Case Summary (G.R. No. 174414)
Key Dates
• 1997 – RA 8436 authorizes COMELEC to adopt Automated Election System (AES).
• 2007 – RA 9369 amends RA 8436, mandating minimum capabilities including VVPAT and authentication.
• 2010–2019 – AES implemented via PCOS (2010, 2013) and VCM (2016, 2019).
• May 13, 2019 – 2019 National Elections.
• December 9, 2020 – En Banc resolution.
Applicable Law
• 1987 Constitution, Art. IX-C, Sec. 1 (COMELEC powers).
• RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369 (Secs. 5, 6, 13, 18, 19, 21, 29, 30, 37).
• Omnibus Election Code (Secs. 179, 261).
• COMELEC Resolutions 8739, 8786, 10057, 10088, 10458, 10460, 10487, 10525.
• Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).
Procedural History
Petitioners sought mandamus to compel COMELEC to:
- Enhance Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) auditability.
- Adopt a robust digital-signature method for transmitted results.
- Remove the ban on capturing devices inside polling places.
United Filipino Consumers & Commuters (UFCC), Froilan M. Dollente, Teofilo T. Parilla, and Bagumbayan VNP intervened. COMELEC and Smartmatic moved to dismiss for mootness and lack of standing.
Legal Issues
- Do petitioners and intervenors have standing?
- Is mandamus available against COMELEC?
- Has COMELEC complied with the VVPAT requirement?
- Is the prohibition on capturing devices unlawful?
- Are iButtons and PINs adequate digital signatures?
- Is the petition moot after the 2019 elections?
Ruling on Standing
Legal standing requires a personal, substantial interest and injury-in-fact. AES-WATCH, et al. claimed citizen interest in election integrity—standing relaxed but recognized. Bagumbayan VNP, as a political party with poll watchers and candidates, had material interest. UFCC and individual movants lacked direct injury and their intervention was denied.
Ruling on Mandamus Availability
Mandamus compels performance of ministerial duties only; it cannot direct discretionary judgment unless there is grave abuse of discretion. Election administration involves COMELEC’s constitutional and statutory discretion to enforce laws, prescribe procedures, and protect ballot secrecy. Petitioners did not identify any non-discretionary duty COMELEC unlawfully neglected.
Analysis of VVPAT Compliance
Bagumbayan-VNP (2016) ordered COMELEC to enable VVPAT printing and regulate deposit into separate receptacles. COMELEC implemented these measures in Resolutions 10088 and 10460, providing voters the printed receipt, opportunity to verify, and mechanisms to record objections. The “camerambola” proposal—shuffling and photographing all VVPATs—lacked statutory basis, was impractical for nationwide deployment, and unnecessary given the random manual audit under Section 29 of RA 8436 (one precinct per congressional district) and implementing Resolutions 10458 and 10525.
Analysis of Capturing-Device Prohibition
Omnibus Election Code Section 179 permits watchers to photograph proceedings during counting and returns but forbids schemes to discover individual ballots. COMELEC Resolution 10460 authorizes photography during testing, counting, transmission, and printing of returns, but bans capturing devices during casting to safeguard secrecy and sanctity. The earlier sweep-phrase “for whatever purpose” was removed in the 2019 guidelines. The prohibition is consistent with Section 261(z)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code against schemes to reveal voter marks.
Analysis of Digital Signatures
RA 8436, Sec. 30 requires authentication of electronically transmitted results. In Capalla v. COMELEC
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 174414)
Procedural History and Relief Sought
- Petition for mandamus filed on April 24, 2019 by AES-WATCH et al.
- Prayers: compel COMELEC to review VVPAT, employ another digital‐signing method, and remove prohibition on capturing devices.
- Motions to intervene filed by United Filipino Consumers & Commuters, Froilan M. Dollente, Teofilo T. Parilla (May 2, 2019) and Bagumbayan VNP Movement, Inc. (May 10, 2019).
- COMELEC, through OSG, moved to dismiss as moot, and challenged petitioners’ standing.
- SMARTMATIC filed comments aligning with OSG’s arguments.
Legislative and Regulatory Framework
- RA No. 8436 (1997) authorized AES adoption; RA No. 9369 (2007) amended it to require paper‐based or direct recording electronic system, minimum system capabilities, and authentication of transmitted results.
- Sections 5, 6, 13, 18, 19, 21, 30, 37 of RA 8436 as amended outline COMELEC’s rule-making, voting procedure, contingency plans, counting, and auditability mandates.
- Omnibus Election Code Section 179 grants watchers the right to photograph counting and returns, but prohibits discovery of a voter’s ballot content.
Implementation of Automated Election System (AES)
- COMELEC deployed paper-based AES in 2010–2019 using PCOS machines (2010, 2013) and VCMs (2016, 2019).
- Electoral Board (EB) members use iButton security keys and PINs to activate and close machines, print and transmit results.
- Resolution No. 10057 (2016), No. 10088 (2016), No. 10460 (2018), No. 10487 (2019) prescribe testing, voting, counting, transmission, and VVPAT handling procedures.
Prior Jurisprudence on AES Features
- Capalla v. COMELEC (2012): PCOS machines capable of digitally‐signed transmissions; digital signature explained via private/public keys tied to iButtons and PINs.
- Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. v. COMELEC (2016): held minimum system capabilities mandatory, distinguished paper ballots from VVPAT, ordered enabling of VCM vote-verification feature (voter’s receipt), and directed COMELEC to issue guidelines on release and disposal of receipts.
Petitioners’ Contentions and “Camerambola” Proposal
- Alleged COMELEC non-compliance with Bagumbayan ruling on VVPAT auditability.
- Proposed “camerambola” method: voters verify printed paper, deposit into a separate box to anonymize identity, then volunteers photograph receipts inside precinct to serve as public audit trail.
- Claimed prohibition on capturing devices contravenes Section 179 of Omnibus Election Code.
- Challenged adequacy of digital signatures (iButtons and PINs) on grounds they are machine‐identifiers, n