Case Summary (G.R. No. 84831)
Petitioner’s Claim and Occupation History
Petitioner asserts continuous, open, and notorious occupation of the 118-square meter portion since 1945 (improvements begun 1945; house enlarged in 1949; store rebuilt 1950; coconut planting 1951). The petitioner characterizes his possession as in the concept of an owner and contends it conferred an equitable right under the Public Land Act that would support reconveyance when title was later issued to Nabasa.
Respondent’s Claim and Title Acquisition
Respondent Nabasa applied for and received a free patent covering Lot 1 (including the disputed 118 sq. m.) and was issued OCT No. P-4140 on September 24, 1974. Nabasa maintains he occupied his claimed portion since about the same period, and that the titling process (including ocular inspection) was regular. Administrative protest by petitioner was dismissed for failure to appear; the land titles were transcribed and registered.
Procedural History
Petitioner filed an action for reconveyance with damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on March 12, 1982. The RTC found for petitioner and ordered reconveyance of 118 sq. m. to Abejaron and the balance to Nabasa. The Court of Appeals reversed on April 26, 1988, declaring Nabasa owner under OCT P-4140; its denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was affirmed in July 1988. Petitioner then sought review by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis
Because the decision date is 2001, the applicable Constitution is the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Relevant statutory law and administrative authority relied upon in the decision include: Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, and further amended by P.D. No. 1073 (which limited Sec. 48(b) prospectively to possession since June 12, 1945). Administrative authority for representation of the Government in land matters is identified under Sec. 35(5), Chapter XII, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Key judicial doctrines referenced are the Susi-Mesina-Herico line (possession under Sec. 48(b) may operate as an effective grant by operation of law) and the contrary Villanueva-Meralco line (that possession under Sec. 48(b) merely creates an inchoate derecho dominical until confirmation).
Legal Issue Presented
Primary legal questions: (1) Whether petitioner established title (or an equitable right) over the disputed 118 sq. m. by virtue of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act; and (2) Whether petitioner had legal standing and was the proper party to maintain an action for reconveyance against the registered patentee.
Rule on Reconveyance and Burden of Proof
An action for reconveyance is the remedy where property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name; reconveyance is available where title is shown to have been fraudulently procured. To prevail on reconveyance based on fraud, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence both (a) his title (or an equitable title sufficient to compel reconveyance) and (b) the fact of fraud in the issuance of the title. Reconveyance does not reopen registration proceedings generally but seeks to show the registered grantee is not the real owner.
Doctrine on Possession of Public Land under Sec. 48(b)
Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act (as amended) provides that persons who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable public agricultural land under bona fide claim for the statutory period are conclusively presumed to have performed conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. The Court surveyed divergent jurisprudence: earlier Susi-Mesina-Herico holdings treated statutory possession that meets Sec. 48(b) as effecting title by operation of law (the land ceases to be public), while Villanueva and Meralco adopted a narrower view treating such possession as an inchoate derecho dominical until formal confirmation. The Court ultimately adhered to the Susi line as reaffirmed in Director of Lands v. IAC and later cases.
Temporal and Statutory Application to the Present Case
P.D. No. 1073 amended Sec. 48(b) to require possession since June 12, 1945 for future applicants. Because petitioner’s thirty-year possession period (alleged 1945–1975) predated P.D. 1073 (effective 1977), the stricter P.D. 1073 requirement did not apply to him; the test remains whether petitioner satisfied the Sec. 48(b) conditions for the pre-P.D. 1073 period.
Evaluation of Evidence on Possession and Title
The Court carefully reviewed the evidentiary record and concluded petitioner failed to prove, by the high standard required, the precise area he possessed since January 24, 1947 (the date pertinent to completing a thirty-year period before 1977). Although petitioner demonstrated existence of improvements (house enlarged in 1949, store rebuilt in 1950, coconut planting in 1951) and long-term occupancy, he failed to establish the metes-and-bounds or the specific portion of Lot 1 he possessed from the statutory cutoff date. Neighbors’ testimony did not supply the “well-nigh incontrovertible” proof necessary when seeking to divest the State’s grant to another. Tax declarations and receipts were dated only from 1950 onward and did not sufficiently corroborate possession dating to the requisite period. Because Lot boundaries were established only after 1970 surveys, the Court found the petitioner’s evidence inadequate to show the exact land area possessed since January 24, 1947 and hence insufficient to vest title by operation of law under Sec. 48(b).
Standing and Real Party in Interest for Reconveyance
The Court held that reconveyance is a remedy for an owner of property erroneously registered in another’s name. Petitioner did not prove ownership or a completed grant; at best he asserted an inchoate or prospective right to apply for confirmation. Precedent establishes that persons without perfected title to public land ordinarily lack standing to seek reconveyance that would result in reversion of land to the State; the proper party to pursue
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 84831)
Nature of the Case and Relief Sought
- Petition for review on certiorari seeking annulment of the Court of Appeals Decision dated April 26, 1988 and Resolution dated July 12, 1988 that reversed the trial court and declared respondent Felix Nabasa owner of the subject lot.
- Underlying action in the Regional Trial Court: action for reconveyance with damages filed by petitioner Pacencio (Pacencio) Abejaron on March 12, 1982, seeking reconveyance of a claimed 118-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, Silway, General Santos City.
- Relief sought in the reconveyance action: declaration of petitioner’s possession and ownership (or equitable right) over the 118-square meter portion, reconveyance deed by respondent, issuance of new TCTs allocating 118 sqm to petitioner’s representative and 57 sqm to respondent, and cancellation of OCT No. P-4140 in respect of the disputed portion.
Factual Background — Possession, Improvements, and Acts Allegedly Establishing Claim
- Petitioner Pacencio Abejaron and family began occupying a portion of the land in 1945, before formal surveys; immediate acts of occupation included fencing the area and constructing a family home and a small store.
- In 1949 petitioner improved his house into a two-storey structure (16 x 18 feet / 87.78 sqm) made of round wood and nipa; this house still stands and occupies a portion of Lot 1 and a portion of adjoining Lot 2 (Lot 2 belongs to petitioner’s daughter, Conchita Abejaron-Abellon).
- In 1950 petitioner rebuilt and expanded the small store; in 1951 he planted five coconut trees on the property and later cultivated banana and avocado trees and installed a pitcher pump; his wife Matilde harvested coconuts from these trees.
- Petitioner declared only his house (not the disputed land) for taxation purposes in 1950, 1966, 1976, and 1978; tax declarations for 1976 and 1978 state the house stands on Lots 1 and 2, Psu 154953; Abejaron paid taxes on the house in 1955, 1966, and 1981.
- Petitioner did not apply for title over the disputed land because he believed it to be public land and therefore unsubject to titling by him.
- Respondent Felix Nabasa occupied and built his house on the remaining 57-square meter portion of Lot 1; petitioner alleges Nabasa began residence in that portion in 1955, while Nabasa at various times testified he had occupied a 12 x 15 m / 180 sqm area since 1945 but elsewhere declared commencement in 1976 (showing inconsistency in Nabasa’s testimony).
- Neighbors (Beatriz Gusila, Alejandra Doria, Pacencia Artigo) testified to arrival dates and observations: Gusila arrived 1949 and confirmed Abejaron already living there; Doria and Artigo arrived 1947 and gave observations about fences and the location of the Abejarons’ house but did not definitively fix occupation to January 24, 1947.
Titling, Administrative Proceedings, and Petitioner’s Administrative Remedies
- While petitioner believed the land public and did not apply for a patent, respondent Nabasa clandestinely applied for and procured Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877 covering Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 and was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-4140 on September 24, 1974.
- Alejandro Abejaron, representing Matilde Abejaron, filed an administrative protest with the Bureau of Lands, Koronadal, which was dismissed on November 22, 1979 for failure to appear at hearings; Alejandro claims notices were not received.
- Alejandro filed a motion for reconsideration (January 10, 1980) and a notice of adverse claim (January 14, 1980); the motion was later treated as an appeal and endorsed to the Director of Lands in Manila on November 24, 1981, but the appeal remained unresolved for a prolonged period.
- The District Land Officer re-transmitted respondent’s patent to the Register of Deeds and the OCT was transcribed in the Registration Book of the Registry of Property of General Santos City on December 13, 1979, leading to issuance of OCT No. P-4140 to Nabasa.
Survey and Expert Evidence
- Geodetic Engineer Abner Lagsub was hired on March 30, 1980 to relocate Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953; his survey measured Lot 1 as 175 square meters.
- Lagsub’s survey showed: 57 sqm of Lot 1 (plus portion of adjoining Lot 3) occupied by Nabasa’s house (fenced partly with hollow blocks and bamboo); 118 sqm occupied by a portion of Abejaron’s house, two coconut trees, and his store; a hollow-block fence separated Abejaron’s 118 sqm from Nabasa’s 57 sqm.
- Lagsub had earlier (1971) conducted a subdivision survey of Psu-154953 for the Silway Neighborhood Association, at which both Nabasa and Matilde Abejaron were present; at the 1971 survey both occupants already occupied the respective areas later designated 118 and 57 sqm.
Trial Court Proceedings and Judgment
- Trial concluded and on September 27, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner Abejaron.
- The trial court declared Abejaron’s possession and occupancy of 118 square meters of Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 in good faith, found inclusion of the 118 sqm in OCT No. P-4140 erroneous, and ordered reconveyance and execution of registerable documents by Felix Nabasa in favor of Pacencio Abejaron (and ultimate issuance of new TCTs to Alejandro Abejaron for 118 sqm and to Nabasa for 57 sqm), directing cancellation of OCT No. P-4140 accordingly.
- The trial court’s judgment further provided that, should Nabasa fail to execute reconveyance upon finality, the Clerk of Court would execute it in his name and the Register of Deeds would issue the new TCTs.
Court of Appeals Ruling and Reasoning
- Respondent Nabasa appealed; the Court of Appeals on April 26, 1988 reversed and set aside the trial court judgment and declared Felix Nabasa as the owner of the lot covered by OCT No. P-4140.
- Key appellate findings and reasons:
- Reconveyance is premised on proof of actual fraud; Abejaron failed to substantiate actual fraud committed by Nabasa in procuring the title.
- There was no proof of irregularity in issuance of title or in proceedings incident thereto; no established claim that fraud intervened; thus the title had become indefeasible (citing Frias v. Esquival).
- Abejaron had in his pleadings and testimony admitted that Nabasa had been occupying the area since 1950, undermining claims of exclusive earlier possession.
- The Bureau of Lands conducted ocular inspection before issuing the title; Abejaron confirmed this.
- Motion for reconsideration to the Court of Appeals was denied (resolution dated July 22, 1988).
Issues Presented to the Supreme Court
- Main assignments of error by petitioner:
- Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not findi