Title
Amante vs. Serwelas
Case
G.R. No. 143572
Decision Date
Sep 30, 2005
Danilo Bicomong sold a vehicle to Bibiano Serwelas, who registered it. Gregorio Amante seized it without a warrant, claiming ownership. Courts ruled Serwelas as lawful owner, declared seizure unconstitutional, and awarded damages for lost earnings and replevin bond.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 143572)

Factual Background

The Court of Appeals found that Danilo Bicomong was the registered owner of the subject 1990 Isuzu Jitney, as evidenced by certificate of registration no. 00567641. Bicomong worked as plant supervisor of Amante Motors, owned by petitioner Vicente Amante. On July 17, 1992, Bicomong sold the vehicle for P200,000 to respondent through a deed of absolute sale. On October 7, 1992, respondent registered the vehicle under his name, as shown by certificate of registration no. 14058314. Respondent thereafter operated the vehicle as a common carrier using a boundary system.

On December 9, 1993, police highway patrol elements seized the vehicle in General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite without a warrant upon the request of petitioner Gregorio Amante, who was the manager of Amante Motors. The vehicle was brought to Camp Vicente Lim in Laguna, and after a macro-etching examination by SPO1 Elfin B. Rico of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory Service, it was later released to petitioner Gregorio Amante. Despite respondent’s demand to return the vehicle, Gregorio Amante refused.

Respondent then instituted a replevin case. Petitioner Vicente Amante, asserting ownership, intervened in the suit.

Trial Court Proceedings and Ruling

In the replevin suit, the trial court declared respondent as the lawful owner. It ruled that the illegal seizure was prompted by Gregorio Amante’s suspicion that the vehicle had been spirited out of Amante Motors by Bicomong, who had been the plant supervisor. The trial court noted that beyond suspicion and an inconclusive technical finding that the chassis number had been “re-stamped,” the intervenor did not present evidence such as a registration certificate to support his claim of ownership. It further found that it was not shown that Bicomong’s certificate of registration was spurious or fake, nor that the subject vehicle was registered in the name of either petitioner or Amante Motors.

Applying the evidentiary situation before it, the trial court contrasted the plaintiff who purchased in good faith for value with supporting genuine documents against the intervenor whose claim was based only on presumed ownership of the chassis. It concluded that the choice favored the purchaser with documentary proof.

The trial court also awarded damages to respondent. It granted P103,200 as lost earnings, computed based on P400 per day under the boundary system from the time the vehicle was taken until its return, and it additionally awarded P37,963 as premium for the replevin bond.

Court of Appeals Review

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that respondent established ownership to the exclusion of the whole world and sustained the damages as unrealized earnings. It deleted the award for the replevin bond premium, reasoning that no claim was made in the complaint. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the present recourse.

Issues Raised by Petitioners

Petitioners argued errors involving questions of fact, which they invoked as grounds to overturn the concurrent factual conclusions of the trial court and Court of Appeals. They also sought to defeat the presumption arising from respondent’s certificate of registration by asserting that the vehicle had been stolen from Amante Motors by Bicomong, and that respondent therefore acted in bad faith when he bought the vehicle.

Petitioners’ bad-faith theory rested on several points: that Bicomong was only a supervisor without a motor shop and without other apparent means to own jeepneys; that respondent supposedly chose the vehicle at Amante Motors where it was on display and that it was the very same vehicle delivered by Bicomong to respondent at his residence; that the vehicle had been spirited out by Bicomong; and that a macro-etching examination revealed signs of grinding on the metal surface where the chassis number normally lay, along with evidence suggesting re-stamping. Petitioners also asserted that the re-stamped chassis number corresponded to the chassis number in Bicomong’s certificate of registration, that the hood dorsal side showed the original chassis number secretly stamped thereon, that Bicomong was not presented in court, and that Bicomong faced a theft charge.

Supreme Court’s Treatment of Factual Findings and Ownership Presumption

The Supreme Court reiterated that under Rule 45, its authority generally extended to review of errors of law, not to re-examination of factual findings, especially when the trial court and Court of Appeals were in agreement. It held that such findings carry respect and even finality, absent a showing that the findings were devoid of support. It found no compelling reason to disturb the lower courts’ findings on ownership and good faith.

On the merits of ownership, the Court emphasized that respondent’s certificate of registration in his name established a strong presumption of ownership in favor of the person in whose name the certificate is issued, unless proven otherwise. It found that petitioners failed to present a certificate of registration supporting their claim. It then stated that between a party armed with a certificate clearly establishing ownership and another whose claim was supported only by unconvincing allegations, the Court had no difficulty ruling for the former.

Whether Respondent Purchased in Bad Faith

The Court addressed petitioners’ effort to destroy the presumption of ownership by alleging theft and bad faith. It declared it unconvinced that the vehicle had been clearly stolen by Bicomong or that respondent had knowledge of any such wrongdoing.

The Court first held that petitioners’ claim that Bicomong’s status as only a supervisor conclusively proved he never owned a jeepney for sale was speculation. It noted that one’s wealth cannot be measured solely by occupation, and it observed that even if ownership by Bicomong was explainable only by possibilities beyond review, the inference petitioners urged did not establish theft with legal clarity.

Second, the Court reasoned that, as supervisor at Amante Motors, Bicomong was clothed with authority to deal with customers. Given that respondent was shown vehicles on display, the Court found it unnecessary to verify under whose names the displayed vehicles were registered. It recognized that a customer ordinarily selects and purchases what is available on display, and it held that whatever internal arrangements existed between the motor shop and Bicomong were not respondent’s responsibility to investigate.

Third, the Court examined petitioners’ argument that the vehicle was registered not to Amante Motors but to Bicomong. It held that this was not sufficient proof of bad faith. What mattered was the existence of a valid certificate of registration in Bicomong’s name, which appeared true and clean on its face. The Court ruled that the buyer was not required to go beyond the certificate.

Fourth, the Court rejected petitioners’ claim that delivery of the vehicle to respondent’s residence should have raised suspicion. It observed that sellers often provide various accommodations to attract buyers, including delivery to a buyer’s doorstep.

Effect of Warrantless Seizure and Illegally Secured Evidence

A central part of the Court’s reasoning addressed the macro-etching evidence relied on by petitioners. The Court noted that the seizure on December 9, 1993—the event that led to the macro-etching examination—had been done without a court warrant. The Court reasoned that Gregorio Amante could not have effected the seizure without cooperation from his “friendly contacts” in the police force and that the examination flowed from that warrantless seizure.

Invoking the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures under Art. III, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution, the Court ruled that the reports based on illegally seized chattels were inadmissible in evidence and carried no probative weight. It acknowledged that the exclusionary rule admits exceptions, such as customs searches, searches of moving vehicles, seizure of evidence in plain view, co

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