Title
Adarne vs. Aldaba
Case
A.C. No. 801
Decision Date
Jun 27, 1978
A 1958 forcible entry case led to multiple appeals, with Atty. Aldaba making "special appearances" for Adarne. Adarne later accused Aldaba of negligence, but the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, citing lack of formal attorney substitution and insufficient evidence of misconduct.
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Case Summary (A.C. No. 801)

Factual Background

In 1958, Raymunda Cumpio and her husband, Rufo Cumpio, initiated an action for forcible entry against Cesario Adarne and others before the Justice of the Peace of Alang-alang, Leyte, docketed as Civil Case No. 96. During those proceedings, Atty. Isauro Marmita represented the defendants and raised an issue of ownership of the land. After hearing, the Justice of the Peace dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Court of First Instance of Leyte, where the case was assigned to Branch VI at Carigara and docketed as Civil Case No. 556. The Court of First Instance ruled that the Justice of the Peace had jurisdiction, returned the case for trial on the merits, and the Justice of the Peace again dismissed the case. The plaintiffs appealed again to the Court of First Instance of Leyte, where the case was re-docketed as Civil Case No. 632. In Civil Case No. 632, Attys. Arturo Mirales and Generoso Casimpan filed the defendants’ answer.

On August 7, 1961, Adarne attended a hearing noting that his attorneys had not yet arrived. He prevailed upon Atty. Aldaba, who was present in court for another electoral case, to appear as counsel for the defendants and to seek postponement. The respondent agreed, entered a special appearance, and when he noticed that the plaintiffs and their counsel were also not present, he did not request postponement. Instead, he moved for the dismissal of the case, and the motion was granted. The plaintiffs later moved for reconsideration; the respondent opposed in behalf of the defendants; and the Court denied the motion. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which set aside the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings.

On October 23, 1964, before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, the respondent was again prevailed upon to appear for Adarne. He entered another special appearance for the complainant. In that appearance, the respondent argued that the interests of justice would be better served if the defendants were allowed to file an action for quieting of title, to be heard jointly with the pending forcible entry case. The court ordered Adarne to file an action for quieting of title within one week, the plaintiffs to answer within the reglementary period, and both cases to be tried jointly. Hearing was deferred until after the filing of the action for quieting of title.

After the deferred schedule, on June 17, 1965, the trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to appear at the hearing set for that day and ordered the plaintiffs to present evidence to support their claim. On September 17, 1965, the court rendered a decision, and a writ of execution followed.

Filing of the Administrative Complaint and the Respondent’s Defense

Because of the adverse outcome, Adarne filed the present administrative complaint on August 3, 1967. In substance, he accused his lawyer of “mal practice,” alleged that the lawyer acted to the detriment of the client, and suggested that the respondent should have prevented the decision or taken steps that would have led to repetition of the forcible entry hearing.

The respondent denied that he had any agreement to handle the complainant’s case in the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Carigara Branch, except for the special appearances entered on August 7, 1961 and October 23, 1964, attributable to the complainant’s attorneys’ non-availability on those dates.

Procedural Handling and the Court’s Assessment

The case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation, after which a complaint for disbarment of the respondent attorney was filed. The disposition required assessment of whether the evidence established the pleaded allegations of gross negligence, malpractice, or misconduct.

The Court held that the default judgment rendered against the complainant could not be attributed to the respondent attorney. The Court reasoned that the blame lay with the complainant for engaging several lawyers to handle the case without formally withdrawing the authority previously granted to them in a manner that would place responsibility properly upon the respondent. The record showed that Adarne also sought to have the clerk of court furnish him with summons and subpoena, and he filed a motion himself, indicating that he was undertaking steps personally in the proceedings. The Court further observed that there were three changes of attorneys in the forcible entry case: first Atty. Isauro Marmita, then an attorney engaged after Marmita’s appointment to the Department of Labor, and later Attys. Arturo Mirales and Generoso Casimpan, and still the respondent’s appearances for special purposes. The Court noted, however, that no formalities were observed in these changes, such that the respondent entered special appearances rather than taking over as attorney of record.

The Rule on Substitution of Attorneys and Its Application

The Court invoked its established rule that substitution of attorneys would not be permitted unless specific formal requirements were met. These requirements were stated as: (one) a written application for substitution; (two) the written consent of the client; (three) the written consent of the attorney substituted; and (four) if written consent could not be secured, proof of service of notice of the motion upon the attorney to be substituted, in the manner prescribed by the rules. The Court emphasized that when these formalities were not complied with, substitution would not be allowed. The attorney who properly appeared last in the cause before the application for substitution would be deemed the attorney of record and would be held responsible for the proper conduct of the case.

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the respondent’s participation remained limited to the special appearances he entered on the specified dates, and that he could not be held to full responsibility for subsequent proceedings when the complainant’s attorney changes did not comply with the procedural requirements governing substitution.

Standard of Proof in Disbarment Proceedings

The Court further stated that in disbarment proceedings the burden of proof rests on the complainant. It held that it must be supported by convincing proof before the Court could exercise disciplinary powers. Based on the record, it found no sufficient proof to warrant disbarment or to impose culpable discipline short of disbarment.

The Court also addressed the respondent’s asserted belief regarding his role. It found that the respondent honestly believed that his appearance was limited to special purposes on the dates when Adarne’s counsel was unavailable. It also found that the complainant had agreed that his counsel of record would handle the case after the hearing of October 23, 1964, so the respondent did nothing further. The Court held that such belief was not culpable. It reiterated that an attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill relevant to the nature of the business undertaken. It further decl

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