Title
Ampatuan vs. Puno
Case
G.R. No. 190259
Decision Date
Jun 7, 2011
ARMM officials challenged President Arroyo's emergency proclamation and administrative orders after the 2009 Maguindanao massacre, alleging violations of local autonomy and misuse of emergency powers. The Supreme Court upheld the President's actions, ruling no local autonomy breach, valid use of "calling out" powers, and sufficient factual basis for emergency measures.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 206438)

Key Dates and Procedural Posture

Massacre occurred on November 23, 2009. Proclamation No. 1946 issued November 24, 2009. Administrative Order 273 issued November 27, 2009 and amended by AO 273‑A thereafter. Petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed by ARMM officials challenging the constitutionality and validity of the proclamation and administrative orders. The Supreme Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition.

Applicable Law and Constitutional Provisions

1987 Constitution: Article VII, Section 18 (President as Commander‑in‑Chief and power to call out the armed forces “whenever it becomes necessary…to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion”); Article VI, Section 23(2) (Congressional authorization for the President to exercise special powers in times of war or other national emergency). Local autonomy provisions cited by petitioners: Section 16, Article X of the Constitution (local government autonomy) and Section 1, Article V of Republic Act No. 9054 (Expanded ARMM Organic Act). Succession rule invoked: RA 9054, Article VII, Section 12 (succession to regional governorship in cases of temporary incapacity).

Issues Presented

  1. Whether Proclamation No. 1946 and Administrative Orders Nos. 273 and 273‑A violated local autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution and Section 1, Article V of RA 9054.
  2. Whether the President invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and PNP to prevent and suppress lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
  3. Whether the President had factual bases for issuing the proclamation and administrative orders.

Factual Background

Following the mass killings in Maguindanao, the President declared a state of emergency over specified areas and directed AFP and PNP to undertake measures to prevent and suppress lawless violence; she also issued administrative orders delegating supervision of ARMM to the DILG (AO 273, later clarified by AO 273‑A to reflect “delegation” rather than “transfer”). Petitioners alleged the President’s issuances authorized the DILG Secretary to take over the ARMM, suspend and replace ARMM officials, and thus usurped ARMM’s autonomy. After ARMM’s Governor was taken into custody, succession occurred under RA 9054: Vice‑Governor Adiong assumed the governorship on December 10, 2009, and the Speaker (Sahali‑Generale) became Acting Vice‑Governor.

Petitioners’ Core Claims

Petitioners contended that (a) the proclamation and administrative orders effectively enabled the DILG Secretary to seize and exercise direct control over ARMM functions—contravening statutory and constitutional guarantees of regional autonomy; (b) the President’s actions constituted an invalid exercise of emergency powers because there was no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency in Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City; and (c) the orders enabled suspension or replacement of ARMM officials without lawful basis.

Respondents’ Principal Defenses

The Office of the Solicitor General (acting for respondents) defended the proclamation and orders as lawful exercises of the President’s constitutional “calling out” power under Article VII, Section 18. The OSG maintained that the president’s delegation of supervisory authority to the DILG did not constitute a takeover of ARMM, did not grant blanket authority to suspend or replace officials, and was intended to facilitate investigation and restoration of peace and order. The government also presented factual bases and intelligence reports supporting the need to call out the armed forces.

Court’s First Ruling — No Unlawful Takeover of ARMM

The Court found that the DILG Secretary did not take over control of ARMM. Succession rules under RA 9054 were followed: the Vice‑Governor assumed the governorship and appointed an Acting Vice‑Governor. No evidence established that the DILG Secretary assumed direct administration or operations of the regional government, or that the administrative orders authorized suspension or replacement of ARMM officials in a manner that stripped the region of its autonomy.

Court’s Second Ruling — Distinction Between “Calling Out” and Emergency Powers

The Court distinguished the President’s “calling out” of the armed forces under Article VII, Section 18 from the extraordinary emergency powers contemplated in Article VI, Section 23(2). The latter contemplates a national emergency and congressional authorization for the President to exercise special powers; Proclamation No. 1946 declared a state of emergency in specified localities, not a national emergency authorizing extraordinary presidential powers under Section 23(2). The immediate deployment of AFP and PNP to prevent or suppress lawless violence is an expressly constitutional power of the President that does not require prior congressional authorization.

Court’s Third Ruling — Deference to Presidential Factual Determination

The Court reiterated established precedent that the President’s determination of the necessity to call out the armed forces is entrusted by the Constitution primarily to the President’s judgment and is entitled to judicial deference. The Court will inquire into factual bases only where there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners failed to demonstrate such grave abuse or lack of factual basis.

Factual Basis Found Sufficient by the Court

The OSG presented detailed intelligence and factual allegations: entrenched private armed forces of the Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans (with estimates of personnel and firearms), support from Special Civilian Auxiliary Army personnel, reported involvement or potential intervention by rebel armed groups, reported procurement of ammunition, and movements of armed factions toward Maguindanao. The Court considered the imminence and gravity of potential violence and the need for preventive action to pacify fears, control proliferation of loose firearms, and dismantle armed groups. These facts sufficed to justify the President’s call‑out of AFP and PNP.

Burden of Proof and St

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