Case Summary (G.R. No. 152343)
Key Dates and Procedural Milestones
- CIR Decision (August 19, 1972): Found A.C. Ransom (Phils.) Corporation guilty of unfair labor practice; ordered cease-and-desist, immediate reinstatement of 22 employees with backwages from July 25, 1969, without loss of seniority rights.
- Supreme Court denial of Ransom’s petition (February 26, 1973): CIR decision affirmed and became final.
- Secretary of Labor clearance to cease operations (effective May 1, 1973; clearance granted June 7, 1973).
- Computation and recomputation of backwages initially P199,276.00 reduced to P164,984.00.
- Repeated motions for execution by the Union (1973–1978) and writs of execution (issued 1976, 1977) unsatisfied.
- Labor Arbiter Order (March 11, 1980): Named seven officers as included parties and directed issuance of writ of execution for P164,984.00 against the corporation and its officers/agents.
- NLRC on appeal: Modified the Labor Arbiter’s order by relieving officers/agents of personal liability for lack of evidence and lack of opportunity to be heard.
- Supreme Court decision (June 10, 1986): Set aside NLRC decision and reinstated Labor Arbiter’s order with modification limiting personal liability to President Ruben Hernandez and subsequent presidents up to corporate termination.
- Final Supreme Court resolution (amended June 1986 dispositive and promulgated May 29, 1987): Denied private respondents’ reconsideration, granted union’s motion in part, and held ROSARIO and surviving private respondents jointly and severally liable; ordered reinstatement or separation pay and made decision immediately executory.
Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis
Governing statutes and regulations relied upon by the Court: CIR Act (CA No. 103) provisions imposing liability on managers/officers who ordered or authorized violations; Industrial Peace Act (RA 875) definition of "employer" to include persons acting in interest of employer; Minimum Wage Law (RA 602) definitions; Article 110 of the Labor Code (worker preference in bankruptcy/liquidation) and implementing Rules and Regulations (Book III, Rule VIII, Sec. 10). Relevant precedents were also cited on piercing the corporate veil where corporations are instruments to perpetrate fraud or evade obligations.
Facts Determinative to Enforcement and Liability
The CIR’s 1972 finding established that A.C. Ransom committed unfair labor practices and ordered reinstatement with backwages. After that decision became final, RANSOM applied for and obtained clearance to cease operations citing financial difficulties. During pendency and after the CIR proceedings, the same family organized ROSARIO (a closed corporation formed in 1969) that used the same plant, personnel, equipment and address. The Union alleged ROSARIO functioned as a successor to avoid liabilities. RANSOM’s assets were encumbered and some sold (machinery and equipment sold in 1975 for P2M), with proceeds allegedly applied to bank obligations. Multiple writs and motions for execution failed to satisfy the award, prompting the Union to seek garnishment against officers and the successor corporation.
Issues Presented
- Whether the officers and agents of RANSOM could be held personally liable for the corporation’s obligation to reinstate the 22 employees and pay backwages.
- Whether ROSARIO, organized and operated by the same family using the same assets and business operations, could be treated as a mere continuation or instrumentality of RANSOM so that its corporate veil should be pierced and ROSARIO held liable.
- Whether the worker-preference rule in case of bankruptcy/liquidation (Article 110 of the Labor Code) gives employees priority entitlement to proceeds from encumbered assets and thus their backwages must be satisfied ahead of other creditors.
Rulings of the Tribunals and the Court’s Reasoning on Officer Liability
The Labor Arbiter treated the CIR’s final judgment as authority to include named officers as parties and issued execution against them. The NLRC reversed this personal liability because it found no evidence that officers exceeded authority and noted they had not been afforded an opportunity to be heard. This Court concluded the NLRC improperly modified a final CIR decision — the CIR had expressly included officers and agents in its remedial command — and that the Labor Arbiter was implementing that final and executory judgment. The Court recognized the general rule that corporate officers are not personally liable for corporate acts but emphasized established exceptions: where corporate form is used to perpetrate fraud, injustice, or to evade existing obligations, the corporate fiction will be disregarded. Applying those principles, the Court held that, given the family-controlled nature of the corporations and the deliberate organization and use of ROSARIO to frustrate payment of employees’ rights, officers and ROSARIO should be held jointly and severally liable with surviving private respondents. The Court earlier (June 10, 1986) limited personal liability to the President(s) as being included in the term "employer," but in the final disposition it extended liability to ROSARIO and the surviving private respondents.
Piercing the Corporate Veil and Successor Liability
The Court relied on precedent recognizing that when corporations are essentially the same economic unit controlled by a single family and used to evade legal obligations, the corporate veil may be pierced and separate entities merged for liability purposes. The facts here — common ownership and management, same facilities and equipment, identical business operations, continuity of personnel and use of the same address — supported the conclusion that ROSARIO was utilized as an instrument to avoid payment of backwages and reinstatement obligations. Consequently, ROSARIO was ordered to reinstate the 22 employees or, alternatively, to provide separation pay (at least one month’s pay or one-half month per year as allowed in the order) if reinstatement was not feasible.
Worker Preference in Bankruptcy and Priority Over Encumbrances
The Court reaffirmed Article 110 of the Labor Code and its implementing rules: unpaid wages due employees before bankruptcy or liquidation enjoy first preference and must be paid in full prior to other creditors asserting claims against employer assets. This priority persists even when employer properties are encumbered by mortgage, thereby creating an automatic first lien for wages above earlier encumbrances. On the facts, proceeds from the sale of RANSOM machinery and equipment should have recognized the workers’ priority claim, and payments to banks or others could not defeat the workers’ statutory preference. The Court rejected claims by heirs or other parties that personal payments to creditors conferred preferential rights over workers’ claims.
Relief Ordered and Computation of Award
The Court affirmed the subject backwages figure fixed for enforcement purposes at P164,984.00 (the recomputed amount used in the Labor Arbiter’s writ of ex
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Case Caption, Citation and Panel
- Reported at 234 Phil. 491; First Division; G.R. No. 69494; decided May 29, 1987.
- Title and parties as given above: A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU (petitioner) versus National Labor Relations and Commission, First Division; A.C. Ransom (Phils.) Corporation and named private respondents (Ruben Hernandez, Maximo C. Hernandez, Jr., Porfirio R. Valencia, Laura H. Cornejo, Francisco Hernandez, Celestino C. Hernandez and Ma. Rosario Hernandez) (respondents).
- Opinion/Resolution authored by Justice Melencio-Herrera.
- Members concurred: Yap (Chairman), Cruz, Paras, and Gancayco, JJ.; Feliciano, J., on leave; Narvasa and Sarmiento, JJ., no part.
Core Judgment of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), August 19, 1972
- CIR rendered a joint Decision (August 19, 1972) finding A.C. Ransom (Philippine) Corporation guilty of unfair labor practices of interference and discrimination.
- Dispositive relief by CIR: order that the corporation, its officers and agents cease and desist from committing the same acts, find the strike legal and justified, and order immediate reinstatement of the affected employees with backwages from July 25, 1969 until actually reinstated, without loss of seniority rights and other employment privileges. (Source underscores the inclusion of officers and agents.) [1]
- The CIR award as to backwages later became the subject of computation and execution proceedings.
Appeal to this Court and Finality of CIR Decision
- Ransom filed a Petition for Review in this Court; this Court denied that petition on February 26, 1973 (G.R. Nos. L-36226-68), thereby affirming the CIR Decision as final, conclusive and executory. The affirmed CIR ruling included liability of the corporation’s officers and agents to implement reinstatement and backwages.
Computation of Backwages; Amounts and Recomputations
- Initial computation by the CIR Examiner of backwages due 22 employees totaled P199,276.00.
- After motions and consideration of employees’ earnings elsewhere during suspension and Ransom’s financial position, a recomputation reduced the award to P164,984.00. [2]
Motions for Execution and Ransom’s Financial Position
- The Union filed successive Motions for Execution: January 27, 1973; March 1, 1973; and others thereafter, seeking enforcement of the backwages award.
- Ransom opposed execution, stressing precarious financial condition and lack of funds to deposit with the court; it asked that earnings of the employees during suspension be deducted from amounts due.
- Writs of execution were issued against Ransom on June 23, 1976, and February 17, 1977, but were ineffectual in satisfying the award.
Clearance to Cease Operations; Timing and Reservation
- Ransom applied for and on April 2, 1973 obtained clearance from the Secretary of Labor; clearance was granted June 7, 1973, effective May 1, 1973, permitting cessation of operations and termination of employment.
- The clearance was expressly granted “without prejudice to the right of subject employees to seek redress of grievances under existing laws and decrees.” [3]
- The stated reason for clearance was Ransom’s financial difficulties incurred prior to 1966.
Allegation and Existence of ROSARIO (Run-away) Corporation
- The Union alleged (Motion for Execution, January 21, 1974) that Ransom’s officers and principal stockholders organized a new corporation, Rosario Industrial Corporation (ROSARIO), using the same equipment, personnel, business stocks and the same place of business, thereby continuing business and evading liabilities.
- Ransom maintained ROSARIO was a distinct and separate corporation organized long before adverse decisions (ROSARIO established in 1969, a closed corporation).
- Factual overlap alleged by the Union and supported by records: ROSARIO and RANSOM engaged in the same line of business, had the same Hernandez family ownership, same officers, same president, same counsel, same address (555 Quirino Avenue, Parañaque, Rizal), and used the same compound, building, plant, equipment, machinery, laboratory and bodega.
- The Union claimed ROSARIO continued to thrive while the CIR award against RANSOM remained unpaid.
Labor Arbiter Tito F. Genilo Order, March 11, 1980
- On December 18, 1978, the Union filed an ex-parte Motion for Writ of Execution and Garnishment, alleging officers/agents personally liable or their estates, due to hiding or shielding corporate assets.
- Labor Arbiter Genilo issued an Order (March 11, 1980) deeming enumerated officers as included parties-respondents in their official capacity and directing issuance of a writ of execution for P164,984.00 against respondent corporation and its enumerated officers/agents:
- a) Ruben Hernandez (President, per testimony August 21, 1974)
- b) Maximo C. Hernandez, Jr. (Director)
- c) Porfirio N. Valencia (Director)
- d) Laura H. Cornejo (Director)
- e) Francisco Hernandez (Chairman of the Board)
- f) Celestino C. Hernandez (Director)
- g) Ma. Rosario Hernandez (Director)
- The Order expressly implemented the already final CIR Decision that had ordered officers and agents liable. [4]
Deaths and Status of Named Private Respondents
- The record notes several deaths among those named in the Genilo Order:
- Ma. Rosario Hernandez died in 1971.
- Maximo Hernandez (named in the CIR Decision) died in 1966.
- Francisco Hernandez died in 1977.
- Celestino C. Hernandez died in 1979.
- These factual circumstances affected enforcement against certain named individuals. [5]
NLRC Decision on Appeal; Modification of Labor Arbiter’s Order
- On appeal the NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter’s Order by relieving the officers and agents of personal liability.
- NLRC’s reasoning: as a general rule, corporate officers are not personally liable for official acts unless they exceed the scope of their authority; there was absence of evidence showing that the officers named in the Labor Arbiter’s Order exceeded their authority; the officers were not given a chance to be heard; therefore the writ of execution could not be enforced against them personally.
- NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s Order except as modified to exclude personal liability of officers/agents. [6]
Petition for Certiorari to this Court; June 10, 1986 Decision by the Supreme Court
- The Union sought reconsideration before the NLRC and, after denial, filed a special civil action of Certiorari to this Court.
- On June 10, 1986, this Court promulgated a Decision setting aside the NLRC Decision and reinstating Labor Arbiter Genilo’s Order of March 11, 1980, with modification:
- Personal liability for backwages due the 22 strikers was limited to Ruben Hernandez (President of Ransom in 1974), jointly and severally with other presidents of the same corporation who had been elected as such after 1972 up to the time corporate life was terminated.
- The Court reasoned that the President should be deeme