Title
Alcedo vs. Spouses Sagudang
Case
G.R. No. 186375
Decision Date
Jun 17, 2015
Petitioner failed to prove prior possession in a forcible entry case against respondents, leading to dismissal of the complaint.
ejectment
ownership
parcel of land
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 186375)

Factual Background

Petitioner alleged that she purchased the subject property from Pedro and Victorino Bacdang. She claimed she acquired one-half from Pedro via a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 22 November 1995, and the other half from Victorino through an Affidavit of Self Adjudication of Estate of Deceased Person with Deed of Absolute Sale executed on 4 June 2003. She further asserted that prior to those transactions, the property had been mortgaged to her sometime in the 1980s and that she had been in possession since then without interference or claim from other persons. She stated that in July 2005, respondents began claiming that a portion of the land belonged to them. She narrated that several conferences were conducted at the office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) regarding the land dispute.
Petitioner then alleged that on 10 November 2005, respondents, together with relatives and friends, entered the premises by force, violence, and intimidation, took possession, and constructed a fence. She claimed these acts unlawfully deprived her of her rights over the property and its fruits and income. She prayed for a TRO to stop respondents from uprooting plants and cutting trees and sought a preliminary injunction to revert possession immediately to her. She also requested an order requiring respondents to vacate and deliver possession, and to pay damages, rental value, and income from harvested fruits, plus attorneys’ fees.

Respondents, in turn, claimed that they owned the adjacent property declared in their name under Tax Declaration No. 021 00539 and denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 1027-C. They asserted that they acquired the land from spouses Godrey Cawis and Annie Cawis on 31 December 2001 and that they took possession in 2002, constructed a house, introduced improvements, and paid realty taxes. They also asserted that in 2005, Mrs. Galvin Backeng and Mr. Florentino Velasco disturbed their possession, prompting respondents to fence their property. They alleged that petitioner later filed a case for forcible entry against those who had disturbed their possession.

Proceedings in the MCTC and RTC

On 19 May 2006, the MCTC ruled in favor of petitioner. It found that respondents forcibly took possession of property possessed by petitioner. In reaching that conclusion, the MCTC considered an affidavit of the former owner of Cadastral Lot 1027-C that the fence erected by respondents encroached on petitioner’s property. The MCTC ordered respondents to remove the fence and surrender possession. It also awarded petitioner P20,000.00 as attorneys’ fees.

Respondents appealed to the RTC. On 4 December 2006, the RTC Branch 45 of Urdaneta City affirmed the MCTC, adopting the same dispositive result in all respects.

Court of Appeals Reversal

The Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint. It ruled that the MCTC did not have jurisdiction because the case was essentially a boundary dispute, which properly belonged to the RTC. It thus set aside the rulings of both lower courts and dismissed the complaint for forcible entry.

Issues Raised on Petition for Review

Petitioner assailed the Court of Appeals on two principal errors: first, that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry; and second, that it erred in declaring the controversy as a boundary dispute that should be pursued through an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria.

Petitioner’s principal contention relied on the rule that both the jurisdiction of the court and the nature of the action are determined by the allegations in the complaint. She invoked Rule 70, Section 1, emphasizing that in forcible entry actions, the complaint must allege that the plaintiff was deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and that the action must be filed within one year from such unlawful deprivation. She likewise argued that the test is whether the complaint alleges prior physical possession followed by unlawful deprivation by the means enumerated in the rule.

The Supreme Court’s Analysis on Jurisdiction and the Nature of the Action

The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the MCTC lacked jurisdiction. The Court reiterated that the test for determining the sufficiency of the allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the plaintiff’s prayer. Applying this principle, the Court found that on its face, the complaint alleged facts satisfying the requisites for forcible entry: petitioner claimed prior possession and alleged that respondents entered and fenced the land by force, violence, and intimidation without authority. Thus, the Court treated the allegations as sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the case as one for forcible entry.

However, the Court did not stop at jurisdiction. It held that even with the correct ruling on jurisdiction, the lower courts’ findings could not stand because petitioner failed to prove the allegations necessary to sustain her claim of prior physical possession. The Court stressed that allegation is not tantamount to proof, and that a party who alleges a fact bears the burden of proving it. Mere allegations, without supporting evidence, cannot establish a prima facie case of prior physical possession.

Failure to Prove Prior Physical Possession

The Court scrutinized respondents’ position on prior possession and noted that respondents’ evidence and narrative were premised on a different timeline and on the delineation of the lots involved. Respondents maintained that petitioner could not claim prior possession against respondents because respondents had been in peaceful possession of the relevant portion before petitioner allegedly acquired the adjacent lot.

The Court adopted the respondents’ contention concerning the relative location of the properties. It recognized that the area in controversy required consideration of three material lots, and that petitioner’s claimed adjacent lot was connected to Cadastral Lot 1027-B, while respondents’ claimed lot was denominated as Cadastral Lot 1027-C. Respondents argued, in essence, that petitioner’s possession could not have preceded respondents’ possession because petitioner’s acquisition of the portion she claimed to have been encroached upon could not precede respondents’ possession beginning in December 2001, when respondents acquired their land from spouses Godrey Cawis and Annie Cawis.

The Court found that petitioner failed to provide specificity about the precise portion of her lot allegedly encroached upon. It explained that the allegations suggested the encroached portion related to Cadastral Lot 1027-B adjacent to respondents’ Cadastral Lot 1027-C. With that framing, the Court concluded that respondents enjoyed the right of prior possession de facto over the contested lot, given that respondents’ possession began in 2001, while petitioner’s possession of Cadastral Lot 1027-B began later. It thus ruled that the absence of prior physical possession by petitioner made it unnecessary to determine whether respondents employed force, intimidation, or related means, because the essential element of prior possession indispensable in forcible entry was not established.

Disposition

The Court therefore denied the petition. It affirmed the Court of Appeals d

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