Title
AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties Corp.
Case
G.R. No. 166744
Decision Date
Nov 2, 2006
ACEI's Feliza Building blowers caused noise and hot air, disturbing FPC's Frabella I tenants. FPC sued for nuisance; SC upheld RTC jurisdiction, ruling it a private nuisance under Civil Code.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 166744)

Administrative testing and earlier notices

From 1995 onward respondent sought abatement administratively and obtained multiple EMB noise reports (1995, 1996, 2000, later in 2002 and 2003) that variously indicated that sound pressure levels from the blowers exceeded allowable ambient noise standards under Section 78(b) of PD 984 or that ambient noise in the area had multiple contributors. Petitioner repeatedly rejected demands to abate and did not implement remedial measures.

PAB proceedings and outcome

Frabella I Condominium Corporation (a distinct entity from respondent) filed before the PAB alleging pollution. After hearings and review of technical findings, the PAB dismissed the pollution complaint on jurisdictional grounds, concluding the matter was more properly one of nuisance to be handled by LGUs under PD 984 and DENR A.O. No. 30, and endorsed the issue to the local government unit (Makati City) without prejudice to a pollution case if definite DENR standards were found violated later.

Makati City response and communications

The City Building Official, Engr. Nelson B. Morales, received EMB reports and, by letter (July 19, 2002), indicated that excess ambient noise did not come solely from the Feliza Building and advised that further inquiries should be addressed to the EMB. Respondent sought clarification and additional EMB testing; the City did not issue a formal adjudicatory decision after investigation and the correspondence was not the product of a quasi‑judicial hearing.

RTC complaint and respondent’s reliefs sought

On July 1, 2003 respondent filed a civil action in the RTC (Malabon City) for abatement of nuisance, preliminary and permanent injunction, damages (actual, exemplary), attorney’s fees, and costs. The complaint attached prior demand letters and EMB testing reports and alleged continuing injury to property and business resulting from petitioner’s blowers.

Petitioner’s motion to dismiss and grounds

Petitioner moved to dismiss on: (1) lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction (contending devolution of functions to Makati City under R.A. No. 7160 and DENR A.O. No. 30), (2) failure to state a cause of action, and (3) res judicata/litis pendentia/forum‑shopping (pointing to prior administrative proceedings and a PAB case and the City Building Official’s letter).

RTC ruling on motion to dismiss

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. It held the complaint sought judicial abatement of a private nuisance and that the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over actions incapable of pecuniary estimation (abatement/injunction). The court concluded the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies did not bar judicial relief where urgency and irreparable injury were alleged and where the remaining questions were primarily legal once the facts were hypothetically admitted for purposes of the motion. The court also found the City Building Official’s letter was administrative and not a final adjudicatory determination to bar judicial action.

Court of Appeals decision

The CA affirmed the RTC. It held: (1) the action is one for judicial abatement of private nuisance and thus within the RTC’s jurisdiction; (2) R.A. No. 7160 and DENR A.O. No. 30 do not oust court jurisdiction over nuisance cases because LGUs lack power to determine whether a non‑per se nuisance actually exists and effect extrajudicial abatement in the ordinary case; (3) primary jurisdiction/exhaustion of administrative remedies were inapplicable because petitioner’s motion to dismiss admitted the complaint’s facts, leaving legal questions for resolution by the court; (4) the Makati City Building Official’s letter was not a final, quasi‑judicial decision and thus did not constitute res judicata; (5) the PAB dismissal was without prejudice and did not adjudicate the merits, so it neither barred the RTC action nor constituted res judicata or litis pendentia; (6) respondent adequately stated a cause of action for private nuisance and damages based on factual allegations and EMB test results attached to the complaint.

Issues presented to the Supreme Court

Petitioner raised four principal assignments: (I) RTC lacked jurisdiction because the LGU (Makati City) had exclusive authority to abate nuisances and enforce noise control; (II) the issues were factual and therefore required exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction of technical agencies; (III) the suit was barred by res judicata, litis pendentia, and forum‑shopping given prior administrative/PAB/City processes; and (IV) the complaint failed to state a cause of action.

Supreme Court: standard on interlocutory certiorari and scope of review

The Court emphasized that an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss is generally not subject to certiorari; certiorari is limited to correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Ordinarily the remedy is to proceed to trial and litigate the merits, then appeal from final judgment.

Supreme Court: jurisdiction over abatement of nuisance

The Court held the RTC had jurisdiction. A civil action for judicial abatement of private nuisance (an action incapable of pecuniary estimation seeking injunctive relief and abatement) falls within the RTC’s exclusive jurisdiction as provided by BP Blg. 129 (as amended). The nature of the relief sought—abatement and injunction—determines jurisdiction irrespective of which administrative or technical agencies have investigatory or regulatory functions.

Supreme Court: effect of devolution under R.A. 7160 and DENR A.O. No. 30

While R.A. No. 7160 and DENR A.O. No. 30 devolved certain regulatory and enforcement functions (including inspection, ordering compliance with noise standards, and administrative abatement powers) to LGUs, such devolution did not deprive courts of their inherent power to adjudicate whether particular conduct constitutes a nuisance. The Court underscored that LGUs cannot make a factual determination that a thing which is not a nuisance per se is a nuisance in fact and cannot exercise extrajudicial condemnation of property in such cases; those factual determinations are for the ordinary courts.

Supreme Court: on primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies

The Court explained that the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies do not automatically bar court proceedings where the questions are legal or where immediate judicial relief (e.g., injunction to prevent irreparable injury) is sought. Here, by moving to dismiss, petitioner was deemed to have hypothetically admitted the complaint’s factual averments, leaving only legal issues for the court. Given respondent’s allegations of urgency and irreparable injury, requiring exhaustion of further administrative remedies would have been unjustified.

Supreme Court: res judicata, litis pendentia, and forum‑shopping analysis

The Court found no bar by res judicata or litis pendentia. The City Building Official’s letter was not a final adjudicatory decision resulting from adversarial proceedings and therefore did not preclude court action. The PAB dismissed the prior complaint without prejudice and explicitly endorsed the matter to the LGU; the PAB’s dismissal was for lack of jurisdiction over a nuisance case and did not resolve the merits. Thus the RTC action was not barred and respondent’s filing did not constitute forum‑shopping.

Supreme Court: sufficiency of complaint — cause of action for nuisance and damages

Applying standards for motions to dismiss, the Court held the complaint adequately alleged a cause of action. The elements of a cause of action were present: (1) respondent’s right to the peaceful and comfortable use of its property, (2) petitioner’s obligation to respect that right, and (3) petitioner’s alleged act or omission in sustaining the blowers producing excessive noise and hot air that interfered with enjoyment of property. EMB reports and demand letters appended to the complaint gave sufficient factual basis, and under Rule 16 a motion to dismiss admits the complaint’s factual averments. The complaint also stated damages that were incidental to injunctive relief.

Supreme Court: nuisance law principles applied

The Court reiterated Civil Code definitions (Arts. 694–706) and principles: noise is not a nuisance per se; whether noise constitutes actionable nuisance depends on reasonableness, locality, character of surroundings, and effect on persons of ordinary sensibilities. Administrative nois

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