G.R. No. 227775 - Eleanor Reyno and Elsa De Vera vs. George Baltazar and Joel Baltazar

Case Summary (G.R. No. 227775)

Key Dates

Elected terms: 1998–2001, 2001–2004, 2004–2007.
Sandiganbayan preventive suspension: September/October 2005 (90 days ordered); suspension lifted by this Court in November 2005; Asilo resumed and finished the term.
COMELEC Second Division resolution: November 28, 2007 (granted due course to candidacy).
COMELEC en banc refusal to reconsider: October 7, 2008.
Supreme Court decision (en banc): December 23, 2009 (applies the 1987 Constitution).

Applicable Law

Constitutional provision: Section 8, Article X, 1987 Constitution (three-year local terms; no more than three consecutive terms; voluntary renunciation not an interruption of continuity).
Statute: Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — repeats the constitutional rule.
Relevant statutes on preventive suspension: Sections 63–64, RA 7160; Section 13, RA 3019; Sections 24–25, RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act). Jurisprudential authorities cited throughout the opinion.

Issues Presented

Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
Whether preventive suspension constitutes the kind of involuntary renunciation contemplated in Section 43(b) such that it interrupts continuity of service for the full term.

Procedural Posture and COMELEC Rulings

Petitioners sought denial or cancellation of Asilo’s 2007 certificate of candidacy on the three-term-limit ground. The COMELEC Second Division denied the petition, reasoning that Asilo had failed to render complete service for the 2004–2007 term because of the preventive suspension. The COMELEC en banc denied reconsideration, adopting the Second Division’s view. Petitioners then sought relief in the Supreme Court by petition for annulment of the COMELEC rulings for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Supreme Court’s Central Legal Question

Central Legal Question

Does preventive suspension interrupt an elective official’s term for purposes of the constitutional three-term limit, or is “interruption” limited to events that result in loss of title to office (involuntary loss of office) rather than mere temporary inability to exercise functions?

Interpretive Framework: Term, Title, and Continuity

The Court analyzed Section 8, Article X as fixing a term as a period of title to office (three years) and as limiting service to three consecutive such terms. The provision’s second sentence — that voluntary renunciation “shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected” — was read as an anti-circumvention rule. The Court emphasized that the constitutional concept of “interruption” should be read with focus on interruption of the term (the title to office) rather than temporary interruption of the exercise of duties within an otherwise uninterrupted term.

Doctrinal and Historical Aids to Construction

The ponencia relied on dictionary meaning of “renunciation,” the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission (noting that “voluntary renunciation” was intended to bar circumvention), and prior jurisprudence defining “term” as a fixed period of title to office. The negative command “no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms” argues for strict construction in favor of enforcing term limits and against expansive exceptions.

Survey of Relevant Jurisprudence

The Court reviewed prior cases addressing what constitutes a completed term or an interruption: Appari (definition of “term”); Gaminde (term as right to hold office); Lonzanida (involuntary severance by writ of execution was an interruption); Ong and Rivera (where de facto service from start to finish counted as a full term despite later judgments); Adormeo and Socrates (breaks from office, e.g., electoral defeat or intervening private-citizen period, interrupt continuity); Latasa (conversion of municipality to city did not change identity of office for three-term rule); Montebon (assumption of a different office by operation of law created an interruption because title to prior office was lost). From this jurisprudential canvas, the Court distilled the principle that interruption sufficient to avoid the three-term restriction generally requires involuntary loss of title to the office (i.e., an effective break from holding the office), not mere temporary inability to exercise functions.

Nature and Legal Effect of Preventive Suspension

The Court explained preventive suspension’s character: an interim remedial measure imposed under different statutes when prima facie evidence indicates likely guilt or to protect evidence/witnesses; it bars the official from performing functions and suspends pay but does not, by itself, vacate the office or divest the official of title. Reinstatement follows lifting of suspension; permanent loss of office only follows a final finding of guilt or other removal mechanism. Preventive suspension is therefore a temporary incapacity to render service during an otherwise continuous term.

Majority Conclusion on Preventive Suspension and Interruption

Applying the interpretive framework and jurisprudence, the Court held that preventive suspension does not constitute an interruption of the term for purposes of the three-term limit. Interruption that exempts an official from the three-term restriction requires involuntary loss of title (e.g., succession by operation of law, removal, being unseated), not a mere temporary bar on exercising functions. Preventive suspension affects actual delivery of service during a term but does not break the term itself. Counting preventive suspension as an interruption would allow circumvention of the three-term rule and pose risks of abuse (e.g., fabricated administrative charges producing suspensions to reset term counts).

Application to Asilo’s Case and Holding

Because Asilo retained title to his councilor office and resumed functions after the Court lifted the preventive suspension, the 2004–2007 term was not interrupted for constitutional purposes. The COMELEC’s rulings granting due course to Asilo’s candidacy thus refused to apply Section 8, Article X and were held to constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted the petition, nullified the COMELEC resolutions, declared Asilo disqualified to run for a prohibited fourth term, and imposed costs against Asilo.

Reasoning on Grave Abuse of Discretion

The Court characterized the COMELEC’s contrary ruling as a refusal to perform a positive constitutional duty and an action outside legal contemplation, amounting to grave abuse of discretion. The majority stressed faithful application of the constitutional prohibition and the danger of undermining it by treating preventive suspension as a term-interrupting event.

Dissenting Opinion (Justice Carpio): Summary of Arguments

Justice Carpio dissented, arguing preventive suspension is an involuntary interruption of continuity of service for constitutional purposes. The dissent reasoned that the constitutional scheme equates “full service” with actual ability to render service; preventive suspension deprives the electorate of services and therefore interrupts continuity. The dissen

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 227775)

Case Caption, Citation and Core Question

Full citation as taken from the source: 623 Phil. 876 EN BANC [ G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009 ] SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N. TALABONG, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO, RESPONDENTS.
Core legal question presented: Whether preventive suspension of an elected public official is an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
Relief sought by petitioners: Annulment and setting aside of the COMELEC ruling which treated preventive suspension as an effective interruption of Asilo’s 2004–2007 term, contending COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Antecedent and Factual Background

Wilfredo F. Asilo (private respondent) was elected Councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: 1998–2001, 2001–2004, and 2004–2007.
In September/early October 2005 (during the 2004–2007 term) the Sandiganbayan ordered his preventive suspension for 90 days in relation to a criminal case.
The Supreme Court (Second Division) later restrained/ lifted the Sandiganbayan suspension; the DILG recalled its implementation order and Asilo reassumed and finished his 2004–2007 term.
Asilo filed a certificate of candidacy for Councilor in 2007 (seeking a fourth consecutive term).
Petitioners (Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, Ferdinand N. Talabong) sought denial of due course or cancellation of Asilo’s certificate of candidacy on ground that he had been elected and served for three consecutive terms, thereby being disqualified under the three-term limit rule.
COMELEC Second Division (Resolution dated November 28, 2007) denied petitioners’ challenge, reasoning Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004–2007 term because of the Sandiganbayan suspension.
COMELEC en banc (Resolution dated October 7, 2008) denied reconsideration and refused to disturb the Second Division’s ruling.
Petition filed with the Supreme Court under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 (seeking writs appropriate to challenge COMELEC rulings).

Issues Presented to the Court

Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule (i.e., whether it interrupts the continuity of service for a “full term” under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) RA 7160).
Whether preventive suspension is to be considered an “involuntary renunciation” as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160, thereby creating an interruption that exempts an official from the three-term limit.

Statutory Provision at Issue (Textual Basis)

Section 8, Article X, 1987 Constitution:
- Fixes local elective term at three years and provides that no such official shall serve more than three consecutive terms.
- States: “Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”
Section 43(b), RA 7160 (Local Government Code) repeats the constitutional provision; Court notes differences in wording are insignificant for the case.

Doctrine: Meaning of "Term" and "Voluntary Renunciation"

“Term” as a legal concept:
- Defined as a fixed and definite period of time which the law prescribes that an officer may hold an office (Appari v. Court of Appeals).
- Term fixes the period during which an officer has title to and may hold office; upon expiration, rights and authority ipso facto cease (Appari).
- Gaminde reiterated that term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right.
“Voluntary renunciation”:
- Dictionary sense: abandonment; to renounce is to give up, abandon, decline, or resign.
- “Voluntary” modifies renunciation to signify surrender based on freely exercised will, i.e., loss of title by conscious choice.
- Constitutional drafting history (Constitutional Commission exchanges) shows framers intended “voluntary renunciation” to be broadly construed to close gaps used to circumvent term limits.

Jurisprudential Background and Precedents Cited

Borja v. COMELEC (329 Phil. 409): mentioned but not controlling; concerned succession, not preventive suspension.
Appari v. Court of Appeals (discussion on “term”).
Gaminde v. Commission on Audit (definition of “term”).
Lonzanida v. COMELEC:
- Two requisites for three-term disqualification: (1) election to same post for three consecutive terms; (2) full service of three consecutive terms.
- Decision: involuntary severance from office short of full term amounts to interruption and prevents application of disqualification.
Ong v. Alegre and Rivera v. COMELEC:
- Final judgments undoing an election but issued after the term expired; Court treated such officials as having served a full term because they assumed and continuously exercised functions from start to end.
- Demonstrates Court’s zeal to give full effect to three-term limitation and to favor limitation rather than exceptions.
Adormeo v. COMELEC and Socrates v. COMELEC:
- Recall elections and interim defeat create intervening breaks; subsequent non-immediate elections do not violate three-term rule.
- Hold that intervening periods as private citizen (rest period) interrupt continuity.
Latasa v. COMELEC:
- Conversion of municipality into city during third term did not change territorial jurisdiction; three-term limit still applied because same inhabitants and same power held; prevented prolonging control over same territorial jurisdiction.
Montebon v. COMELEC:
- Succession by operation of law (highest-ranking councilor becoming vice-mayor) constituted interruption of councilor term — loss of the previous title by operation of law is an effective interruption.

Court’s Doctrinal Conclusion on "Interruption"

Interruption that exempts an elective official from the three-term limit requires involuntary loss of title to office (involuntary severance from office).
Effective interruption: involuntary loss of title to office (e.g., loss by operation of law or other involuntary severance).
Ineffective interruption: temporary inability or disqualification to exercise functions during an otherwise intact term (the officeholder retains title).
Key distinction: interruption of the term (loss of title) vs. interruption of actual service rendered (temporary inability to exercise functions). The constitutional provision is about term continuity, not mere continuity of service performance.
Voluntary renunciation was cited as textual example of what does not constitute interruption because framers wanted to prevent circumvention by voluntary resignation; the term was not intended to define all non-interruptive events.

Nature, Purpose and Legal Effects of Preventive Suspension (As Stated)

Preventive suspension is an interim remedi