G.R. No. 194189 - Almeda vs. Heirs of Almeda

Case Summary (G.R. No. 194189)

Factual Background

The spouses Venancio Almeda and Leonila Laurel-Almeda had nine children: Ponciano L. Almeda, Rafael, Emerlina, Alodia, Leticia, Norma, Benjamin, Severina Almeda-Santos, and Rosalina Almeda-Tibi, the latter being Publio’s deceased wife.

On May 19, 1976, Venancio and Leonila—then aged 80 and 81, respectively—executed a Power of Attorney granting Ponciano authority, among others, to sell parcels covered by OCT Nos. O-197 and O-443 corresponding to Leonila’s inherited property. OCT Nos. O-197 and O-443 were registered in the name of “Leonila L. Almeda married to Venancio Almeda.” OCT No. O-197 covered four parcels with an aggregate area of ninety-five thousand two hundred five square meters, specifically Lot 10, Lot 17, Lot 30, and Lot 32. OCT No. O-443 covered Lot 9.

Venancio died on February 27, 1985, and Leonila died on April 3, 1993. Within the year of Leonila’s death, on April 17, 1993, Rafael, Emerlina, Alodia, Leticia, and Norma filed a notice of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City.

The Sale Transactions Challenged

Petitioners’ complaint, filed on October 10, 1996 as Civil Case No. TG-1643 before the RTC of Tagaytay City, attacked the sales transactions attributed to Ponciano and his use of the power of attorney and subsequent conveyances.

Petitioners alleged that Ponciano caused the simulation and forgery of: (one) a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 9, 1976 over Lot 30 under OCT No. O-197, executed by Ponciano as attorney-in-fact for Venancio and Leonila in favor of Pabilona, et al., and (two) a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 3, 1978 executed by Venancio and Leonila in favor of Ponciano, covering the remaining lots under OCT No. O-197, Lot 9 under OCT No. O-443, and additional lots (Lots 6, 4 and 9-A) with a total area of seventy-one thousand five hundred twenty square meters at the time, sold for a stated consideration of PHP 704,243.77.

Petitioners further claimed that OCT Nos. O-197 and O-443 were cancelled as a result of the 1978 Deed, and that Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued to Ponciano and to other transferees, including TCT No. T-10330 issued in favor of Pabilona, et al. As to the 1978 Deed, petitioners asserted that Venancio and Leonila did not sign it and that their signatures may have been forged. They also alleged lack of due consideration and contended that if Ponciano induced their signatures, it was done without knowledge of the import of the document. Petitioners claimed they did not seek to recover rights already legally transferred to third parties.

Petitioners also alleged that Ponciano withheld the existence of the 1978 Deed from them and promised to partition later. When they eventually filed their adverse claim, they asked the court to declare the 1978 Deed null and void, partition OCT No. O-197 among the heirs of Venancio and Leonila, order reconveyance of the derivative titles in Ponciano’s name to them, direct the Register of Deeds to cancel the derivative titles and restore title to Venancio and Leonila, and award damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation costs.

RTC Proceedings and Dismissal

In the Answer, Ponciano and his wife Eufemia denied that the 1978 Deed was simulated or forged and maintained its genuineness and execution for valuable consideration, claiming that some petitioners received substantial pecuniary benefits. They asserted petitioners lacked clean hands and were guilty of laches. Ponciano died on October 16, 1997, and his wife and children were substituted.

Petitioners presented only the testimony of Emerlina. After respondents failed to present evidence despite opportunities, the RTC considered the case submitted for decision.

During trial, petitioners raised additional documents: an Agreement to Sell dated November 9, 1976 whereby Venancio and Leonila agreed to sell parcels covered by OCT Nos. O-197 and O-443, including Lots 6, 4 and 9-A, to Ponciano for PHP 1,000,000 with a down payment of PHP 200,000 and a balance payable in one year without interest; and a Deed of Sale with Mortgage dated November 11, 1977 expressly superseding the 1976 Agreement to Sell and later being superseded by the 1978 Deed in favor of Ponciano.

On September 2, 2004, the RTC dismissed the complaint. The RTC held that the questioned documents, being notarized and executed in the presence of instrumental witnesses, enjoyed the presumption of regularity, and petitioners failed to overcome this presumption through clear and convincing evidence. It emphasized that petitioners failed to present proof of simulation or forgery of the subject documents.

Appeal to the Court of Appeals

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied on November 29, 2005. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its May 25, 2010 Decision, denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC, and its October 13, 2010 Resolution denied reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that petitioners failed to prove forgery by clear and convincing evidence, particularly because the assailed documents were notarized and therefore enjoyed the presumption of regularity and due execution and authenticity. The Court of Appeals noted that petitioners relied on Emerlina’s testimony that the signatures were forged and held that mere variance in signatures was not proof of forgery. It further held that to establish forgery, petitioners needed to present documents bearing the genuine signatures of Venancio and Leonila for comparison, and that their failure to submit such documents was fatal. It required proof not only of differences, but also the extent, kind, and significance of the variation, that the variation was due to a different personality rather than expected variation, and that resemblance was attributable to skillful imitation rather than habitual and characteristic writing.

Issues Raised in the Petition

Petitioners argued that the CA ruling was contrary to the evidence, the law, and existing jurisprudence. The petition essentially sought reversal of the RTC and CA dismissal of their complaint attacking the 1978 Deed on grounds of forgery, simulation, mental incapacity, undue influence, lack of consideration, and unconscionable price.

Limits of Review under Rule 45

The Court held that the petition lacked merit. It reiterated that a petition under Rule 45 only allows review for errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. It also emphasized that it is not a trier of facts and that factual findings by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, deserve a high degree of respect and become final and conclusive. The Court nonetheless examined the records and reached the same conclusions.

Presumptions Favoring Notarized Deeds and the Burden of Proof

The Court reaffirmed that a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale enjoys the presumption of regularity, carries evidentiary weight as to due execution, and does not require further proof of authenticity to be admitted and credited on its face. It held that the party impugning the notarized deed must present strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity; otherwise, the presumption must stand. It ruled that forgery is not presumed and must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence by the party alleging it.

Applying these principles, the Court agreed that petitioners failed to discharge their burden because they were assailing the genuineness of the 1978 Deed. It noted that the complaint did not clearly allege in definite terms that Venancio and Leonila’s signatures on the 1978 Deed were forged; rather, it stated that their signatures “may have been forged” and also suggested simulated or nonexistent transactions in an equivocal manner. The Court also found Emerlina’s testimony unclear and uncertain as to whether Venancio and Leonila did not sign the 1978 Deed or signed it without knowing its consequences, and at one point she conceded she could not say if the signatures belonged to her parents. The Court held that such uncertainty undermined the forgery claim.

The Court also observed that Emerlina stood to benefit from annulling the 1978 Deed, and her denial of its validity, being made by an interested witness, was not as reliable as documentary evidence. It added that self-serving assertions are inadequate absent proof.

Visual Comparison of Signatures

The Court invoked Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which allows the court to compare the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine. Petitioners had argued that the 1976 Power of Attorney, containing the alleged genuine signatures of Venancio and Leonila, could serve as the basis for comparison. The Court compared the signatures on the 1978 Deed and on the 1976 Power of Attorney and found prominent similarities that indicated habitual and characteristic writing. It noted that Leonila’s signature on the 1978 Deed appeared almost the same as her signature on the 1976 Power of Attorney, and that while Venancio’s signature on the 1978 Deed was less smooth, the similarities in angles and slants remained apparent.

The Court rejected petitioners’ characterization that the questioned signatures showed “wiri-wiri” or “wild strokes,” stating that it did not find such wild strokes. It held that dissimilarities, if any, were outweighed by striking similarities, and therefore the comparison did not overcome the presumption of validity in favor of a notarized document.

Capacity to Contract, Undue Influence, and Supporting Evidence

The Court further addressed petitioners’ reliance on alleged mental incapacity due to advanced age, forgetfulness, and being “at times” sickly. It reiterated that the law presumes competence to enter into contracts until satisfactory proof to the contrary is presented and that incapacity must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The Court held petitioners failed to show that Venancio and Leonila’s mental faculties were impaired to the extent that they could not freely exercise will or understand the provisi

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 194189)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Rafael Almeda, Emerlina Almeda-Lirio, Alodia Almeda-Tan, Leticia Almeda-Magno, Norma Almeda-Matias and Publio Tibi (collectively, the petitioners) filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari questioning the Court of Appeals rulings in CA-G.R. CV No. 86953.
The Court of Appeals denied the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 dismissal of the complaint.
The RTC order dismissed the Complaint for Nullity of Contracts, Partition of Properties and Reconveyance of Title with Damages, filed in Civil Case No. TG-1643.
The respondents included the Heirs of Ponciano Almeda in substitution of original defendant Ponciano Almeda, the Intestate Estate of Spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Perez-Almeda, and the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City.
Certain persons—Cesar Santos, Rosana Santos, Norman Santos and Ferdinand Santos—appeared as unwilling plaintiffs/petitioners, reflecting their participation in the litigation as heirs/substitutes aligned with the adverse claim.

Material Facts

Venancio Almeda and Leonila Laurel-Almeda were the parents of nine children, including Ponciano L. Almeda and the petitioners.
On May 19, 1976, Venancio and Leonila, aged eighty and eighty-one, executed a Power of Attorney granting Ponciano authority to sell parcels of land covered by OCT Nos. O-197 and O-443.
The subject land was registered in the name of “Leonila L. Almeda married to Venancio Almeda.”
OCT No. O-197 covered four parcels with an aggregate area of ninety-five thousand two hundred five square meters, while OCT No. O-443 covered Lot 9 measuring thirty-three thousand nine hundred forty-six square meters.
Venancio died on February 27, 1985, and Leonila died on April 3, 1993, aged ninety-seven.
Within the year of Leonila’s death on April 17, 1993, the petitioners filed a notice of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City.
On October 10, 1996, the petitioners filed the RTC complaint, alleging they were the only heirs of the late spouses who died intestate and without legal obligation.
The petitioners attributed to Ponciano, as eldest child and close relative, the simulation and forgery of two Deeds of Absolute Sale, namely:
- A Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 9, 1976 over Lot 30 under OCT No. O-197, executed by Ponciano as attorney-in-fact in favor of Pabilona, et al., for P160,940.00.
- A Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 3, 1978 executed by Venancio and Leonila in favor of Ponciano covering the remaining lots under OCT No. O-197, Lot 9 under OCT No. O-443, and Lots 6, 4 and 9-A with a total area of seventy-one thousand five hundred twenty square meters, for P704,243.77.
The petitioners claimed the questioned 1978 Deed resulted in cancellation of OCT Nos. O-197 and O-443, with corresponding issuance of TCTs in Ponciano’s name, and issuance of TCT No. T-10330 in favor of Pabilona, et al.
The petitioners alleged that Venancio and Leonila did not sign the October 3, 1978 Deed, their signatures were possibly forged, the parties did not receive due consideration, and any consent was allegedly without knowledge of the import of signing.
The petitioners further alleged withholding of the existence of the 1978 Deed until they demanded partition, after which Ponciano promised partition at a later time.
The petitioners denied they asserted rights over property already transferred to third parties, as reflected in the complaint narrative.

Claims and Relief Sought

The petitioners sought declaration of the 1978 Deed as null and void.
They requested partition of OCT No. O-197 among the heirs of Venancio and Leonila.
They demanded reconveyance of titles derived from Ponciano’s name back to the petitioners and cancellation of the derivative titles by the Register of Deeds.
They prayed for an order directing the unwilling plaintiffs to share in suit expenses.
They sought moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of litigation against Ponciano and his wife Eufemia.

Defense Positions Raised

Ponciano and Eufemia denied that the 1978 Deed was simulated or forged, asserting its genuineness and execution for valuable consideration.
They alleged that some petitioners received substantial pecuniary benefits from the transaction.
They accused the petitioners of lack of clean hands, suggesting possible falsification by the petitioners to transfer estate assets.
They invoked laches as a bar to the petitioners’ claims.
Ponciano later died on October 16, 1997, and his heirs/substitutes proceeded in the litigation.

Trial Evidence and Developments

The petitioners presented the lone testimony of Emerlina.
After the private respondents failed to present evidence despite opportunities, the RTC considered the case submitted for decision.
During trial, two additional related documents were introduced and also impugned by petitioners:
- An Agreement to Sell dated November 9, 1976 between Venancio and Leonila and Ponciano for parcels covered by OCT Nos. O-197 and O-443, plus Lots 6, 4 and 9-A, for a total price of P1 Million, with P200,000.00 as down payment and the balance payable within one year without interest.
- A Deed of Sale with Mortgage dated November 11, 1977 that expressly superseded the 1976 Agreement to Sell, with a stated total price of P1 Million and a secured P700,000.00 balance.
The petitioners maintained that the 1977 Deed with Mortgage was expressly superseded by the 1978 Deed in favor of Ponciano.

RTC Disposition and Reasoning

On September 2, 2004, the RTC dismissed the complaint.
The RTC held that the questioned documents, being notarized and executed in the presence of two instrumental witnesses, enjoyed the presumption of regularity.
The RTC ruled that the petitioners failed to overcome the presumption by clear and convincing evidence.
The RTC stressed that the petitioners presented no proof of simulation or forgery of the subject documents.
The RTC denied a subsequent Motion for Reconsideration on November 29, 2005.

CA Disposition and Reasoning

On May 25, 2010, the Court of Appeals denied the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC dismissal.
The CA ruled that the petitioners failed to prove forgery with clear and convincing evidence.
The CA emphasized the special need for such evidence because the assailed documents were notarized, hence enjoying presumption of regularity and due execution and authenticity.
The CA found petitioners’ proof relied primarily on Emerlina’s testimony, which the CA treated as insufficient.
The CA held that mere variance in handwriting between genuine and disputed signatures does not automatically prove forgery.
The CA required petitioners to submit documents bearing the genuine signatures of Venancio and Leonila for comparison.
The CA found fatal the absence of such required comparison materials and described what proof of forgery must show, including:
- The extent, kind, and significance of signature variation.
- That variation was due to a different personality rather than expected variation from the same writer.
- That resemblance resulted from skillful imitation rather than habitual or characteristic resemblance.

Issues Raised in Certiorari

The petitioners argued that the CA ruling was contrary to the evidence, law, and existing jurisprudence.
The central dispute concerned whether the 1978 Deed was forged or otherwise invalid due to alleged simulation, lack of capacity, undue influence, and lack or inadequacy of consideration.

Supreme Court Standards of Review

The Court reiterated that a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 limited its review to alleged errors of law by the appellate court.
The Court held it was not a trier of facts.
The Court affirmed that factual findings of the RTC, as adopted and affirmed by the CA, became final and conclusive and could not be reweighed on appeal.

Presumption for Notarized Documents

The Court held that a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale carried a presumption of regularity and evidentiary weight on due execution.
The Court stated that such notarized documents were admissible without further proof of authenticity and were entitled to full faith and credit on their face.
The Court ruled that the party impugning a notarized document must present strong, complete and conclusive proof of falsity or nullity due to flaws or defects.
The Court emphasized that absent clear, strong, and convincing evidence of falsity, the presumption of regularity must stand.
The Court applied that the burden of proof to overcome the presumption lay on the party contesting the notarized instrument.

Forgery Not Presumed

The Court