Title
Achacoso vs. Macaraig
Case
G.R. No. 93023
Decision Date
Mar 13, 1991
Tomas Achacoso, appointed POEA Administrator without CES eligibility, contested his replacement after a courtesy resignation. The Supreme Court ruled his temporary appointment lacked security of tenure, validating his replacement.
validity of appointment
security of tenure
constitutional law
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 93023)

Key Dates

Appointment of petitioner: October 16, 1987 (assumed office October 27, 1987).
Courtesy resignation filed by petitioner: January 2, 1990 (at the President’s request).
President’s acceptance of resignation: April 3, 1990.
Secretary of Labor’s order to turn over office: April 10, 1990.
Petitioner’s protest and refusal to vacate: April 19, 1990.
Appointment of Jose N. Sarmiento as POEA Administrator: April 19, 1990 (petitioner informed April 20).
Motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner: April 23, 1990 (denied April 30, 1990).
Supreme Court decision: March 13, 1991.
Applicable constitutional framework: 1987 Philippine Constitution (security of tenure principle invoked by petitioner and considered by the Court).

Facts

Achacoso was appointed and served as POEA Administrator beginning in late 1987. In early 1990, pursuant to a presidential request addressed to various high-level officials, he submitted a courtesy resignation which the President accepted. After acceptance, respondents sought turnover of the office; Achacoso protested, asserting that his resignation had only been tendered in obedience to the President’s directive and was not voluntary, and refused to vacate. On the same day he protested, Sarmiento was appointed Administrator. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and he sought relief from the Supreme Court by petition for prohibition and mandamus to annul Sarmiento’s appointment and to prevent his removal.

Issues Presented

  1. Whether petitioner, as POEA Administrator, enjoyed security of tenure as a member of the Career Executive Service (and thus could not be removed except for cause).
  2. Whether the appointment of petitioner was a permanent appointment conferring career status or a temporary/acting appointment subject to termination at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
  3. Whether the courtesy resignation tendered by petitioner was legally effective or, being submitted under duress, should be disregarded.

Petitioner’s Contentions

  • Petitioner asserted that the POEA Administrator position is within the Career Service and that he held the rank equivalent to undersecretary, invoking Article IV, Section 5 of P.D. 807 (Civil Service Decree) which enumerates Career Executive Service positions and their characteristics, including security of tenure.
  • He argued that courtesy resignations requested by the President could not validly undermine security of tenure and that a courtesy resignation given under duress should be disregarded because it does not demonstrate a clear and voluntary intention to relinquish office (relying on Ortiz v. Commission on Elections).
  • Consequently, petitioner contended that his removal was illegal and that the appointment of a successor filled no legitimate vacancy.

Respondents’ Contentions

  • The Solicitor General conceded that the office of POEA Administrator is a Career Executive Service position but maintained that petitioner himself was not a Career Executive Service (CES) eligible or member at the time of his appointment.
  • The Civil Service Commission certification indicated that Achacoso had not participated in the CES Development Program, was not CES eligible, and was not appointed to a rank in the CES.
  • Rules in the Integrated Reorganization Plan (as amended and embodied in P.D. 1, P.D. 336, P.D. 337) permit the President, in exceptional cases, to appoint non-CES eligibles to CES positions, but only on the condition that the appointee subsequently take the required CES examination and that the appointee may not be promoted further until qualified.
  • Because petitioner lacked the requisite eligibility and had not taken the required examination, respondents argued his appointment could only be regarded as temporary (or acting) and thus terminable at the pleasure of the appointing authority; he was not entitled to the constitutional security of tenure afforded to permanent career incumbents.

Applicable Law and Precedent Considered

  • The Court applied the constitutional principle that removal of public officers is governed by law—i.e., the guarantee of security of tenure protects permanent career officials from removal except for cause as provided by law—and recognized the 1987 Constitution as the governing charter for that principle in this decision.
  • Statutory/regulatory framework invoked included P.D. 807 (Civil Service Decree), the Integrated Reorganization Plan provisions regarding appointment to the Career Service, and the rule that permanent appointment requires satisfaction of requisite eligibility.
  • The Court relied on long-standing jurisprudence delineating that temporary or acting appointees do not enjoy fixed tenure and may be removed at the appointing power’s pleasure (cases cited in the decision include Cuadra v. Cordova; Austria v. Amante; Manalang v. Quitoriano; and other older precedents enumerated in the opinion).
  • The Court distinguished cases cited by petitioner (e.g., Luego v. Civil Service Commission; Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. IAC; Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz; Dario v. Mison) on the ground that those involved officials who had permanent appointments and the requisite qualifications.

Court’s Analysis

  • The Court emphasized that the mere classification of a position as part of the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on whoever occupies it; what matters is the nature of the appointment and whether the occupant had the requisite eligibility at the time of appointment.
  • Because the Civil Service Commission certified that petitioner was not a CES eligible, the petitioner fell within the exception that permits the President to appoint a non-CES eligible in exceptional cases, but only as an acting or temporary appointee pending qualification. Such appointments do not confer permanent status or the protection of security of tenure.
  • The Court explained the legal character of acting or temporary appointments: their purpose is to prevent interruption of public service by authorizing discharge of duties pending selection of a permanent appointee; an acting appointee accepts office on the condition of surrendering it when called upon, and t
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