128 Phil. 230; 65 OG 14399-E (December, 1969)
The vital issue in this case is whether the dismissal of the eight (8) respondent employees by the petitioner Republic Bank (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning ands intendment of the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875). The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) found it did and its decision is now on appeal before us. The Bank maintains that the discharge was for cause.
The Bank had in its employ the respondents Rosendo T. Resuello, Benjamin Jara, Florencio Allasas, Domingo B. Jola, Diosdado S. Mendiola, Teodoro de la Cruz, Narciso Macaraeg and Mauro A. Rovillos. On July 12, 1958 it discharged Jola and a few days after (July 18, 1958), the rest of respondents, for having written and published "a patently ribelous letter * * * tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt not only of officers and employees of this bank, but also of your employer, the bank itself."
The letter referred to was a lettercharge which the respondents had written to the bank president, demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees. The letter, dated July 9, 1958 is hereunder reproduced in full:
Mr. Ramon Racelis President, Republic Savings Bank M a n i l a "Dear Mr. President: "We, the undersigned, on behalf of all our members and employees of the Republic Savings Bank, who have in our hearts only the most honest and sincere motive to conserve and protect the interest of the institution and its 200,000 depositors, do hereby, demand the much needed resignation of His Excellency, Mr. Ramon Racelis as President and Member of the Board of Directors of the Bank. Mr. President, you have already, in so many occasions, placed the Bank on the verge of danger, that now we deem it right and justifiable for you to leave this Bank and let other more capable presidents continue the work you have not well accomplished. "In the above instance, we are presenting charges which in our humble contention properly justifies incapacity on your part to continue and assume the position as top executive of the huge institution:"(1) That you Mr. President, have tolerated and practiced immorality in this Bank. We have been expecting you to do something about this malpractice which is very disgraceful and affects the morale of the hundreds of your employees. But so far, Mr. President, you have just let this thing passed through. As a matter of fact, you have even promoted these women like Misses Pacita Mato and Edita Castro. These women are of questionable characters, Mr. President, and should have had no place in the Bank as managers or even as mere employees. We know Mr. President, because it is an open secret in the Bank, that you have illicit relations with one of them - Miss Edita Castro. As top officer and as father of the employees of the Bank, you have shown this bad example to your employees. Mr. President, we are really ashamed of you.
(2) That you have allowed the practice of nepotism in this Bank. You have employed relatives of yours like Honorio Ravida; Bienvenido Ravida; Antonio Racelis; Jesus Antonio; and Argentina Racelis. Not only that Mr. President. You have also given those nieces and nephews of yours good positions at the expense of the more capable employees. Mr. President, if we have to mention all of them, one page will not be enough.
(3) With regards to promotion, you have given more preferences to your close relatives. When the Banks advocated the sending of pensionados to States, you have only limited your choice among your nieces, nephews, and quirida, namely Miss Argentina Racelis, Mr. Jesus Antonio, Miss Edita Castro, and her brother-in-law, Mr. Pedro Garcia, Jr. In doing this, Mr. President, you have only lowered the reputation and standing of the Republic Savings Bank. There is really no sense in sending high school and B.S.E. graduates to States to study advanced banking. Because of this silly decision, it took one pensionado six months and cost the Bank a total of P10,000.00 just to study Christmas savings. That subject is very simple; one need not go to States to study savings; that you know full well, Mr. President. The reason why you sent Miss Castro to States was because you were also there. Are we not right?
(4) That you Mr. President, tolerated and still tolerating grave dishonesty in this Bank as evidenced by the following irregularities and anomalies:
"(a) In one of our branches, around P200,000.00 was mulcted and embezzled by a certain Maximo Donado by doctoring the ledgers and records of that particular office. To the present, the amount is still increasing and some more are being dug up from the records everyday ever since its discovery in February 1957. In this case you dismissed Mr. M. Dorado, immediately. But this was all that you did. If you have toe go back to the history of the case, you will find out that your beloved niece and nephews are also involved having been managers of that particular office. Another nephew, the Vice President-Operations, then Vice President Personnel, was also involved for valid reasons that he did not even shift this particular employee to other branches or departments since the beginning when it has been the policy of the Bank to reshuffle its personnel. If you want to know why your good nephew did not transfer this employee, we will tell you. 'Your good nephew has eaten too many baskets of delicious alimango.' Mr. President, if there is someone to be blamed in this particular case, it is your good nephews and nieces for their gross negligence.
"(b) Aside from the one mentioned above, we have also Mr. Rodolfo Francisco, who in April 1955, maliciously withdraw (sic) P970.00 in two withdrawal slips from the account of one depositor in one of our provincial offices, inserting his name as co-depositor in the savings account ledger.
(c) In January 1958 Mr. Jose de los Santos expended an unapproved representation expense in the amount of P300.00 in one of our provincial offices.
(d) Mr. Federico A. Dabu, the ex-cashier and now Personnel Manager, incurred a shortage in the amount of P1,240.00 in the course of the audit on August 3, 1954.
(e) Mr. Jose S. Guevara Vice-President on Personnel have (sic) been accepting bribe moneys. One of these amounts to P4,000.00, which was delivered by a messenger sometime during the last quarter of 1957.
"Mr. President, the anomalies are only a partial list of the irregularities which so far you have not acted upon. This type of people should have been fired out from the Bank; yet, on the contrary, you promoted them to higher and responsible positions, thus, resulting in the demoralization of the more capable employees. "Mr. President, we hope that you have still a littler sense of decency and propriety left. So, for goodsake and for the welfare of the Bank, DO RESIGNS NOW as President and as Member of the Board of Directors of the Republic Savings Bank. Very respectfully yours, (Sgd.) Rosendo T. Resuello President, RSB Supervisors' Union (FFW) (Sgd.) Benjamin Jara Vice-President RSB Supervisors' Unions (FFW) (Sgd.) Florencio Allasas Treasurer, RS Supervisors' Union, FFW) (Sgd.) Domingo B. Jala Chairman, Executive Committee, RSBCopies of this letter were admittedly given to the chairman of the board of directors of the Bank, and the Governor of Central Bank.
At the instance of the respondents, prosecutor A. Tirona filed a complaint in the CIR on September 15 1958, alleging that, the Bank's conduct violated section 4(a) (5) of the Industrial Peace Act which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having filed charges or for having given or being about to give testimony under this Act"
The Bank moved for the dismissal of the complaint, contending that respondents were discharged not for union activities but for having written and published a libelous letter against the bank president. The court denied the motion on the basis of its decision in another case in which it ruled that section 4(a) (5) applies to cases in which an employee is dismissed or discriminated against for having filed "any charges against his employer." Whereupon the case was heard.
In 1960, however, this Court overruled the decision of the CIR in the Royal Interocean case and held that the charge, the filing of which is the cause of the dismissal of the employee, must be related to his right to self-organizations in order to give rise to unfair labor practice on the part off the employer," because "under subsection 5 of section 4(a) the employee's (1) having filed charges or (2) having given testimony or (3) being about to give testimony, are modified by 'under this Act' appearing after the last item." The Bank therefore renewed its motion to dismiss, but the court held the motion in abeyance and proceeded with the hearing.
On July 4, 1962 the court rendered a decision finding the Bank guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering it to reinstate the respondents, with full back wages and without loss of seniority and other privileges. This decision was affirmed by the court en banc on
Relying upon Royal Interocean Lines v. CIR and Lakas ng Pagkakaisa sa Peter Paul v. CIR, the Bank argues that the court should have dismissed the complaint because the discharge of the respondents had nothing to do with their union activities as the letter in fact admitted at the lettering that the writing of the letter-charge was not a "union action" but merely their "individual" act.
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admissions of the respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge, trey were nonetheless protected for they were engaged it a concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, interference width whim constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 4(a)(1). This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union acclivity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated.
Indeed, when the respondents complained against nepotism, favoritism and other management practices, they were acting within an area marked out by the Act as a proper sphere of collective bargaining. Even the reference to immorality was not irrelevant as it was made to support the respondents' other charge that the bank president had failed to provide wholesome working conditions, let alone a good moral example, for the employees by practicing discrimination and favoritism in the appointment and promotion of certain employees on the basis of illicit relations or blood relationship with them.
In many respects, the case at bar is similar to National Labor Relations Board v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurances Co. The issue in that case was whether an insurance company was guilty of an unfair labor practice in interfering with this right of concerted activity by discharging two agents employed in a branch office. The cashier of that office had resigned. The ten agents employed there held a meeting and agreed to join in a letter to the home office objecting to the transfer to their branch office of a cashier from another branch office to fill the position. They discussed also the question whether to recommend the promotion of the assistant cashier of their office as the proper alternative. They then chose one of their member to compose a draft of the letter and submit it to them further discussion, approval and signature. The agent selected to write the letter and another were discharged for their activities in this respect as being, so their notices stated completely unpleasant and far beyond the periphery of their responsibility. In holding the company liable for unfair labor practice, the Circuit Court of Appeals said:
A proper construction is that the employees shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection even though no union activity be involved, or collective bargaining be contemplated. Here Davis and Johnson and other salesmen were properly concerned with the identity and capability of the new cashier. Conceding they had no authority to appoint a new cashier or even recommend anyone for the appointment, they had a legitimate interest in acting concertedly in making known their views to management without being discharged for that interest. The moderate conduct of Davis and Johnson and the others bore a reasonable relation to conditions of their employment. It was therefore an unfair labor practice for respondent to interfere with the exercise of the right of Davis and Johnson and the other salesmen to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection.Other members of this Court agree with the SIR that the Blanks conduct violated section 4(a)(5) which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to dismiss an employee for having filed charges under the Act.
Some other members of this Court believe, without necessarily expressing approval of the way the respondents expressed their grievances, that what the Bank should have done was to refer the letter-charge to the grievance committee. This was its duty, failing which it committed an unfair labor practice under section 4(a)(6). For collective bargaining does not end with the execution of an agreement. It is a continuous process. The duty to bargain imposes on the parties during the term of their agreement the mutual obligation "to meet and confer promptly and expeditiously and to good faith * * * for the purpose off adjusting any grievances or question arising under such agreement and a violation of this obligation is, by section 4(a)(6) and (b)(3) an unfair labor practice. As Professors Cox and Dunlop point out:
"Collective bargaining * * * formally takes the fort of negotiations when major conditions of employment to be written into an agreement are under consideration and of grievance committee meetings and arbitration when questions arising in the administration of an agreement are at stake.Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances. Good faith bargaining required of the Bank an open mind and a sincere desire to negotiate over grievance. The grievance committee, created in the collective bargaining agreements would have been an appropriate forum for such negotiation. Indeed, the grievance procedure is a part of the contiguous process of collective bargaining. It is intended to promote, as it were, a friendly between labor and management as a means of maintaining industries peace.
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of organization of employees is not unlimited, as the right of employer to discharge for cause is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of employer to select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering the countervailing right of self-organization. But the difficulty arises in determining whether in fact the discharges made because of such a separable cause or because of some other activities engaged in by employees for the purpose of collective bargaining.
It is for the CIR, in the first instance, to make the determination, "to weigh the employer's expressed motive in determining the effect on the employees of management's otherwise equivocal act." For the Act does not undertake the impossible task of specifying in precise and unmistakable language each incident which constitutes an unfair labor practice. Rather, it leaves to the court the work of applying the Act's general prohibitory language in the light of infinite combinations of event, which may be charged as violative of its terms. As the Circuit Court of Appeals puts it:
"Determining the legality of a dismissal necessarily involves an appraisal of the employer's motives. In these cases motivations are seldom expressly avowed, and avowals are not always candid. There thus must be a measure of reliance on the administrative agency knowledgeable in labor-management relations and on the Trial Examiner who receives the evidence firsthand and is therefore in a unique position to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Where Examiner and Board are in agreement there is an increased presumption in favor of their resolution of the issue."What we have just essayed underscores at once the difference between Royal Interocean and Lakas ng Pagkakaisa on the one hand and this case on the other. In Royal Interocean, the employee's letter to the home office, for writing which she was dismissed, complained of the local manager's "inconsiderate and untactful attitude"-- a grievance which, the court found "had nothing to do with or did not arise from her union activities." Nor did the court find evidence of discriminatory discharge in Lakas ng Pagkakaisa as the letter, which the employee wrote to the mother company in violation of the local company's rule, denounced "wastage of company funds." In contrast, the express finding of the court in this case was that the dismissal of the respondents was made on account of the letter they had written, in which they demanded the resignation of the bank president for a number of reason touching labor-management relations -- reasons which not even the Bank's judgment that the respondents had committed libel could excuse it for making summary discharges in disregard of its duty to bargain collectively.
In final sum and substance, this court is in unanimity that the Banks conduct, identified as an interference with the employee right of self-organization, or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of July 4,1962 and resolution of August 9,1962 of the Court of Industrial Relations are affirmed, at petitioners cost.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles JJ., concur. Mariano v.
Note 2, supra.
G.R. No. L-10130,
Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act provides: "Employees Right to Self-Organization. Employees shall have the rights self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organization of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. Individuals employed as supervisors shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of employees under their supervision but may form separate organization of their own."
Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 416 (1949).
167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1948).
Industrial Peace Act, sec 13.
NLRB v. Highland Shoe, Inc., 119 F.2d 218 (1st Cir. 1941 NLRB v. Bachelder, 120 P.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1941).
The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term of an Existing Agreement, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1097, 1105 (1950).
Cf. id. at 1110.
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); accord, United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324
E.g ., Philippine Educ. Co. v.
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW 346
NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 13.
NLRB v. M & B Headwear Co., 349 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1965
See second Royal Interocean case, G.R. No. L-12429,
"Considering the actualities of the collective bargaining and grievance procedures, we think the employer must realize that far-fetched and overstated claims, easily dissuadable, are often made initially by one side in a labor dispute (especially when it is inexperienced in labor relations). Such claims may well evaporate on discussion and negotiation, and never become an integral part of the union's real purposes. We think that the employer cannot seize upon this kind of claim -- made by ignorant workers in their initial demands -- in order to justify retaliatory measures against them. He must make some effort to find out if the employees mean in fact to pursue these claims to stick to demands which are not protected by sec. 7. Summary discharge seems especially premature here." NLRB v. Electronics Equip.
Cf. Abaya v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-25641,