Title
Alba vs. Arollado
Case
G.R. No. 237140
Decision Date
Oct 5, 2020
Regina Alba sued Nida Arollado for unpaid petroleum debts. Nida claimed payment and prescription. SC ruled the oral contract prescribed in six years; checks did not convert it to written, and partial payments without written acknowledgment did not interrupt prescription.
A

Case Summary (A.M. No. RTJ-20-2596)

Facts and Transactional Details

Regina sold petroleum products on credit to Nida on various dates beginning in 2000. Among numerous transactions, three specific purchases were the subject of checks: a July 26, 2000 transaction (check amount P60,000.00) and two later transactions evidenced by checks for P44,092.00 and P66,168.50 (issued in November 2002). The three checks were dishonored by the drawee banks (the July 26, 2000 check dishonored on August 25, 2000; the November 2002 checks dishonored on April 4, 2003). Regina claimed broader outstanding balances for earlier and later purchases (including alleged amounts of approximately P616,169.75, P156,662.00, and P150,996.00), but the trial court limited recovery to the value of the three dishonored checks (total P170,260.50). Regina sent an extrajudicial demand on May 15, 2013 and filed a complaint for sum of money on June 4, 2013.

Procedural Posture

The RTC, in a decision dated August 18, 2014, rendered judgment in favor of Regina but confined liability to the aggregate value of the three dishonored checks (P170,260.50), plus attorney’s fees and costs, while dismissing the counterclaim and other claims. Nida appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, in a decision dated September 8, 2017, reversed the RTC and dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. Regina’s motion for reconsideration before the CA was denied on January 22, 2018, and she filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 to the Supreme Court challenging the CA’s conclusion on prescription.

Issue Presented

Whether Regina’s action for collection of the sums represented by the three dishonored checks was timely — specifically, whether the prescriptive period should be reckoned from (a) the dates of dishonor of the checks, (b) the date of last partial payment (asserted November 8, 2012), or (c) the date of extrajudicial demand (May 15, 2013) — such that the complaint filed on June 4, 2013 would not have prescribed.

Legal Framework on Prescription and Accrual

The controlling Civil Code provisions are: Article 1145 (six‑year prescriptive period for actions upon an oral contract), Article 1150 (the prescriptive period is counted from the day the action may be brought), and Article 1155 (interruption of prescription occurs only by filing a suit, by a written extrajudicial demand, or by a written acknowledgment of the debt). The accrual of a cause of action is determined by the legal possibility of bringing the action — i.e., when the last element of a cause of action (the defendant’s violative act or omission) occurs. Jurisprudence distinguishes between written contracts (subject to a ten‑year period) and oral contracts (six years), and requires that any writing relied upon to invoke the ten‑year rule must, on its face, contain an express or fairly implied promise to pay.

Characterization of the Contract and Effect of the Checks

The courts found the underlying sales agreement to be oral. The issuance of the three checks did not, by themselves, transform the oral agreement into a written contract for purposes of the ten‑year prescriptive period because none of the checks contained, on their face, an express or implied written promise to pay the obligation in the manner contemplated by the ten‑year statute. The Supreme Court adopted the CA’s reliance on established jurisprudence (Manuel v. Rodriguez; PNB v. Buenaseda) holding that a writing must, by its own language, affirmatively indicate the promise to pay if the ten‑year prescription is to apply. Consequently, the six‑year period of Article 1145 governs Regina’s claim.

Accrual of the Cause of Action and Computation of Prescription

A cause of action for nonpayment accrued upon the dishonor of each check, which constituted the breach of the payment obligation. The relevant dishonor dates accepted in the record were: August 25, 2000 for the July 26, 2000 check (starting the six‑year period to August 25, 2006), and April 4, 2003 for the two November 2002 checks (starting the six‑year period to April 4, 2009). Because Regina filed the complaint on June 4, 2013, more than six years after those accrual dates, the claims based on those dishonored checks had prescribed.

Interruption of Prescription and Alleged Acknowledgments or Payments

Prescription may be interrupted only by filing of a suit, by a written extrajudicial demand, or by a written acknowledgment of the debt. Regina’s extrajudicial demand (dated May 15, 2013) postdated the expiration of the relevant six‑year periods and therefore did not interrupt prescription. Regina’s assertion that partial payments (notably an alleged payment on November 8, 2012) constituted an acknowledgment sufficient to interrupt prescription was not supported by satisfactory evidence. Under Article 1155, payment alone, unless manifested in a written acknowledgment signed by the debtor, does not interrupt prescription. The documentary record actually showed the last receipt for payments was dated November 21, 2006 for P2,000.00, which, if relevant, would at best have extended the actionable period only up to November 21, 2012 — still prior to Regina’s June 4, 2013 filing.

Limitation of Review by Final RTC Determination

The Supreme Court noted a procedural bar: Reg

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