Title
A' Prime Security Services, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Case
G.R. No. 93476
Decision Date
Mar 19, 1993
Security guard repeatedly slept on duty, went AWOL after relief, filed for illegal dismissal; SC ruled abandonment, denied separation pay.
illegal dismissal
separation pay
security guard

Case Summary (G.R. No. 93476)

Procedural and Chronological Anchors

In a request dated September 8, 1988, Asst. Regional Security Officer Alan E. Gentile of the U.S. Embassy sought Lising’s relief as guard supervisor, on the ground that he had been found sleeping while on duty. The petitioner conducted an investigation on September 12, 1988, which it reported as having affirmed that Lising was caught sleeping on duty at least four times. In two sworn statements, however, Lising admitted sleeping on duty only once, on July 16, 1988. The petitioner reported the results to the RRF in a letter dated September 14, 1988, and later issued letters dated September 28, 1988 and October 13, 1988, addressing Lising’s absence without official leave (AWOL) and warning him that failure to report within the grace period would be construed as resignation or abandonment.

Lising filed a complaint on October 13, 1988 for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, and he specifically demanded separation pay and back wages, not reinstatement. On December 14, 1988, Labor Arbiter Oswald B. Lorenzo found illegal dismissal and ordered reinstatement with full back wages, while dismissing the overtime claim for lack of basis. On February 5, 1990, the NLRC modified the ruling: it held that Lising was dismissed for cause, though without due process, and directed the grant of separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, while affirming the dismissal of overtime. After the NLRC denied reconsideration on March 30, 1990, the petitioner sought review by certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in awarding separation pay.

Factual Background: Sleeping on Duty and Subsequent AWOL

The evidentiary starting point was the U.S. Embassy’s request for Lising’s relief as guard supervisor dated September 8, 1988, attributed to sleeping while on duty. The petitioner’s investigation, dated September 12, 1988, allegedly found that Lising was caught sleeping on duty at least four times, even as Lising’s sworn statements admitted only one instance.

In its letter to the RRF dated September 14, 1988, the petitioner stated that Lising’s “services under the contract and other U.S. mission facilities in the Philippines were terminated effective September 7, 1988.” When Lising learned of the request for his relief, the petitioner reported that he went on absence without official leave. The petitioner sent Lising a letter on September 28, 1988, reminding him that he had been AWOL since September 15, 1988, and warning that if he did not return within three days from receipt, he would be considered to have abandoned his work. After Lising returned but was informed he would be transferred to another client, the petitioner reported that he again went on AWOL, prompting another letter dated October 13, 1988, warning anew that failure to report would lead to termination of his services. That same date, instead of reporting for work, Lising filed his complaint for illegal dismissal.

Labor Arbiter’s Ruling

On December 14, 1988, Labor Arbiter Oswald B. Lorenzo ruled that the petitioner was guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered Lising’s reinstatement with full back wages. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the overtime claim for lack of basis. The illegal dismissal finding rested on the Labor Arbiter’s view of the petitioner’s termination action, as reflected in the dispositive outcome.

NLRC’s Modification

On February 5, 1990, the NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The NLRC concluded that Lising was dismissed for cause, but that the dismissal was effected without due process. It thus directed the grant of separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, while affirming the dismissal of the overtime claim.

The petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the NLRC denied on March 30, 1990, leading to the present petition.

The Parties’ Contentions in the Certiorari Proceeding

The petitioner argued that there was no illegal dismissal because it did not terminate Lising’s employment; rather, it allegedly withdrew his assignment at the Clark Air Base at the request of the U.S. Embassy. It maintained that Lising himself severed the employment by abandonment. The petitioner invoked the doctrine that abandonment requires both intent to abandon and overt acts from which such intent may be inferred, and it argued that no formal investigation was needed where the employee had abandoned and refused to return. It also emphasized that when the petitioner wrote on October 13, 1988 expressing willingness to retain Lising provided he reported within three days, Lising instead filed a complaint for illegal dismissal that, significantly, did not seek reinstatement and instead sought separation pay and back wages.

The petitioner further contended that the general rule that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with abandonment did not apply because Lising sought separation pay rather than reinstatement. It posited that the evidence showed that what had been “terminated” was merely the detail or assignment, with the possibility of reassignment preserved, and that Lising refused to be transferred to another client.

Lising agreed with the decision under review. The Solicitor General argued that Lising was not illegally dismissed, and it supported the NLRC’s award of separation pay on grounds described as equity and social justice.

Supreme Court’s Core Determinations on Dismissal, Abandonment, and Management Prerogative

The Court rejected the premise that Lising’s employment had been terminated as an employer-employee relationship. It scrutinized the letter dated September 14, 1988 and held that it did not mean that Lising’s employment was terminated; rather, it showed that only Lising’s detail or assignment to the U.S. facility at Clark Air Base was terminated, with the relief being without prejudice to re-assignment to another client as determined by the petitioner in accordance with its employment agreement.

The Court emphasized that the assignment of personnel is a prerogative of the employer in managing its business. It found nothing in the record indicating that reassignment was used to ease Lising out of employment. It also found no satisfactory reason offered by Lising for refusing transfer to another client.

On these facts, the Court concluded that Lising, by continued AWOL, severed his employment with the petitioner through abandonment. It reasoned that Lising could not be subjected to investigation on the AWOL ground, if it was necessary, because he refused to return to work and simply took “French leave” in effect. Accordingly, the Court held that the petitioner was justified in treating his services as terminated due to his own abandonment.

Whether Separation Pay Could Be Awarded

After determining that Lising had caused his own separation through abandonment, the Court squarely addressed whether separation pay could still be awarded. It restated that separation pay is the amount an employee receives at the time of severance from the service and is meant to provide wherewithal during the period of seeking another employment. It further recited that, under the Labor Code, separation pay is payable when services are validly terminated due to retrenchment, closure of business, or disease. It also acknowledged that separation pay may be awarded as a measure of social justice where an employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those involving moral turpitude, citing prior cases.

The Court acknowledged the observation in PLDT v. NLRC that a security guard found sleeping on the job could be allowed separation pay since the conduct, though inept, was not depraved. However, it held that this doctrine did not apply because, in the case at bar, Lising was not dismissed at all; rather, he caused his own separation by refusing to return to work.

The Court also relied on the petitioner’s communications in determining the circumstances surrounding separation. It quoted a letter dated October 13, 1988 in which the petitioner stated that Lising had been AWOL since October 10, 1988, found his act prejudicial to the interest of the company, and requested that he settle his employme

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