"In Civil Case No. 163, it appeared during the whole proceedings that the question of OWNERSHIP and the illegality of the collection of rentals were presented as vital questions of law. The question of possession therefore, cannot properly be determined without settling that of ownership and when it appeared that the plaintiff is not and cannot be the owner of said foreshore land on the date of the hearing, even with her application submitted and her subleasing same being contrary to law, then the jurisdiction of the COURT IS LOST and the ACTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED. The moment she subleased the foreshore land, which she had merely applied for, she placed her ownership in serious 'jeopardy and her ownership and possession becomes questionable and her act of collecting rents on a land that is not yet hers is likewise questionable. She not being the owner as yet of. the property, and not knowing that she would be one, and coupled with her action of collecting illegal rents and/or subleasing the land in violation of law which would 'cause the disapproval of her application, which in fact was disapproved, makes the case one of ownership and thus cause the judge to have no jurisdiction and these facts being admitted, the Judge in hearing the case did it in EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. The lower court in the light of the facts stated above should have dismissed the ease for lack of jurisdiction and in trying the case did it in excess of jurisdiction.
Premises considered, the Court hereby gives due course to the petition for Certiorari and likewise believes and hereby declares that the lower court in trying the case under the facts existing and admitted by the parties, did it in EXCESS OF JURISDICTION and orders that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 163 is without any legal force and effect.
* * * * * * *
Hence this appeal.
We believe that the lower court erred on two counts:
First.It held that the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction, the issue being the ownership of Paz Bayot. This is error. The issue was the right of Mrs. Bayot as lessee of the Governmentnot ownership. She did not claim to be the owner of the foreshore land. And Qra-a did not maintain he was the owner. There was, therefore, no question of ownership which was beyond the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace. The right to recover detained land was the only issue. And the justice of the peace had jurisdiction to pass on that issue.
Second.It entertained the certiorari petition although it was clear that Ora-a's remedy was to appeal from the decision of the justice of the peace. The complaint by its terms, was one of detainer. It described a contract of sublease, rents paid, subsequent default and refusal to vacate. It was, therefore, cognizable by the justice of the peace.[1] The defense sought to question the right of Bayot to sublease, on the alleged ground that the land was public land, and her application for lease for the same had not yet been approved by the Government.
Such defense did not set up ownership as issue. As stated, the defendant does not claim ownership in himself, and the plaintiff did not allege ownership in herself. She asserted the rights of a lessee of the Government and wanted to eject Ora-a as sub-lessee.
In the circumstances it was, at least, doubtful that Ora-a could deny the right of Bayot to let him occupy the land as sub-lessee. The conclusive legal presumption says that the lessee may not deny the lessor's title at the beginning of the lease.[2] And there's no reason not to apply the same rule between sub-lessee and sub-lessor.
At any rate, the question whether the lease application of Bayot had been approved, was a question of fact which the justice of the peace had to decide; and his decision should have been appealed to the court of first instance. The error of said municipal judge in deciding itif anydid not have the effect of depriving his court of the jurisdiction already acquired by it by the filing of the complain, which was admittedly, in form and allegation one for illegal detainer.
"Whether title is necessarily involved in an action for forcible entry and detainer is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence presented by both parties at the trial, and that question can be reviewed only on appeal and not by certiorari proceedings in Court of First Instance. (Moran, Rules of Court (1963 Ed.) Vol. 3, p. 279, citing Alviar vs. Pampolina, 84 Phil. 45; and De los Reyes vs. Elepano, L-3466, Oct. 13, 1950"
By the way, the alleged illegality of the sub-lease does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
The appealed order is reversed, and the petition for certiorari is denied, with costs against appellee.
Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
[1] Daquioro vs. Vda. de Atas, 71 Phil. 120.
[2] Sec, 67 (b), Rule 123, Rules of Court.