Title
Agricultural Credit vs. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices
Case
G.R. No. L-21484
Decision Date
Nov 29, 1969
Labor dispute over ACCFA/ACA's proprietary functions, CBA enforcement, unfair labor practices, and certification election upheld by CIR and Supreme Court.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-21484)

Petitioner, Respondent and Organizational Roles

ACCFA/ACA: A government agency created under Republic Act No. 821 and subsequently reorganized under the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844) to implement credit functions in furtherance of land reform. The ACA was placed under the Land Reform Project Administration (LRPA) by Executive Order No. 75, with personnel subject to civil service rules and appointments ultimately vested in the President.
Unions: Labor organizations composed of supervisors (ASA) and rank-and-file employees (AWA) of the ACCFA/ACA, which negotiated a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) dated September 4, 1961, and later sought certification as exclusive bargaining agents.

Key Dates

  • September 4, 1961: Execution of the collective bargaining agreement between ACCFA and the Unions (effective July 1, 1961 for one year).
  • October 25–November 26, 1962: Strike declared by the Unions; strikers returned voluntarily.
  • October 30, 1962: Unions filed unfair labor practice complaint with CIR (Case No. 3450-ULP).
  • March 25, 1963: CIR decision ordering ACCFA to implement CBA provisions, pay specified living allowance, cease discouraging union activity, and bargain in good faith.
  • August 8, 1963: Enactment of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (R.A. No. 3844), reorganizing ACCFA into ACA.
  • March–May 1964: Petition for certification election filed; CIR certified the Unions as exclusive bargaining representatives (Case No. 1327-MC; order dated May 21, 1964).
  • Supreme Court appeals followed from both CIR rulings.

Applicable Law and Governing Constitutional Framework

Statutes and executive instruments relied upon in the Court’s analysis: Republic Act No. 821 (creating ACCFA), Republic Act No. 3844 (Land Reform Code, reorganizing ACCFA into ACA), Executive Order No. 75 (implementing LRPA personnel and administrative integration), and Republic Act No. 875 (Labor Code provision referred to re: prohibition of strikes by government employees).
Constitutional framework applicable to this 1969 decision: the 1935 Constitution (the Constitution in force at the time), as the Court’s reasoning addresses the scope of governmental functions and the permissibility of state entry into economic and social activities under constitutional principles then operative.

Procedural History and Core Claims

Two related Supreme Court appeals challenged (1) a CIR decision finding ACCFA guilty of unfair labor practices and ordering compliance with the CBA, and (2) a CIR order certifying the Unions as exclusive bargaining agents for ACA employees after ACCFA had been reorganized. ACCFA/ACA raised jurisdictional defenses (that the agency performed governmental functions and thus CIR lacked jurisdiction or authority to grant certification and compel bargaining), challenged the validity and enforceability of the CBA and its fringe benefits (arguing presidential approval was required), and disputed the factual findings of unfair labor practice.

Facts Relevant to Jurisdiction and Collective Bargaining

The 1961 CBA provided for various fringe benefits and required ratification by the Board of Governors; the Board conditionally ratified the contract but required Office of the President approval for fringe benefits. The Office of the President gave conditional approval on October 23, 1962. The parties later negotiated partial implementation and payment of specified benefits, and the Board ratified that implementation agreement on July 24, 1963 (with reservation as to pending appeal). Executive Order No. 75 integrated ACA into the LRPA and placed its personnel in a single pool under civil service rules; appointments for ACA officials were identified as being ultimately made by the President.

Issues Presented

  1. Whether the CIR had jurisdiction over the unfair labor practice complaint and the certification election petition—i.e., whether ACCFA/ACA was engaged in governmental or proprietary functions.
  2. Whether the September 4, 1961 collective bargaining agreement was valid, had lapsed, and whether its fringe benefits were enforceable absent prior presidential approval.
  3. Whether there was legal or factual basis for the CIR’s finding of unfair labor practice and its remedial orders (cease-and-desist, implementation of CBA, bargaining in good faith).
  4. Whether the CIR could enforce a CBA that had expired.

Court’s Analysis — Jurisdiction: Governmental vs. Proprietary Functions

The Court analyzed the statutory scheme of the Land Reform Code (R.A. No. 3844) and implementing Executive Order No. 75, noting that the ACA’s functions—extending and administering agricultural credit to implement land reform, auditing and supervising farmers’ cooperatives (visitorial powers under Section 113), prosecuting cooperative officials for malfeasance, exemption from duties and taxes, and large appropriations for credit—were integrally connected to a national land reform program and therefore governmental in character. The Court emphasized structural indicia of governmental character: policymaking and program formulation vested in the National Land Reform Council (a government instrumentality), personnel subject to civil service laws and standardized wage/position structures, placement within the LRPA for unified administration, and appointment authority resting with the President. These features, combined with the statute’s express delegation of sovereign-type powers (e.g., auditing with subpoena power), led the Court to conclude that ACA performed governmental, not proprietary, functions.

Court’s Rationale on Certification Election and Section 11 of R.A. No. 875

Applying the conclusion that the ACA’s functions were governmental, the Court held that the Unions were not entitled to the certification election sought before the CIR to secure collective bargaining rights that would include the right to strike. The Court relied on Section 11 of Republic Act No. 875 (as interpreted): employees employed in governmental functions are prohibited from striking for purposes of securing changes in their terms and conditions of employment, and collective bargaining that contemplates the use of strike as a coercive economic weapon is contrary to that statutory policy where governmental functions are involved. Given ACA’s governmental character, the Court ruled that certification as bargaining units for the purpose of collective bargaining (including strikes) was inappropriate and therefore denied the certification sought by the Unions.

Court’s Disposition as to the CIR’s Unfair Labor Practice Decision

Because the reorganization converting ACCFA to ACA and the Court’s determination of governmental character rendered the propriety of collective bargaining with the Unions moot insofar as further bargaining rights and certification were concerned, the Court found the CIR’s order compelling the agency to bargain collectively to be effectively foreclosed. The Court set aside or modified CIR’s prior decisions and en banc resolutions to the extent they ordered collective bargaining and certification inconsistent with the governmental character of ACA.

Collective Bargaining Agreement and Fringe Benefits: Validity and Enforceability

The Court examined the CBA’s ratification clause and subsequent approvals. The contract required Board ratification; the Board ratified the agreement but expressly conditioned the fringe benefits on presidential approval. The Office of the President gave conditional approval stating that salaries and benefits were acceptable provided they were not in conflict with law and were within the corporation’s financial capacity. The parties thereafter negotiated an implementation agreement and ACCFA/ACA paid certain specified benefits (cost-of-living adjustments, longevity pay, night differential for certain categories) and set aside funds for payment. The Court concluded that (1) the condition requiring presidential approval for fringe benefits had been satisfied insofar as the President’s office had expressed approval consistent with the contract’s condition, and (2) the payment of fringe benefits demonstrated that they were financially supportable and thus enforceable. Consequently, the Court declined to set aside the CIR’s decision insofar as it related to fringe benefits already paid; however, because the Unions were not entitled to certification or to collective bargaining for future terms (given ACA’s governmental character), the Unions could not demand further fringe benefits on the basis of collective bargaining.

Final Holding and Relief

The Supreme Court held that (1) the ACA (successor to ACCFA) performs governmental functions; (2) the CIR’s certification of the Unions and order to bargain collectively were inconsistent with that governmental character and therefore could not stand; (3) fringe benefits under the 1961 CBA that had been approved and paid (or paid pursuant to negotiated implementati

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