Title
Aguinaldo vs. Ventus
Case
G.R. No. 176033
Decision Date
Mar 11, 2015
Petitioners accused of estafa for misrepresenting vehicle ownership; case reinstated improperly by non-party, but arraignment suspension and preliminary investigation upheld as valid.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-10556)

Procedural Background (chronology)

  • Dec. 2, 2002: Complaint‑Affidavit for estafa filed by Ventus and Joson before the OCP of Manila, alleging petitioners induced them to part with P260,000 by pledging motor vehicles represented as owned by Aguinaldo but actually owned by Levita De Castro (LEDC Rent‑A‑Car).
  • Jan.–Feb. 2003: Perez filed Counter‑Affidavit (Jan. 15) and Rejoinder (Jan. 29); private respondents filed Reply‑Affidavit (Jan. 22).
  • Feb. 25, 2003: ACP Renato F. Gonzaga issued Resolution recommending indictment under Art. 315(2) RPC; noted Aguinaldo’s failure to submit controverting evidence.
  • July 16, 2003: Information for estafa filed in RTC of Manila (Crim. Case No. 03‑216182).
  • July 31, 2003: Perez arrested; bail reduced by trial court that day. Petitioners filed motions to recall/quash arrest warrants and a joint Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Withdrawal of Information with OCP (Aug. 4, 2003).
  • Aug.–Dec. 2003: Trial court granted withdrawal of information recall insofar as Aguinaldo pending DOJ review (Aug. 6, 2003); proceedings deferred; case archived Dec. 23, 2003 pending resolution of petition for review at DOJ.
  • Feb. 27, 2004: Petition for review filed with DOJ (I.S. No. 02L‑51569). Trial court temporarily suspended arraignment (Apr. 16, 2004).
  • June–Oct. 2004: Levita De Castro filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant (June 23, 2004); De Castro filed a Manifestation (Oct. 15, 2004) presenting a DOJ Resolution dated Sept. 6, 2004 dismissing a petition for review in a different case (De Castro v. Aguinaldo).
  • May 16, 2005: Trial court (public respondent) issued Order granting De Castro’s Motion to Reinstate and ordering issuance of arrest warrant against Aguinaldo.
  • May 30, 2005: Petitioners filed Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Quash Warrant.
  • Aug. 23, 2005: Trial court denied motion for reconsideration and set arraignment, invoking the 60‑day limit for suspension under Sec. 11(c), Rule 116.
  • Petition to CA (Rule 65) and CA disposition: Petitioners sought certiorari; CA dismissed petition (Aug. 11, 2006) and denied reconsideration (Dec. 4, 2006).
  • Supreme Court: Petition for review on certiorari filed; SC resolved issues and rendered decision (March 11, 2015; judgment received April 1, 2015).

Issues Raised by Petitioners

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

Petitioners raised three principal grounds:
I. The Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant was filed by Levita De Castro, who is not a party to Criminal Case No. 03‑216182, so the trial court erred in granting the motion.
II. The 60‑day suspension provision in Section 11(c), Rule 116 (limiting suspension of arraignment when a petition for review is pending at DOJ) is directory and may be relaxed in the interest of orderly and speedy administration of justice; therefore proceedings should remain suspended pending DOJ resolution.
III. The preliminary investigation was not completed and petitioners were denied the right to a full preliminary investigation because the Information was filed and warrant issued before they could obtain a copy of the DOJ resolution and seek reconsideration at the DOJ.

Supreme Court’s Analysis and Ruling on Issue I (De Castro’s Motion)

Ruling on Issue I — De Castro was not a party and May 16, 2005 order was erroneous

  • The Court agreed with petitioners that Levita De Castro was not a private complainant or party in Criminal Case No. 03‑216182; she was a witness/owner of the vehicles.
  • Because De Castro was not a party, her Motion to Reinstate and to Issue Warrant should have been treated as without legal effect (subject to expungement). The public respondent should have granted petitioners’ motion to expunge and treated De Castro’s motion as a scrap of paper.
  • The trial court’s May 16, 2005 Order granting De Castro’s motion was also wrongly founded on a purported DOJ dismissal — but that DOJ dismissal (Sept. 6, 2004) pertained to a different case (I.S. Nos. 02G‑29349 & 02G‑28820, Levita De Castro v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo).
  • The Court noted that a DOJ certification (Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Miguel F. Guido, Jr.) indicated that the petition for review relevant to I.S. No. 02L‑51569 (Ventus et al. v. Aguinaldo) was still pending as of May 27, 2005.
  • Conclusion on Issue I: The trial court erred in issuing the May 16, 2005 order reinstating the case and ordering an arrest warrant on the basis of De Castro’s motion and an unrelated DOJ resolution.

Supreme Court’s Analysis and Ruling on Issue II (60‑day suspension)

Ruling on Issue II — 60‑day suspension under Rule 116 Sec. 11(c) is mandatory and was not abused

  • The Court rejected petitioners’ contention that the 60‑day suspension provision is merely directory and that the trial court should have indefinitely suspended proceedings pending DOJ resolution.
  • The Court reiterated binding jurisprudence: pendency of a petition for review is grounds to suspend arraignment, but Section 11(c) of Rule 116 explicitly limits such suspension to 60 days from filing of the petition with the reviewing office. After that period the trial court must either arraign the accused or deny the motion to defer arraignment. The Court cited Samson v. Judge Daway, DiAo v. Olivarez, and other authorities emphasizing strict application of reglementary periods to prevent needless delays.
  • The CA’s factual finding that the period from April 16, 2004 (when arraignment was deferred) to May 16, 2005 (when the trial court ordered reinstatement and arrest warrant) — more than one year — was ample time for petitioners to obtain a DOJ resolution was upheld. The Court also noted counsel’s delay in complying with DOJ’s request for pleadings (DOJ letter dated Apr. 15, 2004 complied with only on Oct. 15, 2004), which contributed to the delay.
  • Conclusion on Issue II: The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying further suspension and setting arraignment after the 60‑day rule had been exceeded.

Supreme Court’s Analysis and Ruling on Issue III (Preliminary investigation and due process)

Ruling on Issue III — Preliminary investigation rights were respected; no denial of due process

  • Petitioners argued that they were denied a complete preliminary investigation because the Information was filed and warrant issued before they could receive DOJ resolution and file for reconsideration. They relied on Sales v. Sandiganbayan.
  • The Court distinguished Sales: in Sales the accused was prevented from moving for reconsideration or reinvestigation before the Ombudsman; in contrast, petitioners here were afforded the opportunity to file motions for reconsideration at the prosecutorial level. Perez had filed Counter‑Affidavit and Rejoinder‑Affidavit before the filing of the Information; Aguinaldo relied on those pleadings and filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Withdrawal of Information pursuant to Department Circular No. 70 (Sec. 3) and Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors.
  • The Court held that the filing of such motions and the opportunity to be heard satisfy the requirements of a complete preliminary investigation and procedural due process. Due process is satisfied when parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side, whether by pleadings or oral argument. The Court therefore rejected the contention that the Information was fatally premature.
  • Conclusion o

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