Title
Abella vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 100710
Decision Date
Sep 3, 1991
Dispute over Leyte governorship after 1988 elections; Larrazabal disqualified for residency issues, Abella denied proclamation; SC upheld COMELEC ruling.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 100710)

Factual Background

The controversy arose from the February 1, 1988 local elections for Governor of Leyte. Benjamin P. Abella was the official Liberal Party candidate. Emeterio V. Larrazabal was originally the Lakas ng Bansa-PDP-Laban candidate but was disqualified for lack of residence on January 18, 1988. On January 31, 1988 his wife, Adelina Y. Larrazabal, filed a certificate of candidacy in substitution. On election day a petition to disqualify her for alleged false statements regarding residence was filed by Silvestre T. De la Cruz. The provincial canvass proceeded; Larrazabal obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed, but litigation concerning her qualifications continued.

Procedural History through the COMELEC and this Court

A temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on February 4, 1988 enjoining the provincial board of canvassers from proclaiming Larrazabal if she obtained a winning margin. The fully constituted Commission on Elections was remanded the petition on March 1, 1988 to decide whether to maintain or lift the TRO. Abella lodged several canvass objections and intervened in SPC No. 88-546. The COMELEC consolidated related pre-proclamation and disqualification matters. On February 3, 1989 a COMELEC division largely upheld the provincial board of canvassers and dismissed the disqualification case, but the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 88004 reversed and set aside COMELEC’s dismissal and ordered the COMELEC to hear SPC No. 88-546 under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, with authority to maintain or lift the Court’s TRO. The COMELEC then lifted its TRO and Larrazabal was proclaimed and assumed the governorship while the disqualification hearings continued. The COMELEC Second Division, by a 2–1 vote, disqualified Larrazabal in a decision promulgated February 14, 1991; the COMELEC en banc denied reconsideration on July 18, 1991 and disallowed Abella’s proclamation. Both Larrazabal and Abella filed petitions to this Court contesting the COMELEC decisions. This Court issued a TRO on August 1, 1991 to enjoin enforcement of the COMELEC decisions and to restrain Leopoldo E. Petilla from assuming the governorship pending resolution.

Issues Presented

The consolidated petitions raised principally: (1) whether Adelina Y. Larrazabal possessed the legal residence and voter-registration qualifications required to be a candidate and governor of Leyte under Title II, Chapter I, Sec. 42, B.P. Blg. 337 in relation to Art. X, Sec. 12, Philippine Constitution; (2) whether a registered voter of Ormoc City, a component city whose charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial elective officials under Sec. 89, R.A. No. 179, can run for and be elected Governor of Leyte; (3) whether the candidate placing second, Benjamin P. Abella, could lawfully be proclaimed governor upon the disqualification of the first-placer; and (4) whether the COMELEC decision was void by reason of alleged expiration of the term of one commissioner who joined the majority.

Parties’ Contentions

Adelina Y. Larrazabal contended that she was a resident and registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, asserting animus revertendi and that her later physical presence and registration in Ormoc City did not extinguish her domicile in Kananga. She argued that the COMELEC erred in applying Family Code provisions to displace the evidentiary principle of intention in residence determinations and challenged the validity of the COMELEC decision on procedural and membership grounds. Benjamin P. Abella argued that because Section 6, R.A. No. 6646 declares votes for a candidate ultimately disqualified by final judgment to be not counted, the votes cast for Larrazabal should be disregarded and he, as second placer, should be installed. He distinguished the present proceeding from quo warranto cases relied upon by COMELEC and contended those precedents were misapplied. De la Cruz and Abella urged that evidence showed Larrazabal’s residence and registration were in Ormoc City and that her certificate of candidacy contained material misrepresentations.

COMELEC Findings and Reasoning

The COMELEC Second Division found Larrazabal lacked legal residence and registration in Kananga and was a resident and registered voter of Ormoc City from 1975 to the present. The COMELEC discredited Larrazabal’s account of a November 25, 1987 cancellation of registration in Ormoc and a November 28, 1987 registration in Kananga as marked by implausible circumstances and inconsistent documentary serial numbers. The Division applied Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code to infer that spouses normally fix a common domicile and noted documentary evidence, including a lease with option to buy and an Ormoc residence certificate, indicating the Larrazabals’ residence in Ormoc. The COMELEC also construed Sec. 89, R.A. No. 179, together with Art. X, Sec. 12, Philippine Constitution, to mean that component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the province and that such prohibition extends both to voting and to being voted for; thus registered voters of Ormoc City are barred from being elected provincial officials of Leyte.

Supreme Court’s Analysis and Legal Reasoning

The Court reviewed the findings for substantial evidence and accorded COMELEC’s determinations the presumption of regularity and independence in election administration. The Court held that the COMELEC’s factual conclusion that Larrazabal had established residence in Ormoc City and lacked the necessary animus revertendi to Kananga was supported by documentary and testimonial evidence and was therefore binding. The application of the Family Code to infer family domicile when husband and wife live together and present joint indicia of residence was appropriate given the record. The Court rejected Larrazabal’s contention that the question of domicile turned solely on declared intention without regard to such corroborating acts and documents. On the issue of Ormoc City’s status, the Court affirmed the COMELEC’s interpretation of Art. X, Sec. 12, Philippine Constitution and Sec. 89, R.A. No. 179, holding that a component city whose charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial officials is, for purposes of provincial elective offices, independent of the province and that the statutory language “shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte” reasonably encompasses both a prohibition to vote and a prohibition to be voted for. The Court applied established canons of construction to reject Larrazabal’s linguistic argument to the contrary and relied on precedent including Peralta v. The Commission on Elections.

On the contention that Commissioner Flores had no authority when he joined the February 14, 1991 decision because his term had expired, the Court declined to decide any constitutional question unnecessary to the disposition and found the point moot in light of the validity of the decision under the de facto doctrine. The Court observed that, even if his term had technically expired before February 14, 1991, his continued exercise of office carried a color of validity and his official acts remained operative.

Regarding Abella’s claim to the governorship as second-placer, the Court reiterated settled doctrine that when a candidate has been voted for in the sincere belief that he or she was a qualified candidate, the votes are not to be treated as stray or meaningless absent a clear legislative policy to the contrary. The Court applied the

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