Title
Ang Nars Party List vs. Executive Secretary
Case
G.R. No. 215746
Decision Date
Oct 8, 2019
Petitioners challenged Section 6 of EO No. 811, which downgraded nurses' salary grade, arguing it violated Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173. Supreme Court ruled EO invalid, mandating Salary Grade 15.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 215746)

Procedural history and reliefs sought

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, challenging the validity of Section 6 of EO No. 811 and seeking to compel respondents to implement Section 32 of R.A. 9173 (i.e., to secure SG-15 for government nurses). Petitioners alleged grave abuse of discretion by respondents for downgrading or disregarding R.A. 9173. The OSG, representing respondents, contested standing, the proper remedy, and argued that J.R. No. 4 effectively amended or repealed Section 32 and that EO No. 811 was a valid exercise of delegated authority.

Issues presented to the Court

The petition framed principally three questions: (1) whether respondents exceeded the authority granted by J.R. No. 4 and committed grave abuse by downgrading nurses’ salary grades in EO No. 811; (2) whether J.R. No. 4 amended Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173; and (3) whether respondents abused discretion by asserting Nurse I entry level should be SG-11 in disregard of R.A. 9173.

Parties’ principal arguments

Petitioners: J.R. No. 4 did not (and could not) amend R.A. 9173; EO No. 811, as an executive issuance, cannot amend or repeal a statute and thus cannot lawfully lower the statutory SG-15 floor. They asserted DBM and DOH responses were unsatisfactory and sought judicial intervention as representatives of nurses. OSG/Respondents: challenged petitioners’ standing, argued certiorari and mandamus were improper remedies (declaratory relief or lower courts might be proper), maintained J.R. No. 4 had the force and effect of law and that EO No. 811 properly implemented J.R. No. 4 and did not diminish compensation because the salary actually received under the modified schedule was not less in amount; DBM also cited fiscal and hierarchical distortions as reasons to avoid implementing SG-15.

Legal standing: Court’s analysis and holdings

The Court analyzed standing under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and constitutional jurisprudence distinguishing real party-in-interest (private suits) and representative taxpayer/citizen suits (public suits). It held that PSLINK, as an unincorporated association, lacked juridical capacity to sue in its own name and therefore had no standing. The Court recognized Rep. Paquiz’s standing in her capacity as the duly-elected party-list representative of Ang Nars to bring the petition on behalf of her nurse constituents: legislators may have standing to vindicate rights where the challenged act impinges on their institutional prerogatives or where the representative shows a direct interest in protecting constituents; here the representative’s electoral mandate to represent nurses gave her a sufficiently direct interest. The Court noted its discretion to relax locus standi requirements in cases of transcendental importance.

Hierarchy of courts and jurisdictional considerations

Although petitions for certiorari and mandamus are within the concurrent jurisdiction of lower courts and the Supreme Court, the Court acknowledged the doctrine of hierarchy of courts but applied recognized exceptions (public welfare, transcendental importance, patent nullities, or other compelling reasons). Given the long-standing and widespread implications of the unresolved implementation of R.A. 9173 (seventeen years without full implementation and significant uncertainty for nurses), the Court accepted original jurisdiction and waived procedural strictures that would have required initial filing in lower courts.

Core constitutional question: can a joint resolution amend an existing law?

The Court examined the constitutional law-making provisions of the 1987 Constitution (Sections 26 and 27, Article VI) and legislative rules. It stressed that only a bill is expressly mentioned in the constitutional provisions governing enactment into law and that those procedures (three readings on separate days, distribution of printed copies, presentment to the President) serve transparency and the constitutional veto/presentment scheme. The Court concluded that a joint resolution cannot amend or repeal an existing statute in the way a subsequent law can. Although the Senate and House rules may treat joint resolutions similarly to bills procedurally, and although in practice joint resolutions (and implementing measures) are used to effect compensation standardization, the Constitution’s explicit language allows amendment of prior laws only through a valid law enacted pursuant to the constitutional process for bills. Consequently, J.R. No. 4 could not lawfully amend Section 32 of R.A. 9173.

Relationship among R.A. 6758, R.A. 9173, J.R. No. 4 and EO No. 811

R.A. 6758 established the compensation and position classification framework and authorized DBM’s role in preparing indices and schedules; R.A. 9173 amended applicable compensation for nurses by statutory command to set the minimum base pay at SG-15. J.R. No. 4 sought to modify the compensation system but, as a joint resolution, could not effectuate an amendatory repeal or revision of R.A. 9173. EO No. 811, being an executive issuance implementing J.R. No. 4, likewise could not lawfully amend or repeal R.A. 9173. The Court thus held that Section 32 of R.A. 9173 remained valid and that the portions of J.R. No. 4 (paragraph 16) and Section 6 of EO No. 811 purporting to amend or repeal Section 32 of R.A. 9173 were void and unconstitutional.

Appropriations, separation of powers, and the limits of judicial relief

Although the Court declared Section 32 of R.A. 9173 valid and struck down the purported repeal or amendment effected by J.R. No. 4 and EO No. 811, it denied the petitioners’ prayer to compel respondents to implement Section 32 by mandamus. The Court emphasized the constitutional separation of powers and the exclusive legislative power of the purse: appropriations (payment of money from the Treasury) require an appropriation made by law (Sections 24, 25 and 29(1), Article VI). Implementation of a statutory salary floor that requires additional public funds cannot be compelled by the judiciary absent appropriation by Congress. Thus, while R.A. 9173 survives, its practical enforcement as to funded salary increases depends on Congress appropriating funds through valid legislation; the Court cannot mandate Congress to appropriate.

Practical consequences and guidance

The Court’s disposition preserved the statutory right created by R.A. 9173 (nurses’ minimum base pay at SG

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