Title
Abundo Sr. vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 201716
Decision Date
Jan 8, 2013
Abundo served partial term due to election protest; SC ruled involuntary interruption, allowing him to run in 2010 despite three-term limit claim.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 201716)

Factual Background

For four successive regular elections—2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010—Abundo ran for mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. He was proclaimed and served after the 2001 and 2007 elections. In 2004 the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Jose Torres as winner and Torres served as mayor. Abundo filed an election protest and was ultimately declared the rightful winner of the 2004 election, whereupon he assumed the mayoralty on May 9, 2006 and served until June 30, 2007, a period of a little over one year. In the May 10, 2010 elections Abundo again ran and was proclaimed mayor-elect by a 219-vote margin. Torres filed a petition to disqualify Abundo based on the three-term limit. Before COMELEC resolved that disqualification petition, Vega filed a quo warranto before the RTC (Election Case No. 55) seeking to dislodge Abundo on substantially the same ground.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

By Decision of August 9, 2010, the RTC, Branch 43, Virac, Catanduanes, granted the quo warranto petition and declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor. The RTC found that Abundo had served three consecutive terms—2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010—because his eventual assumption of office after prevailing in the 2004 election protest constituted service of the 2004-2007 term in full for purposes of the three-term limit rule. The RTC therefore disqualified Abundo from the 2010 term.

Rulings of the Commission on Elections

On June 16, 2010 the COMELEC First Division denied Torres’s disqualification petition against Abundo. After the RTC decision, Abundo appealed to COMELEC in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010. On February 8, 2012, the COMELEC Second Division affirmed the RTC and dismissed Abundo’s appeal. The Second Division applied the doctrine in Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC and concluded that the partial service resulting from a successful election protest by a protestant who is later declared the winner counted as service of the full term for the three-term rule. The COMELEC en banc denied reconsideration on May 10, 2012 and affirmed the Second Division resolution.

Intervening Events After the COMELEC Rulings

After the COMELEC en banc denied reconsideration, the COMELEC declared its resolution final and executory on June 20, 2012 and entered judgment June 21, 2012. Vega moved for execution with the RTC and the COMELEC transmitted the records to the RTC. The RTC granted the motion for execution on June 29, 2012 and issued a writ of execution the same day. The writ was served on Mayor Abundo on July 2, 2012. On July 3, 2012 the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of the COMELEC resolutions. Nevertheless, on July 4 and 5, 2012 Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes took their oaths and assumed the offices of mayor and vice-mayor, respectively. Vega asserted that the TRO had become functus officio because of the execution of the RTC decision.

Issues Presented

Petitioner advanced two principal grounds for relief: first, that the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing as mere rehash his arguments in the motion for reconsideration; and second, that the COMELEC erred in holding that Abundo had served three consecutive terms because he served only about one year and one month of the 2004-2007 term as a result of the election protest.

Parties’ Contentions

Petitioner argued that his motion for reconsideration did not merely repeat arguments in his appeal brief but amplified distinct, pertinent legal points, and that his partial service of the 2004-2007 term following an election protest constituted an involuntary interruption that removed him from the ambit of the three-term limit. Petitioner relied on Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections and Rivera III v. Commission on Elections and urged that the interruption here was analogous to involuntary interruptions recognized by prior cases. Respondents—the COMELEC and Vega—urged that the COMELEC correctly applied Aldovino, Jr., that Abundo never lost title to the office and merely was temporarily unable to exercise the functions of office during the pendency of the protest, and that the length of actual service within a term is immaterial because the constitutional command refers to the term, not the time actually served.

Legal Framework and Precedent Survey

The Court summarized the governing constitutional and statutory provisions: Section 8, Article X, 1987 Constitution, providing that no elective local official shall serve more than three consecutive terms, and Section 43(b), RA 7160, which reiterates the three-term limitation and the rule on voluntary renunciation. The Court explained that two requisites must concur for disqualification under the three-term limit: (1) the official was elected for three consecutive terms to the same post; and (2) the official fully served those three consecutive terms. The Court surveyed controlling jurisprudence applying the three-term rule to varied factual contexts: succession by operation of law (Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC; Montebon v. COMELEC), recall elections (Adormeo v. COMELEC; Socrates v. COMELEC), conversion of a municipality into a city (Latasa v. COMELEC), preventive suspension (Aldovino, Jr.), and election protests with differing outcomes (Lonzanida, Ong v. Alegre, Rivera III v. COMELEC, Dizon v. COMELEC). The Court distilled from these authorities that involuntary interruptions—succession by operation of law, defeat in an election protest entailing loss of office, recall election interlude, or judicial ouster prior to completion of the term—may break continuity of service and hence prevent the accumulation of three consecutive full terms, whereas voluntary renunciation and preventive suspension ordinarily do not operate as interruptions for the three-term rule.

Core Legal Question and Analysis

The Court identified the pivotal question as whether service of an unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who was ultimately declared the winner in an election protest should be counted as full service of the term for purposes of the three-term limitation. The Court reasoned that the determinative consideration is title to and the actual right to hold and exercise office during the term. The Court distinguished cases where the protestant actually served the entire term before being ousted—e.g., Ong and Rivera—from cases where the proclaimed winner held office during most of the term and was later declared not entitled. Here, Abundo was not proclaimed and did not hold title at the start of the 2004-2007 term; his opponent, Torres, held and exercised the office from July 1, 2004 until May 8, 2006. Abundo only obtained title and assumed office on May 9, 2006 after the favorable protest resolution and thus

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