Title
Alejano vs. Cabuay
Case
G.R. No. 160792
Decision Date
Aug 25, 2005
Armed soldiers seized Oakwood Apartments in 2003, demanding President Arroyo's resignation. Detained officers challenged confinement conditions; Supreme Court upheld detention as lawful, deeming restrictions reasonable for security.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 185368)

Antecedent Facts

On 27 July 2003, approximately 321 armed soldiers led by the detained junior officers entered and occupied Oakwood Premier in Makati, disarmed security, planted explosive devices, publicly renounced the administration and called for resignations, and later surrendered voluntarily at about 7:00 p.m., defused the devices and returned to their barracks. On 31 July 2003 and 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued directives that led to the transfer and custody of several junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center while investigations proceeded. On 1 August 2003 government prosecutors filed Informations for coup d’état in RTC Makati (Criminal Case No. 03‑2784). Commitment orders placed certain officers in ISAFP custody. Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus on 11 August 2003.

Initial Writ and Referral

On 12 August 2003 the Supreme Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, directed respondents to return the writ and produce the detainees before the Court of Appeals on 18 August 2003, and referred the case to the Court of Appeals (by raffle) for hearing, further proceedings and decision, with the instruction that a report be made to the Supreme Court within ten days after promulgation of the CA decision. The detainees and counsel participated in the CA proceedings; respondents produced the detainees and filed their Return and Answer; the CA issued its decision on 17 September 2003.

Court of Appeals’ Ruling

The Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition. It held that the detainees were legitimately indicted for coup d’état and that habeas corpus is not available to collaterally attack a valid prosecution or lawful confinement. The CA recognized certain rights violations (notably the opening/reading of a detainee’s letter) as “abhorrent,” but concluded those violations did not amount to unlawful restraint justifying habeas corpus. The CA nevertheless directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to visiting hours and to honor a two‑hour daily exercise regimen under Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263‑04.

Issues Raised on Appeal to the Supreme Court

Petitioners urged that: (1) the Court of Appeals improperly reviewed and effectively reversed the Supreme Court’s 12 August 2003 Order (arguing that that Order had already granted the petition); (2) the CA failed to recognize the appropriateness of habeas corpus for the detainees’ complaints regarding conditions and restrictions; and (3) the CA erred in asserting the legality of the ISAFP Detention Center’s regulations and conditions of confinement.

Legal Standard on Habeas Corpus and Scope of Review

The Supreme Court reiterated the governing principle that a writ of habeas corpus is a summary remedy to inquire into the cause of detention and to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of liberty. The proper inquiry is limited: if detention is unlawful, the court should order release; if lawful, the habeas proceedings terminate. The Court emphasized that habeas corpus is not a writ of error, not an appeal, and not a general remedy for all prison‑condition grievances. The remedy may, in limited circumstances, be extended where constitutional rights are so infringed as to render detention unlawful — e.g., deprivation of a constitutional right that results in unlawful restraint, lack of jurisdiction to impose sentence, or imposition of an excessive/void penalty — but the threshold to void confinement is high.

Procedural Claim Rejected: Nature of the Supreme Court’s 12 August 2003 Order

The Supreme Court rejected petitioners’ contention that its 12 August 2003 Order had already granted release. The Court explained that the production order and referral to the Court of Appeals for hearing were preliminary, procedural steps required under Rule 102 (Sections 6–8) to allow the respondent to produce the detainees and explain the cause of detention. The referral to the CA did not constitute a substantive adjudication in favor of petitioners. Because petitioners actively participated in the CA hearing, they were estopped from later contesting the CA’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits.

Application of RA 7438 and Reasonableness Standard for Detention Regulations

The Court interpreted Section 4(b) of RA 7438, which on one hand penalizes obstructing visits and consultations with counsel “at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night,” but on the other hand expressly authorizes detention officers to undertake “such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape.” The Court held that regulations limiting access must be reasonably related to legitimate security objectives (i.e., securing safety and preventing escape). The statute thus establishes a reasonableness standard rather than an absolute right to unrestricted access.

Visiting Hours and Right to Counsel — Application to the Facts

Applying the reasonableness standard, the Court found the ISAFP visiting hours (lawyers allowed to visit detainees weekdays between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch break, and urgent cases accommodated) to be reasonably related to security objectives and not unduly impairing the detainees’ right to counsel. The detainees were afforded daily face‑to‑face meetings; counsel had access to confer with detainees before Senate and commission hearings; and procedures existed to obtain access in emergencies. Thus, the Court concluded that the regulated access did not nullify the indictment or render detention unlawful.

Conditions of Confinement and Prohibition Against Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment

The Supreme Court, relying on controlling principles articulated in Bell v. Wolfish and Block v. Rutherford (as discussed in the record), applied a deferential standard to detention‑facility regulations that are reasonably related to legitimate institutional security needs. The Court held that the separation of detainees from visitors by iron bars, the boarding of cell grills with plywood, and the attendant reduction in light and ventilation, while discomforting, were security measures reasonably designed to prevent contraband, communication that could facilitate escape or coordinated wrongdoing, and to maintain order. The Court found no patent arbitrariness and accepted the CA’s factual finding that the ISAFP cells were relatively clean, livable, and that detainees (save for two named exceptions as noted in the CA) were treated well and fed regularly. The restrictions did not amount to punishment or to inhuman, degrading, or cruel conditions sufficient to void confinement.

Privacy of Correspondence and Privileged Communications

On the specific claim that detention officers opened and read letters handed by Trillanes and Maestrecampo to a petitioner acting as a personal courier, the Court distinguished unsealed non‑privileged mail from privileged attorney‑client correspondence. The impounded letters were folded, not in sealed envelopes, and were not communications to or from counsel. The Court adopted the view, reflected in U.S. a

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