Title
Acharon vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 224946
Decision Date
Nov 9, 2021
Christian Acharon acquitted of VAWC charges; SC ruled failure to provide financial support due to hardships, not willful denial, insufficient for conviction under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 231765)

Procedural History and Lower Courts’ Reasoning

The RTC convicted Acharon, relying on findings of neglect to remit support, alleged paramour relationship, and failure to maintain open communication. The CA affirmed, treating refusal to give financial support as economic abuse within R.A. 9262 and upholding the conviction under Section 5(i). Acharon appealed to the Supreme Court.

Controlling Issue Presented

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding Acharon guilty under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 for causing psychological or emotional anguish by (1) denying financial support to AAA and (2) failing to keep communications open.

Statutory Framework and Interpretive Principles

  • Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262: defines “violence against women and their children” and classifies types of violence (physical, sexual, psychological, economic) as consequences or forms of harm that may result from prohibited acts.
  • Section 5: enumerates the specific punishable acts (5(a)–5(i)); Sections 5(e) and 5(i) are central here: 5(e) addresses acts that compel or restrict a woman’s movement or conduct (including depriving financial support) “with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting” movement/conduct; 5(i) addresses acts “causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation,” including “denial of financial support.”
  • Section 6: prescribes penalties tied to the specific acts listed in Section 5.
  • Canon of strict construction of penal statutes and constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation govern interpretation and limit conviction to offenses charged or necessarily included in the information.

Court’s Analytical Distinction: Denial/Deprivation Versus Failure/Inability

The Supreme Court emphasized the textual difference between “denial”/“deprivation” (terms used in Sections 5(i) and 5(e)) and mere “failure” to provide support. “Denial” and “deprivation” connote willfulness and an active, intentional withholding; “failure” or “inability” implies passivity. Because Sections 5(e) and 5(i) concern acts that are mala in se, the Court held that a specific mental element (mens rea) is required: the willful refusal to provide support accompanied by a purpose to inflict psychological harm (Section 5(i)) or to control/restrict movement or conduct (Section 5(e)).

Elements Formulation for Section 5(i) (as clarified by the Court)

The Court articulated that, insofar as it addresses denial of financial support, the elements of Section 5(i) are:

  1. The offended party is a woman and/or her child(ren);
  2. The relationship specified in the statute exists (wife, former wife, dating/sexual relationship, or common child);
  3. The offender willfully refuses to give or consciously denies financial support legally due the woman and/or child(ren) (actus reus);
  4. The offender denied such support for the purpose of causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation (specific mens rea). Both actus reus (willful denial) and mens rea (intent to inflict psychological harm) must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Elements Formulation for Section 5(e) (as clarified by the Court)

For deprivation of financial support under Section 5(e), the Court specified elements as:

  1. The offended party is a woman and/or her child(ren);
  2. The relationship required by statute exists;
  3. The offender deprived or threatened to deprive the woman or children of financial support legally due, or deliberately provided insufficient financial support;
  4. The deprivation was committed for the purpose of controlling or restricting the woman’s or child’s movement or conduct (specific mens rea). Accordingly, Section 5(e) criminalizes deprivation of support only where done with the purpose or effect of controlling/restricting the victim’s conduct or movement.

Application of Law to the Record and Reasons for Acquittal

Applying the above elements to the evidence, the Supreme Court found the prosecution failed to prove the crucial elements (willful denial and specific intent to cause psychological harm or control conduct). The record showed Acharon had remitted substantial sums (around P71,000) and that later non-remittance was explained by accidents and a fire in Brunei—circumstances consistent with inability rather than a willful denial. AAA was employed at trial and did not demonstrate an inability to obtain support that resulted from Acharon’s conduct. Evidence about Acharon’s alleged paramour and infidelity, while relevant to other forms of abuse or to the complainant’s emotional state, were not charged in the information and thus were irrelevant to proving the statutory elements alleged. For these reasons, the Court granted the petition and acquitted Acharon.

Clarification on Variance Doctrine and Abandonment of Melgar and Reyes

The Court expressly abandoned Melgar v. People and Reyes v. People to the extent those cases applied the variance doctrine to allow conviction under Section 5(e) when the information charged Section 5(i). The Court reasoned that the two provisions penalize distinct acts requiring distinct specific intents (intent to cause psychological anguish under 5(i); intent to control or restrict under 5(e)). Because the specific mens rea elements differ materially, one provision cannot be deemed necessarily included in the other for variance purposes. Accordingly, conviction under one when charged under the other is improper absent an information that properly alleges the requisite elements.

Doctrinal and Policy Observations by the Court

  • Penal statutes must be strictly construed; criminal liability cannot be grounded on constructive extensions of statutory language.
  • R.A. 9262 was not enacted to criminalize mere inability or failure to provide support; to do so would produce manifestly unjust and unconstitutional consequences, particularly in a context of widespread poverty and employment instability.
  • Remedies for nonpayment of support that lacks the specific criminal intent described in Sections 5(e) or 5(i) remain civil (support proceedings under the Family Code and Civil Code).
  • The Court stressed the constitutional guarantee that an accused must be informed of the nature and cause of accusation, which confines criminal liability to what is charged.

Summary of Concurring Opinions’ Key Contributions

  • Senior Associate Justice Perlas‑Bernabe: Emphasized doctrinal clarity that Section 3(a)’s enumerated types of violence are descriptive of resulting effects (physical, sexual, psychological, economic) rather than the punishable acts themselves; recommended that acts enumerated in Section 5 be treated as the punishable offenses and the types of violence as resu
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