Case Summary (G.R. No. 78223)
Key Dates and Applicable Law
Relevant events: petition filed April 24, 2019; intervenors filed May 2, May 10 and May 24, 2019; disputed election procedures relate to the May 13, 2019 National Elections. Applicable constitutional basis: 1987 Philippine Constitution (COMELEC is an independent constitutional commission under Article IX-C). Statutory and regulatory framework: Republic Act (RA) No. 8436 (as amended by RA No. 9369) — authorizing AES, specifying minimum system capabilities (Sec. 6), and requiring authentication of transmitted results (Sec. 30); Omnibus Election Code (including Sec. 179 on watchers' rights); COMELEC Resolutions Nos. 10088 (2016), 10458 (RMA), 10460 (2019 general instructions), 10487, and 10525 (RMA amendments).
Relief Sought by Petitioners
Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to (1) compel COMELEC to implement measures improving VVPAT auditability (including a proposed "camerambola" process by which voters’ printed receipts would be deposited, shuffled and photographed for auditing), (2) require COMELEC to employ a different method for digitally signing electronically transmitted results (challenging the sufficiency of iButtons and PINs as signatures), (3) declare unconstitutional COMELEC’s prohibition on use of capturing devices in polling places (to allow poll watchers and voters to photograph proceedings), and (4) compel production of device identifiers (MAC and IP addresses) and other auditing data.
Legislative and Technological Background
RA No. 8436 (as amended) authorized COMELEC to adopt AES and set minimum system capabilities including provision for a VVPAT, system auditability and verification by voters (Sec. 6). COMELEC implemented paper-based AES using optical mark readers: PCOS machines (2010, 2013) and Vote-Counting Machines (VCMs) (2016, 2019). Electoral Board (EB) members use iButtons and personal identification numbers (PINs) to initialize and close vote-counting machines and to effect transmissions. COMELEC issued implementing resolutions prescribing voting, counting, VVPAT handling and random manual audit (RMA) procedures.
Prior Supreme Court Guidance on VVPAT and Digital Signatures
Bagumbayan-VNP (2016) held that the enumerated minimum system capabilities are mandatory; a VVPAT requires that individual voters be able to verify that the machine registered their vote and that verification should be, at minimum, paper-based. The Court ordered COMELEC to enable vote verification features (print voter receipts) and allowed COMELEC to issue reasonable guidelines on release and disposal. Capalla (2012) addressed whether PCOS machines are capable of producing digitally-signed transmissions; the Court expressed that PCOS machines can produce digitally signed transmissions and discussed how private/public key mechanisms relate to iButtons/PINs.
COMELEC’s Implementation for 2019 Elections
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 10460 (2019) adopting procedures for VVPAT implementation consistent with Bagumbayan. Resolution No. 10088 (2016) initially prohibited use of capturing devices inside the polling place with a broad phrase “for whatever purpose”; Resolution No. 10460 removed that broad phrase and clarified that taking pictures is permitted during testing and sealing, counting, transmission and printing of election returns, but not during the casting of votes. Detailed voting procedures (e.g., Section 73 of Res. 10460) required printing of VVPAT receipts, voter verification, deposit of receipts into a sealed receptacle within the precinct, procedures for objections, and sealing of VVPAT receptacles at close of polls.
Petitioners’ Main Contentions
Petitioners contended COMELEC (a) failed to institute sufficient auditability measures for VVPATs (proposing the camerambola method), (b) unlawfully prohibited capturing devices thereby impeding poll watchers and voters from documenting irregularities and verifying VVPAT discrepancies, and (c) failed to authenticate electronically transmitted results properly because iButtons and PINs are machine identifiers rather than personal electronic signatures; they argued Capalla’s statements on digital signatures were obiter.
Respondents’ and Intervenors’ Positions
COMELEC (through OSG) and SMARTMATIC argued the petition was moot after the elections, petitioners lacked standing, and mandamus was inappropriate as COMELEC had already complied with Bagumbayan by enabling VVPAT printing and issuing guidelines. They contended the proposed camerambola was impractical and unnecessary in view of statutory RMAs (Sec. 29, RA 8436) and COMELEC RMA resolutions. They also maintained that Capalla and subsequent rulings established the validity of the iButtons/PIN authentication mechanism. UFCC’s intervention seeking MAC/IP lists lacked asserted personal interest.
Standing Determination
The Court applied constitutional and prudential standing principles. It found AES-WATCH et al. (citizen groups) and Bagumbayan VNP (a political party with candidates and poll watchers) had sufficient interest to litigate (the Court relaxed strict standing requirements for citizens raising issues of election integrity and granted Bagumbayan’s intervention). United Filipino Consumers & Commuters, Froilan Dollente and Teofilo Parilla lacked a personal and substantial interest and their motion to intervene was denied.
Mandamus Standard and Discretion of COMELEC
The Court reiterated mandamus requirements: petitioner must show (1) a clear legal right to the act demanded; (2) respondent’s duty under law to perform the act; (3) unlawful neglect by respondent; (4) the act is ministerial; and (5) no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. The Court emphasized that mandamus cannot direct the exercise of discretion unless there is grave abuse. Because COMELEC’s actions on AES implementation, VVPAT procedures, digital signatures and camera policies involved discretionary policy judgments entrusted by statute and the Constitution, mandamus was inappropriate absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
VVPAT Compliance and the “Camerambola” Proposal
The Court held that Bagumbayan’s directive is substantially complied with when the VVPAT is printed and voters can physically verify their votes; COMELEC’s Res. 10460 implemented such measures (printing, voter verification, receipt deposit, procedures for objections, sealing). The proposed camerambola (collecting, shuffling and photographing all VVPATs immediately after elections) lacked statutory or regulatory basis, was impractical, and petitioners/intervenors failed to specify legal authority or operational details for nationwide implementation. The Court found the statutory random manual audit (Sec. 29, RA 8436) and COMELEC RMA procedures (Res. 10458, 10525) provide the appropriate audit mechanism and use VVPATs to reconcile discrepancies.
Capturing Devices and Secrecy of the Ballot
The Court upheld COMELEC’s prohibition on photographing during casting of votes to protect the constitutional policy securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot. It interpreted Omnibus Election Code Sec. 179 and COMELEC Res. 10460 as allowing watchers to take photographs during testing/sealing, counting, transmission and printing of returns, but not during voting. The prohibition is consistent with statutory prohibitions against schemes to discover the contents of a voter’s ballot (Omnibus Electio
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 78223)
Case Background and Antecedents
- The petition is for mandamus seeking to compel the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to: review the voter verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT), employ an alternative method of digitally signing election results, and to remove the prohibition on capturing devices inside polling places.
- Statutory background:
- RA No. 8436 (1997) authorized COMELEC to adopt an automated election system (AES) using appropriate technology for voting and electronic counting/canvassing.
- RA No. 9369 (2007) amended RA 8436 to allow paper-based or direct recording electronic systems and prescribed minimum system capabilities and a requirement for authentication of electronically transmitted election results (Sections 5, 6, 30 as cited).
- COMELEC implementation history:
- Paper-based AES using optical mark reader machines in 2010, 2013, 2016, and 2019 National Elections.
- Specific machines: Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) used in 2010 and 2013; Vote-Counting Machines (VCM) used in 2016 and 2019.
- Electoral board members are assigned iButton security keys and personal identification numbers (PINs) to initiate and close machines for accepting ballots and printing/transmitting results.
- Prior judicial scrutiny and directives:
- Capalla v. COMELEC addressed digital signatures on 2010 results and, per the Court’s oral clarifications, PCOS machines could produce digitally signed transmissions.
- Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. v. COMELEC required enabling the VCM vote verification feature and clarified that VVPAT is distinct from the physical ballot and that minimum system capabilities under RA 8436 are mandatory.
Procedural Posture
- Petition filed days before the May 13, 2019 National Elections by AES-WATCH, et al., seeking mandamus and other reliefs related to VVPAT implementation, capturing devices, and digital signature methods.
- Interventions:
- United Filipino Consumers & Commuters (UFCC), Froilan M. Dollente, Teofilo T. Parilla moved to intervene (later denied).
- Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. intervened and adopted petitioners' arguments.
- Respondent filings:
- COMELEC, via Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued mootness after elections, lack of standing of petitioners, and that COMELEC complied with Bagumbayan; asserted no legal basis for "camerambola."
- SMARTMATIC filed a comment reiterating OSG arguments.
- Court resolution: En Banc decision dated December 9, 2020 (G.R. No. 246332) resolving the petition.
Parties
- Petitioners: A coalition including AES-WATCH, several religious groups and leaders, and election reform advocates (named individually in the caption).
- Respondents: Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and Smartmatic Total Information Management.
- Movant-Intervenors: United Filipino Consumers & Commuters (UFCC), Froilan M. Dollente, Teofilo T. Parilla (motion to intervene denied).
- Petitioner-in-Intervention: Bagumbayan VNP Movement, Inc., represented by Carissa O. Coscolluela (intervention granted).
Petitioner Reliefs and Core Contentions
- Primary prayers:
- Compel COMELEC to review and ensure the auditability of VVPAT.
- Require COMELEC to adopt an alternative or additional method to digitally sign election results, contending existing iButtons and PINs are machine identifiers not personal electronic signatures.
- Remove COMELEC’s purported prohibition on capturing devices inside polling places to allow poll watchers and voters to photograph proceedings and VVPATs.
- Proposed solution:
- "Camerambola" — a method combining camera use and shuffling ("karambola") wherein voters verify printed VVPATs, deposit them in a receptacle, then volunteers photograph VVPATs inside the precinct after randomized mixing to create an audit trail of photographed receipts that remain inside the precinct.
- Additional requests:
- Order COMELEC to submit a complete list of MAC and IP addresses used in the 2019 National Elections (advanced by certain intervenors).
Intervenors’ Positions (Bagumbayan and Movants)
- Bagumbayan VNP Movement, Inc.:
- Adopted petitioners’ claims.
- Emphasized that prohibitions against capturing devices impede poll watchers from recording irregularities and voters from timely objecting to VVPAT discrepancies.
- Asserted material interest and standing as a political party with candidates affected by VVPAT compliance.
- United Filipino Consumers & Commuters and individual movants:
- Sought to intervene to support transparency objectives and requested MAC/IP list disclosure; motion denied for lack of requisite personal and substantial interest.
Respondents’ Arguments and Defenses
- COMELEC (via OSG) and Smartmatic:
- Argued the petition was mooted by the conclusion of the 2019 National Elections.
- Contended petitioners lacked legal standing or material interest to invoke mandamus.
- Asserted COMELEC implemented VVPAT capability in compliance with Bagumbayan and issued guidelines (Resolutions No. 10088 and No. 10460) including mechanisms for voter verification and objection.
- Argued "camerambola" lacked statutory basis, impractical nationwide, and essentially called for a manual audit of all votes by photographing each VVPAT.
- Maintained that random manual audit procedures (Resolutions No. 10458 and 10525) adequately address machine-manual discrepancy concerns.
- Stated Capalla settled the digital signature issue as PCOS machines are capable of digitally-signed transmissions and COMELEC procedures using iButtons and PINs remain consistent.
Issues Presented to the Court
- Whether AES-WATCH, et al. and intervenors have legal standing to maintain the petition.
- Whether mandamus lies to compel COMELEC to:
- Implement the proposed "camerambola" VVPAT audit; or
- Change or adopt another method for digitally signing electronically transmitted election results; or
- Remove prohibitions on capturing devices in polling places.
- Whether COMELEC complied with the Bagumbayan directive concerning VVPAT and whether its 2019 guidelines are lawful.
- Whether the petition is moot following the conclusion of the 2019 National Elections.
Relevant Statutes, Regulations, and Resolutions Cited
- Republic Act No. 8436 (1997) and RA No. 9369 (2007) — AES authorization, minimum system capabilities (Section 6), and authentication requirement (Section 30).
- RA No. 10756 (definition referencing electoral board).
- Omnibus Election Code:
- Section 179 — Rights and duties of watchers, including right to take photographs “during the counting of votes” (with caveats).
- Section 261 (z)(5) — Prohibited acts that thwart secrecy (scheme to discover contents of a ballot).
- COMELEC Resolutions:
- No. 10057, No. 10088 (2016 guidelines enabling printing capability; originally included phrase “for whatever purpose” prohibiting capturing devices for voters).
- No. 10460 (2019 General Instructions adopting VVPAT procedures with modification removing “for whatever purpose” phrase).
- No. 10458 and No. 10525 — Rules and implementing details for Random Manual Audit (RMA/RMA-VT).
- No. 10487 — VCM operation procedures reference.
- Court administrative rules on electronic evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC) referenced in Bagumbayan.
Prior Jurisprudence and Controlling Precedents
- Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. v. COMELEC:
- Declared minimum system capabilities mandatory.
- Ordered COMELEC to enable vote verification printing and allowed COMELEC to issue guidelines regulating release/disposal of receipts.
- Clarified substantial compliance occurs when voter receipt prints and voters can physically verify.
- Later interpreted that iButtons and PINs are functional equivalents of electoral board members’ signature