Title
Acuna vs. Caluag
Case
G.R. No. L-10736
Decision Date
Apr 30, 1957
Mortgage foreclosure case involving disputed property possession, receiver appointment, and failed agreement; Supreme Court upheld trial court's jurisdiction and receiver's validity, ruling no novation of original judgment.
trial court
jurisdiction
appoint a receiver
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-10736)

Procedural and Chronological Background

On August 1, 1951, the parties entered into a written agreement acknowledging the loan, the interest, the mortgagors’ default, the amount advanced by the mortgagee for the insurance policy, and the reduction of liquidated damages. They also agreed that judgment be rendered for the plaintiff, with the defendants jointly and severally ordered to pay within ninety days from receipt of the decision the amounts specified. The court rendered judgment the same day in accordance with that agreement.

After the decision became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued on December 20 of that year. The mortgaged properties were sold to Santos, with a sheriff’s certificate of sale dated February 23, 1952. On March 10, 1952, the sheriff’s certificate of sale was approved and confirmed. On May 10, 1952, upon Santos’ petition, the trial court issued an order for a writ of possession, and the writ was actually issued five days later. Petitioners sought an extension of time to vacate through an urgent motion filed on June 27, 1952, but the trial court denied the motion on July 2, 1952, reasoning that the decision had long become final and executory and that it had no more jurisdiction over the case.

Nearly a year later, on June 2, 1953, the trial judge issued an alias writ of possession directing the provincial sheriff to take possession of the mortgaged properties. On June 9, 1953, Santos and the petitioners submitted an “Agreement and Petition” (Annex D). That agreement proposed that the defendants would offer to purchase the properties for P40,000, payable on or before December 31, 1953, and that the defendants would pay P500 a month for the use and occupation of the premises, beginning on May 20, 1953. It further provided that upon failure to pay the monthly amounts or the principal sum by the dates stated, the agreement would automatically become null and void, and the defendants would voluntarily deliver possession to the plaintiff. The agreement expressly stated that it was not a lease and that it would not prejudice the plaintiff’s right to enforce the writ of possession on default, while also stating that it did not constitute a waiver of the plaintiff’s rights under the judgment. It also noted that amounts paid under the previous agreements were forfeited. The parties prayed that the alias writ of possession sought to be executed on June 11, 1953 be held in abeyance.

Orders on the Alias Writ of Possession

On September 23, 1953, the trial judge issued an order stating that it had been shown that the defendants failed to comply with the terms of the June 9, 1953 agreement. The court ordered that an alias writ of possession be issued immediately for execution with assistance if necessary. The clerk of court issued the alias writ the same day.

Many months afterward, on May 8, 1954, petitioners filed an urgent petition to quash the September 23, 1953 alias writ of possession. They argued that the judgment sought to be enforced had been satisfied and/or novated by the June 9, 1953 agreement; that the alias writ had no longer force and effect because its life had lapsed after sixty days; and they raised other grounds. Respondent judge ordered that the sheriff and agents refrain from enforcing the writ until further order, on the premise that more than sixty days had elapsed.

Still later, on July 8, 1954, the trial judge issued another order directing the issuance of an alias writ of possession to enforce the decision. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal from the order of July 8, 1954 on July 12, 1954, and their perfected appeal was docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-8881, titled “Reynaldo T. Santos vs. Emiliano Acuna, et al.”

Appointment of Receiver and Subsequent Orders

On October 28, 1955, respondent judge appointed Guillermo Romero as receiver of the properties involved, despite petitioners’ opposition. On February 7, 1956, the court directed the sheriff to place the receiver in possession of the premises (Annex H). On February 27, 1956, respondent judge ordered Acuna to surrender possession to the receiver within two days, with a warning that failure would be punished by contempt of court (Annex I). Petitioners later filed a motion for reconsideration on March 8, 1954—challenging the February 7 and February 27, 1956 orders on the theory that the court issued them without jurisdiction and that it had lost jurisdiction because the appeal in the main case had already been perfected (Annex J). The court denied the motion on April 25, 1956 and ordered petitioners to deliver possession within two days, failing which they would be dealt with accordingly (Annex K).

The Issue Raised in the Certiorari Petition

In the present certiorari proceedings, petitioners maintained that once they perfected their appeal in the main case—whose subject included the possession of the property—respondent judge no longer had jurisdiction over the issue of possession. They further asserted that the trial court could not deprive appellants of actual possession and deliver it to another by virtue of the receiver orders.

Respondents’ Position and the Court’s Resolution

The Court held that, although the perfection of an appeal deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the case, the trial court nevertheless retained jurisdiction over matters necessary to preserve the property under litigation and to protect rights pending appeal. The Court emphasized that, under Rule 61, Section 1(d) and Section 7, the trial court’s retained authority included the appointment of a receiver with power to take and keep possession of the property in controversy during the pendency of the appeal. The Court relied on Velasco & Co. vs. Go Chuico, 28 Phil., 39, and Jocson vs. Presbitero et al., 97 Phil., 6, to support the principle that the preservation of the litigated property remains within the trial court’s competence even after appeal.

The Court further noted that petitioners did not contest the legality and propriety of the appointment of the receiver. They also did not file a motion for reconsideration of the appointment, and the Court treated the challenge as coming too late. The Court also considered respondents’ averments that petitioners were insolvent, that the buildings and improvements were in danger of being destroyed or impaired, and that petitioners had failed to pay the rents of P500 a month from August, 1953 up to June 26, 1956, amounting to about P15,000, which circumstances justified the receiver’s appointment.

Most importantly, the Court rejected petitioners’ characterization that the orders directing delivery of possession to the receiver involved a matter already litigated on appeal—namely,

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.

About Privacy Terms