G.R. No. L-69773-75 - Ali vs. Commission on Elections

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-69773-75)

Factual and Procedural Background

After the Court promulgated a majority decision on November 19, 1985 dismissing the respective petitions for lack of merit, the petitioners filed motions for reconsideration. On December 13, 1985, Mahadi M. Pimping filed a joint motion for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 69765-67, and Habib Ali, et al. filed a similar motion for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 69773-75. In G.R. No. 69846, Rashid Sampaco filed a motion for reconsideration dated December 20, 1985 through counsel.

The Court then directed respondents to comment on the motions. In a resolution dated January 7, 1986, the Court required comments. On February 21, 1986, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the public respondent COMELEC, moved to dismiss the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, arguing that the motions were pro forma and did not raise new and substantial arguments that would justify a modification or reversal of the November 19, 1985 decision.

Thereafter, a change in government occurred, and the Court invoked Rule 3, Section 18. By resolutions dated April 3, 1986 and April 29, 1986, the Court directed the new Solicitor General to submit a Comment on the pending motions and to indicate whether he maintained the position taken by his predecessor. In compliance, the petitioners filed a manifestation dated April 22, 1986, contending that the cases had not become moot despite the change of administration and the expiration of the terms of the officers involved, because the determination of the validity of the elections of private respondents would bear on petitioners’ right to claim damages.

Developments After Change of Administration

While the Court required positions from the parties in view of the government transition, developments occurred regarding the contested local posts in Marawi City. Respondent Salam N. Pangadapun stated in a manifestation dated May 30, 1986 that the case in G.R. Nos. 69765-67 had become moot and academic because an officer-in-charge had already been appointed to the contested position.

The new Solicitor General submitted a manifestation dated May 7, 1986, indicating that COMELEC, by its letter dated April 30, 1986, maintained the validity of its decision installing the private respondents as local elective officials in Marawi City. The manifestation also informed the Court that, based on information from the Ministry of Local Government, Hadji Abbas M. Basman and Sultan Ali M. Mindalano had been designated as officers-in-charge for the offices of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Marawi City, respectively. The Court observed that the Solicitor General’s manifestation contained no suggestion that any modification or reversal of the November 19, 1985 decision was required.

The Court’s Disposition on Motions for Reconsideration

Considering the events that transpired after the government change and the resulting appointments of officers-in-charge, the Court resolved to deny the motions for reconsideration filed by the petitioners in the consolidated cases for lack of merit. The Court further ruled that the motions had been rendered moot and academic in light of the supervening circumstances described in the parties’ submissions.

The resolution noted concurrence by Alampay, J. as ponente, with Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, and Gutierrez, JJ. The resolution thus affirmed the earlier dismissal of the petitions.

Separate Dissent and Its Legal Themes

Teehankee, C.J. maintained a dissent from the majority decision of November 19, 1985, with the concurrence of Feria, Yap, Fernan, Cruz, and Paras, JJ. The dissent accepted that the pending motions for reconsideration could be viewed as rendered moot and academic by the appointment of officers-in-charge to the contested positions due to the government transition since February 25, 1986 under a new President, Her Excellency Corazon C. Aquino. However, it argued that the Court should not allow the alleged errors of law committed by COMELEC to remain uncorrected in the jurisprudence.

The dissent’s central thesis was that COMELEC may not arbitrarily decide an election protest based on alleged widespread election frauds and irregularities attributed to the contending parties without conducting the necessary revision, recount, and appreciation of the ballots. It supported this view by invoking multiple considerations stated in the dissent, including an abstention by Commissioner Ramon H. Felipe, Jr. for lack of necessary ballot revision; COMELEC’s alleged mandatory internal rules requiring revision and recount; the fact that the parties had prayed for such revision and recount; and the claim that COMELEC failed to discharge a ministerial duty to appoint committees for ballot revision and to require submissions by the protagonists.

The dissent further emphasized due process concerns rooted in the assertion that COMELEC short-circuited the proceedings by skipping recount and revision when the case had been pending for an extended period and when recount was characterized as the “heart” of election protests. It also raised concerns of discriminatory handling, including claims that notice of the promulgation date was not properly served to petitioners-protestees, and that a copy of the resolution denying reconsideration was allegedly served to respondents-protestants on the same day the resolutions were dated, with petitioners allegedly learning only through newspapers.

Finally, the dissent argued that Section 23 of Res. No. 1450, making COMELEC decisions “final and executory” after ten (10) days from promulgation, was “manifestly void and unconstitutional” in view of Article XII-C, Section 11 of the Constitution, which it cited as granting a thirty-day period for appeal of COMELEC decisions to the Supreme Court on certiorari. It concluded that, even if the case had become moot, the Court should still “go on record” disowning what the dissent described as unpredictable and improvised COMELEC action that allegedly disregarded settled rules and basic due process.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The majority’s resolution rested on two linked grounds: first, the Court found the motions for reconsideration lacked merit; and second, the matters had become moot and academic due to the change in administration and the appointment of officers-in-charge to the contested offices. The resolution further reflected

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-69773-75)

The petitions in G.R. Nos. 69773-75 were separate petitions for certiorari filed by the petitioners and were consolidated with related petitions in the Court’s majority resolution dated November 19, 1985.
The Court’s majority decision in the consolidated cases dismissed the petitions for lack of merit.
After the adverse decision, petitioner Habib Ali, et al. filed a joint motion for reconsideration on December 13, 1985 in G.R. Nos. 69773-75.
The Court required the respondents to comment on the motions for reconsideration, and the Office of the Solicitor General moved to dismiss the motions as pro forma for failure to raise new and substantial arguments warranting reversal.
Following a change in administration, the Court directed the new Solicitor General to confirm whether he maintained the position of his predecessor and to submit the required comment.
Petitioners manifested that the cases were not moot despite the change of administration and the expiration of the officers’ terms because the determination of the validity of the elections of private respondents would affect petitioners’ claims for damages.
Respondent Salam N. Pangadapun reported that her case had become moot and academic due to the appointment of an officer-in-charge.
The new Solicitor General, acting for the COMELEC, manifested that COMELEC maintained the validity of its decision installing private respondents as local elective officials in Marawi City, but also stated that officers-in-charge had been designated for the Mayor and Vice-Mayor positions.
The Court found no statement in the COMELEC-related submissions seeking a modification or reversal of the November 19, 1985 decision.
The Court denied the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, and further held that the motions had become moot and academic in light of subsequent developments.
The resolution reflected the concurrence of Alampay, J. with the concurrence of Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, and Gutierrez, JJ.
Teehankee, C.J. maintained a dissent from the majority decision of November 19, 1985, and the dissent’s rationale was treated as incorporated by reference in the later resolution.

Related Consolidated Petitions

The Court’s resolution addressed multiple consolidated cases, including G.R. Nos. 69765-67 and G.R. Nos. 69846, besides G.R. Nos. 69773-75.
Mahadi M. Pimping filed a separate motion for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 69765-67, dated December 13, 1985, and Rashid Sampaco filed a similar motion in G.R. No. 69846, dated December 20, 1985.
The Court’s resolution treated these motions together in assessing merit and mootness, while acknowledging that the dissent focused on alleged legal errors by the COMELEC at the time of the questioned resolution.

Procedural History and Motions

The Court’s majority resolution of November 19, 1985 dismissed the petitioners’ certiorari petitions for lack of merit.
After the dismissal, petitioners pursued reconsideration, filing motions dated December 13, 1985 (Habib Ali, et al. and Mahadi M. Pimping) and December 20, 1985 (Rashid Sampaco).
The Court, through subsequent resolutions dated January 7, 1986 and in later developments after administration changed, required the respondents to comment and required the new Solicitor General to confirm whether the prior posture would be maintained.
The Office of the Solicitor General sought dismissal of the motions for reconsideration as pro forma and argued that they did not present new and substantial arguments.
The Court ultimately denied the motions for reconsideration and added that they had become moot and academic.

Key Developments Affecting Mootness

The events after the November 19, 1985 decision included a change in administration and appointments of officers-in-charge for the contested offices.
Petitioners argued that the cases had not become moot because the validity of the elections would still matter for a right to claim damages.
Respondent Salam N. Pangadapun asserted that the case had become moot because an officer-in-charge had been appointed to the contested position.
COMELEC, through the new Solicitor General, maintained the validity of its earlier decision installing private respondents, while also reporting that officers-in-charge had been designated for the offices involved.
The Court found no request for modification or reversal of the decision, and it treated the post-decision