Title
Adormeo vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 147927
Decision Date
Feb 4, 2002
Adormeo challenged Talaga, Jr.'s mayoral candidacy, alleging violation of the three-term limit. SC ruled Talaga, Jr. eligible, as his 1998 defeat interrupted term continuity, and recall election service didn't count as a full term.
mayoral candidate
disqualification
recall election
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 147927)

Factual Background

Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates who filed Certificates of Candidacy for Mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Private respondent Talaga had been elected mayor in May 1992 and re-elected in May 1995, serving full terms. He lost the May 1998 election to Bernard G. Tagarao and was not mayor from June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000. He won a recall election on May 12, 2000 and thereafter served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.

Administrative Filing and Grounds

On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed a petition with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Lucena City, seeking denial of due course or cancellation of private respondent’s Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that private respondent had already served three consecutive terms as mayor, invoking Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contended that service of the unexpired term following the recall election must be counted as a full term for purposes of the three-term limitation.

Response and Initial Contentions

On March 9, 2001, private respondent opposed the petition and maintained that he had not been elected to three consecutive terms. He relied on his defeat in 1998 to show an interruption in continuity and argued that his service from May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001 was not a full term. He invoked this Court’s decision in Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, 311 SCRA 602 (1999), for the proposition that two conditions must concur for disqualification under Section 8, namely election to three consecutive terms and full service of those three consecutive terms.

COMELEC First Division Ruling

On April 20, 2001, the COMELEC First Division found private respondent disqualified on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms and ordered the withdrawal or cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. The First Division treated the unexpired term served after the recall election as one of the three consecutive terms.

COMELEC En Banc Reconsideration

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that his defeat in May 1998 interrupted continuity and that the recall election was a special election whose unexpired term should not be treated as a regular full term. On May 9, 2001, the COMELEC en banc reversed the First Division. The en banc ruled that private respondent had not been elected for three consecutive terms because he lost in 1998, that he was installed by reason of his recall election victory, that recall victory was not considered a term of office for purposes of the three-term rule, and that he had not fully served three consecutive terms.

Proclamation and Petition to the Supreme Court

After canvassing, private respondent was proclaimed Mayor of Lucena City on May 19, 2001. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for injunctive relief before this Court, contending that the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring Talaga qualified to run. Petitioner asked that votes cast for private respondent not be counted and that any proclamation be declared null and void.

Parties’ Legal Arguments Before the Court

Petitioner argued that the unexpired portion of the term served after the recall election must be counted as a full term and that private respondent therefore had already served three consecutive terms, invoking Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. 7160. Petitioner warned that excluding the recall service would permit the evasion of the constitutional limit. Private respondent reiterated that his defeat in 1998 interrupted continuity and that the recall service did not amount to a full term. COMELEC supported the en banc position that election loss in 1998 constituted an interruption of continuity.

Precedents and Legal Standard

This Court identified controlling precedent in Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998), and Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, 311 SCRA 602 (1999). The Court summarized the doctrine that the three-term limitation requires concurrence of two elements: election to three consecutive terms in the same post and full service of three consecutive terms. The Court observed that the constitutional restriction limits both the right to be elected and the right to serve in the same position.

Supreme Court Reasoning

The Court held that private respondent’s continuity of service had been interrupted by his electoral defeat in 1998 and that he had been a private citizen for nearly two years before the recall election. The Court found petitioner's argument untenable insofar as it would treat the recall victory as creating an unbroken sequence from 1992 through 2001. The Court noted that Fr. Joaquin Bernas’s

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