Title
Josef-Dax Aguilar vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Monetary Board, and Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
Case
G.R. No. 254333
Decision Date
Jan 14, 2025
Petitioner Aguilar challenged the closure of MaxBank by BSP, contending procedural violations and asserting constitutional issues regarding due process. The Supreme Court denied Aguilar's petition, affirming the closure as lawful.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 254333)

Key Dates

Incorporation and BSP licensing of MaxBank: February 2006.
Initial BSP PCA initiation: March 6, 2008 (Resolution No. 281).
Failure of PCA declared: July 10, 2014.
Re‑initiation to PCA: October 9, 2014 (after change in ownership).
Monetary Board approval of share transfer to third‑party investors and license conversion: November 16, 2017 (Resolution No. 1922).
BSP regular examinations: December 12, 2017–January 23, 2018; February 20–April 16, 2019.
Monetary Board confirmation of unsafe/unsound practices: October 10, 2019 (Resolution No. 1569).
Monetary Board prohibition of business and designation of PDIC as receiver: November 7, 2019 (Resolution No. 1704.C).
Petitioner filed mandamus in Court of Appeals: February 5, 2020.
Supreme Court decision resolving review: January 14, 2025.

Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis

Primary statutory framework: Republic Act No. 7653 (New Central Bank Act of 1993), as amended by Republic Act No. 11211 (2019) — especially Section 30 (grounds and procedure for receivership, liquidation, and the Monetary Board’s power to summarily forbid a bank from doing business) and Section 37 (administrative sanctions, cease‑and‑desist, and right to request a hearing). Secondary statute referenced: Republic Act No. 7906 (Thrift Bank Act of 1995), Section 9 (powers of the Monetary Board in capital deficiency situations). Constitutional basis: 1987 Philippine Constitution (Article XII, section 20) as the decision was issued in 2025 and the 1987 Constitution governs.

Procedural Posture and Reliefs Sought

Aguilar sought: (a) a writ of mandamus directing BSP/Monetary Board/PDIC to apply RA 7906 remedies and to conduct the Section 37 hearing; (b) production of an accurate financial condition/result of operations and a copy of the Report of Examination; and (c) preliminary injunctive relief preventing PDIC liquidation and seeking reinstatement or other protections. The Court of Appeals denied the mandamus petition as procedurally infirm under Rule 65 and held that the proper remedy to contest a Monetary Board closure is certiorari by majority stockholders within ten days. Aguilar then petitioned the Supreme Court by certiorari review.

Core Legal Holdings — Monetary Board Authority and “Close Now, Hear Later”

The Monetary Board, exercising the BSP’s supervisory authority under RA 7653 and the State’s police power, may summarily and without prior hearing forbid a bank from doing business if supported by substantial evidence that the bank (a) has insufficient realizable assets to meet liabilities, and/or (b) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to depositors or creditors, among enumerated grounds. The statutory scheme contemplates immediate action to protect depositors and the public (“close now, hear later”); due process may occur after closure through judicial review but prior hearing is not required because a prior public proceeding could precipitate runs and further dissipation of assets.

Proper Remedy to Challenge a Monetary Board Closure

Section 30 prescribes that actions of the Monetary Board under receivership/liquidation are final and executory and may be set aside only by petition for certiorari on the ground of excess or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari is available exclusively to the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock and must be filed within ten (10) days from receipt by the bank’s board of directors of the order directing receivership, liquidation, or conservatorship. Mandamus is not the correct remedy to compel the Monetary Board to exercise its discretionary powers or to substitute judicial judgment for administrative discretion; mandamus lies only to compel performance of a ministerial duty or to protect an established legal right where no other adequate remedy exists.

Mandamus Standards and Why It Was Inappropriate Here

Under Rule 65 (mandamus) and settled jurisprudence, mandamus issues only where a clear legal right exists and the respondent has a ministerial duty to perform. The Monetary Board’s decision to close a bank is a discretionary, quasi‑judicial exercise entrusted to the Monetary Board; mandamus will not control that discretion. Aguilar’s claims sought review of a discretionary closure and asked for discretionary relief (application of RA 7906 measures, a Section 37 hearing, etc.), not enforcement of a purely ministerial duty. The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that mandamus was the wrong remedy.

Standing and the Statutory 10‑Day Rule

Section 30 confines judicial review to majority stockholders of record and imposes a strict 10‑day reglementary period. Aguilar, a nominal shareholder and former officer, was not a majority stockholder of record and filed beyond the ten‑day window. The statutory limitation serves to prevent incumbent boards and officers from frustrating closure orders and to vest decision whether to litigate in majority shareholders who have the principal economic stake. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the statutory prescription is valid and that compliance with its party and temporal requirements is mandatory.

Challenge to the Constitutionality of Section 30

Petitioner argued Section 30 unconstitutionally intrudes on the Supreme Court’s rule‑making power by limiting the mode of judicial contest, the party with standing, and the period to litigate. The Court rejected the collateral attack: (1) Aguilar raised the constitutional question only conditionally and collaterally after failing to meet Section 30 requirements; (2) statutes are presumptively constitutional, and petitioner failed to demonstrate clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution; (3) Congress may lawfully define the jurisdiction of administrative agencies and conditions for judicial review, including temporal and party limitations. The Court therefore upheld Section 30’s constitutionality.

Due Process Claims — Section 37 and Request for Report of Examination

Aguilar asserted denial of due process because he was not afforded a Section 37 administrative hearing or a copy of the Report of Examination. The Court held: (a) Section 37 (administrative sanctions and the right to request a hearing) is distinct from Section 30 closure proceedings — Section 37 contemplates administrative sanctions and a hearing for those sanctions but does not require a pre‑closure hearing under Section 30; (b) there is no statutory ministerial duty obligating BSP to furnish a bank a copy of the Report of Examination, consistent with prior precedent (BSP v. Valenzuela); and (c) the statutory closure framework contemplates post‑closure judicial inquiry rather than mandatory prior provision of the full Report of Examination or pre‑closure hearings.

Factual Findings and Substantial Evidence Supporting Closure

The Monetary Board’s Resolution No. 1704.C relied on BSP examination findings and departmental memoranda summarizing multiple supervisory concerns as of 31 December 2018 and subsequent supervisory correspondence. Key factual findings included: negative adjusted capital and negative capital adequacy ratio; chronic net losses and accumulated deficit; insufficient estimated realizable value of assets vis‑à‑vis liabilities (negative net realizable value); continued unsafe or unsound banking practices (hazardous lending, servicing deposits outside bank premises, AML/CFT weaknesses); weak board and management oversight; failure of investor commitments and capital infusions; and material discrepancies regarding the source and composition of capital infusions. The Monetary Board concluded that losses were likely to persist and that continuation of MaxBank’s operations would involve probable losses to depositors and creditors.

Standard of Review and Deference to Monetary Board Findings

The Court reiterated the established rule that the Monetary Board’s factual determinations are accorded great weight and will not be disturbed

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