Title
Agdeppa vs. Ibe
Case
G.R. No. 96770
Decision Date
Mar 30, 1993
Dispute over Rosario Igarta's estate: heirs contested partition, validity of deeds, and property inclusion; Supreme Court upheld deeds, excluded conveyed properties, and ordered partition among heirs.
validity of documents
properties
certiorari
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 96770)

Factual Background

Rosario had two sisters: Carmen, who married Maximo Agdeppa and bore Hermenegildo and Jose (Jose later died in 1954, leaving sons Joseph, Jefferson, and Stevenson), and Emiliana, who married Fructuoso Ibe and bore Benjamin, Lolita, and Cesar. After Rosario’s death, the Ibe family remained in possession of all of Rosario’s properties. Hermenegildo and his branch expressed a desire to partition in accordance with law, which the Ibes resisted.

The partition complaint identified ten parcels (Parcels I to X) as subjects of the suit, describing each by location, area, and assessed value. Several parcels had tax declarations in Rosario’s name alone, while Parcel III was declared in the names of Rosario and Emiliana, Parcel IX was declared in the names of Rosario, Higino, and Fernando Igarta, and Parcel X was declared in the name of Joaquin Igarta. Subsequently, a supplemental pleading enumerated eight additional properties (labeled a to h), stating that they were included in Rosario’s estate.

In their answer, the defendants admitted that certain parcels were subject to partition (including Parcels I, II, III, and VIII), while averring that other properties had been conveyed by Rosario to different recipients. They asserted that Parcels IV, VI, and XI were conveyed to Benjamin Ibe; Parcels V and X to Ferdinand Ibe; and Parcel VII to Corazon Ibe Lanario. As to the supplemental properties, defendants alleged that property c had been sold to a third person, and that properties a, d, e, f, g, and h had been acquired by them from Rosario by deed of conveyance. They also admitted that supplemental property b should be partitioned.

The defendants supported their claims with notarized documents, including: (1) a deed of quitclaim and transfer of ownership executed on April 28, 1985 (Document No. 384, Page 78, Book II, Series of 1985), and (2) another deed of quitclaim (Document No. 157, Page 33, Book I, Series of 1985), and (3) a deed of absolute sale (Document No. 380, Page 78, Book II, Series of 1985) showing that on April 28, 1985, Rosario sold a parcel denominated as Parcel VI to Benjamin Ibe for P50,000.00. They also presented (4) a deed of quitclaim renouncing Rosario’s rights over supplemental properties d, e, f, g, and h in favor of Emiliana Ibe executed on January 16, 1984. During the case, Emiliana died on June 10, 1987, and she was substituted by her family.

Trial Court Proceedings

After trial, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the challenge to the January 16, 1984 deed of quitclaim favoring Emiliana, but it invalidated the other conveyances executed by Atty. Ernesto S. Yalao in 1985 that were used to exclude certain parcels from Rosario’s estate.

The trial court found that Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 were defective. It reasoned that the residence certificate numbers shown in the documents did not belong to Rosario Igarta. In the municipal treasurer’s certification (Exhibit F), Residence Certificate No. 10529408 (appearing in the deed of absolute sale, Exhibit 3) was said to belong to David Arrocena; Residence Certificate No. 10529708 (appearing in Exhibit 1) was said to have been issued to Simeon Bautista; and Residence Certificate No. 10502786 (appearing in Exhibit 2) was said to have been issued to Florante Rosal, who testified during trial that he had prepared the questioned documents notarized by Atty. Yalao.

The trial court also treated as a “badge of anomaly” that Exhs. 1 and 3 conveying inter vivos certain properties to Benjamin Ibe and his children were executed “at different hours of the same day.” It viewed this as inconsistent with ordinary course because, as it put it, if Rosario disposed of her properties in more than one instance on the same day, such dispositions should have been embodied in only one document. It further observed that Parcel IV was the subject of both the April 28, 1985 instruments in favor of Benjamin (Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2) and another deed of quitclaim, all naming Benjamin as recipient, which it found irregular.

Based on those circumstances, the trial court concluded there was “clear, strong and convincing evidence” that the documents notarized by Atty. Yalao did not reflect the truth. Nonetheless, it upheld the 1984 deed of quitclaim in favor of Emiliana because tax declarations indicated co-ownership of Rosario and Emiliana over supplemental properties d, e, f, g, and h. It further ruled that Parcel III, also declared in both names, must be treated as Rosario’s exclusive property since it had not been included in the 1984 deed of quitclaim.

The Regional Trial Court ordered: (a) all parcels subject to the suit, except Parcels c, d, e, f, g, and h under the supplemental pleading, to be declared part of Rosario’s hereditary estate; (b) partition between Hermenegildo Agdeppa and Benjamin Ibe in equal shares, in representation of their parents, Carmen and Emiliana, respectively; (c) Parcels d, e, f, g, and h to be declared the exclusive properties of Emiliana, subject to whatever lifetime dispositions Emiliana might have made; (d) the parties to agree on partition or submit for commissioners; and (e) an accounting and vacating of portions allotted to Hermenegildo, among other directives.

Only Hermenegildo appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal also raised, as an underlying ruling, the trial court’s holding that Hermenegildo’s co-plaintiffs—Joseph, Jefferson, and Stevenson—could not be considered heirs, because representation in a collateral line occurs only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (citing Art. 972, Civil Code).

Appellate Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

While the appeal was pending, Hermenegildo died on October 23, 1989, and his heirs pursued the case. On December 17, 1990, the Court of Appeals modified the judgment in favor of petitioners. It declared that it was not persuaded to disregard the dispositions in the questioned deeds.

The Court of Appeals treated the trial court’s approach as erroneous. It held that the evidence adduced by plaintiff-appellees was insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity attached to the notarized documents. It reasoned that the rebuttal testimony of the municipal treasurer and the attached certification (Exhibit F) were not adequate; it characterized them as secondary evidence and faulted plaintiff-appellees for allegedly failing to lay the basis for their presentation. It emphasized that the best evidence of residence certificates would be the residence certificates themselves, and that certified true copies, as part of public record, should have been presented if originals could not be produced.

The Court of Appeals further reasoned that the surrounding circumstances did not show fraud, force, or intimidation on Rosario in the preparation of the documents. It added that there was no showing of forged signatures, and it reiterated that forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved. Because petitioners had not proven forgery or other defects, the Court of Appeals upheld the dispositions and modified the partition in line with those deeds.

Specifically, the Court of Appeals declared as the exclusive properties of Emiliana Ibe, and therefore not subject to partition, Parcels IV, V, VI, VII, IX, X, and one-half of Parcel III (with reference to the complaint and supplemental pleading), noting that defendants had admitted the partible nature of half of Parcel III and that partition should proceed only as to that half.

The Parties’ Contentions at the Supreme Court

On further review, petitioners assailed the Court of Appeals for overturning the trial court’s findings that the three documents conveying properties to respondents were irregular and did not reflect the truth. They also challenged the exclusion from Rosario’s estate of certain parcels—particularly Parcels IV, V, VI, VII, IX and X—asserting, in substance, that the trial court’s factual appraisal of the deeds should have been sustained.

In turn, the Court of Appeals’ ruling had rested primarily on the presumption of regularity accorded to notarized public documents and on the insufficiency of the evidence presented to rebut that presumption.

Legal Issues and Scope of Review

The Supreme Court framed the central issue as the validity of the documents executed by Rosario conveying certain properties to respondents and, consequently, whether the excluded parcels formed part of Rosario’s hereditary estate for partition.

It recognized that, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45, its jurisdiction was limited to review of errors of law. It also reiterated that factual findings of the Court of Appeals were ordinarily conclusive. However, it acknowledged established exceptions where the Court of Appeals’ findings conflicted with those of the trial court. In such a case, the Supreme Court considered it necessary to review the conflicting factual findings, especially because the trial court and Court of Appeals had diverged in evaluating the questioned documents.

Legal Basis and Reasoning of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court scrutinized the trial court’s objections, which were anchored on the claim that residence certificate numbers in the deeds belonged to persons other than Rosario. It examined how the plaintiffs attempted to prove the mismatch and whether the proof met the evidentiary threshold required to defeat notarized instruments.

The Court noted that the trial court had relied on Exhibit F, a certification from the municipal treasurer, supported by testimony of Mrs. Ester T. Ramos, the municipal treasurer. Ramos admitted signing Exhibit F and testified that the certification was based on an abstract of residence certificates, but that the pages containing the specific numbers had allegedly been lost. The Court treated Ramos’s explanation as inadequate to establish the truth of the mismatch because a residence certificate is a public document, and as part of public record its contents should be proved by presentation of the certif

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