 Decision; the instant Resolution (December 7, 2021) addresses that Motion for Reconsideration.
- The Court, through Justice Lazaro-Javier as ponente, denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and ordered the entry of judgment immediately.
- The Decision directed that a copy be furnished to the House of Representatives and the Senate as reference for a possible review of RA 7941, specifically Section 11(b).
Statutory Provision Contested (Section 11(b), RA 7941)
- Text of challenged provision as set out in the source:
- "Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x x x x x (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats." (emphasis and underscoring in source)
- The provision embodies a guaranteed seat for "two-percenters," an allocation of additional seats "in proportion to their total number of votes," and a three-seat cap.
BANAT Formula (Court precedent interpreting Section 11(b))
- BANAT (Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC) provides the operative method for seat allocation under Section 11(b) as applied by the Court:
- Round 1:
- Rank participating parties by votes (highest to lowest).
- Each party receiving at least 2% of the total party-list votes is entitled to one guaranteed seat.
- Round 2, Part 1:
- Multiply each party's percentage of votes by the number of remaining available seats after Round 1; all party-list participants participate in this round regardless of percentage.
- The whole integer of that product yields additional seats; fractional seats are not awarded in this step.
- No party may be awarded more than two additional seats (respecting the three-seat cap).
- Round 2, Part 2:
- Allocate one additional seat each to parties next in rank (based on the ordering) until all remaining seats are distributed.
- Round 1:
Petitioners’ Core Argument in Motion for Reconsideration
- Constitutional claim:
- The method of allocating additional seats (Round 2) violates the "one person, one vote" policy and the equal protection clause because it gives unequal weight to votes.
- Allegation of double-counting:
- Votes used to obtain a guaranteed seat in Round 1 for two-percenters are again counted for purposes of additional seats in Round 2, effectively double-counting those votes and diluting votes of non-two-percenters.
- Proposed remedial formula (petitioners’ suggested steps reproduced from source):
- Rank parties by votes.
- Grant one guaranteed seat to those with at least 2%.
- Deduct from each two-percenter a vote-amount equivalent to 2% of total votes from its total votes before allocation of additional seats.
- Re-rank parties on recomputed votes.
- Distribute remaining seats in proportion to the recomputed votes until all additional seats are allocated.
- Observe the three-seat cap.
- Impact claimed by petitioners applying their formula to 2019 data:
- Petitioners (ANGKLA and SBP) and intervenor AKMA-PTM would be entitled to one seat each at the expense of certain parties (e.g., 1PACMAN, MARINO, PROBINSYANO AKO).
- Noted that Chief Justice Gesmundo adopted petitioners’ proposed formula in his Dissent; petitioners criticized other separate opinions for various reasons.
Respondent COMELEC / Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) Position
- COMELEC’s principal defenses in its Comment:
- The Court correctly applied the intent and language of Section 11(b); devising a different formula is a legislative function and not for the Court.
- There is no double-counting: there are two rounds with different purposes, but only one original counting of votes used for ranking; the data are not re-tallied in Round 2—votes are considered but not counted anew.
- The distinction between two-percenters and non-two-percenters justifies a preferential guarantee to two-percenters; petitioners’ 2% deduction proposal perversely favors parties with lower vote totals, producing outcomes inconsistent with proportionality.
- Historical practical point:
- Petitioners themselves (ANGKLA and SBP) benefited from BANAT formula applications in earlier elections (2013, 2016); SBP previously defended application of BANAT in earlier petitions; AKMA-PTM previously invoked BANAT in 2013.
Threshold Legal Issue Presented
- Essential question presented to the Court:
- Does the proviso in Section 11(b) of RA 7941, as implemented by the BANAT formula, violate the "one person, one vote" principle and the equal protection clause by effectively double-counting votes in the allocation of additional seats?
Court Disposition on Motion for Reconsideration
- Holding:
- Motion for Reconsideration denied; September 15, 2020 Decision stands; Section 11(b), RA 7941 is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL as applied; National Board of Canvassers Resolution No. 004-19 upheld.
- Directives:
- Let entry of judgment issue immediately; furnish copy of Decision to House and Senate for possible legislative review.
Ponente’s Reasoning — Principal Grounds for Denial
- Preliminary:
- The motion rehashed arguments already considered in the September 15, 2020 Decision; no new issues were presented; majority remained unconvinced.
- First ground — Misapplication of "one person, one vote" by petitioners:
- The Court rejected petitioners’ premise that the one person-one vote doctrine mandates absolute proportionality in party-list representation.
- Cited Justice Carpio’s dissent in Aquino III (context): one person-one vote underlies proportional representation, but the Constitution entrusts Congress with wide discretion in designing the party-list system.
- Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution grants Legislature latitude: party-list representatives are those "as provided by law" and thus Congress may set rules that depart from absolute proportionality.
- BANAT expressly recognized no constitutional requirement for absolute proportional representation in party-list allocation.
- Statutory mechanisms (2% threshold and three-seat cap) are deliberate congressional devices that prevent absolute proportionality and promote broad representation; these mechanisms advantage some groups (non-two-percenters) and limit domination by high vote-getters (e.g., ACT-CIS example showing many votes but capped seats).
- Petitioners previously participated in and benefited from the two-round scheme in earlier elections, undermining their present complaint.
- Second ground — BANAT formula reflects statutory language and intent:
- The textual progression of Section 11(b) corresponds to the two-tier (two-round) allocation: first sentence for guaranteed seats; proviso for additional seats.
- Historical jurisprudence (Veterans Federation Party decisions) initially confined Round 2 participation to two-percenters with full votes; BANAT later removed the 2% threshold in Round 2 to meet the constitutional 20% party-list membership requirement, but retained the concept that two-percenters participate with full votes.
- Thus the original intent favored two-percenters having full votes in Round 2; BANAT’s modification to include non-two-percenters in Round 2 was to achieve the 20% constitutional target, not to count votes twice.
- Third ground — No double